[认识老美思维模式]: 在阿富汗问题上如何推其他国家下脏水
[译文]
把地区有影响力的国家卷入阿富汗: 威胁和机会
背景:
这份报告是2009年10月15日"后冲突重建方案" 的一个专家会议的结果, 讨论焦点集中在该地区有份量有影响力的国家 ─ 主要是中国, 印度,
伊朗, 俄国和沙地阿拉伯 ─ 在促进该地区稳定的角色, 出席会议的包括许多政府官员和非政府组织专家,
他们提出每个国家目前正在如何被卷入阿富汗和巴基斯坦， 地区利益是什么， 每个国家如何能参与建立一个有效的区域战略的工作。
报告概括了会议的重要结论和突出了进一步研究的途径。
主要问题:
1每一个在该地区有份量有影响力的国家在阿富汗的国家利益是什么 ?
2 现时这些国家在阿富汗和巴基斯坦的维持稳定问题上, 作出过什么努力?
3 什么样的国家利益会跟在阿富汗的区域合作有矛盾?
4 每一个在该地区有份量有影响力的国家能为促进区域整合和重建努力 作出什么贡献?
5 该地区的其他国家, 能提供什么奖励以促进每个国家担任一个更加积极的角色?
国家研究专家:
中国 - 安德鲁 斯摩 (Andrew Small) ，德国马歇尔基金会 (German Marshall Fund) 的跨大西洋研究员
印度 - 特雷西塔谢弗 (Teresita Schaffer) ，美国国际战略研究中心 (CSIS) 的南亚项目主任
伊朗 - 阿明塔尔兹( Amin Tarzi) ，海军陆战队大学(Marine Corps University) 中东研究主任
俄罗斯 - 安德鲁库钦斯 (Andrew Kuchins) ，美国国际战略研究中心(CSIS) 的俄罗斯和欧亚项目主任
沙特阿拉伯 - 弗兰克安德森 (Frank Anderson) ，中东政策委员会(Middle East Policy Council)主席
关于中国
中国应该扩大它的在该地区所担任的角色以积极利用它在巴基斯坦特 有的影响和提高它在阿富汗的投资,
中国对阿富汗的政策定义仍然狭隘, 政策主要集中在支持联合国任务的财政支持, 保护中国在该地区的投资, 工作人员,
和跟巴基斯坦保持一个强大的同盟, 中国已经公开表示顾意作出更多贡献, 但是还在等候着一个明确的战略,
这个在中国政策上的缝隙代表着一个把中国卷入该区域担任一个更加 有建设性的角色的机会。
中国想要阿富汗稳定为的是促进其自身的经济与安全利益， 并保障其与巴基斯坦结盟。中国受益于阿富汗的铜，铁，黄金和铀矿 - 她在艾纳克铜矿的35亿美元投资是阿富汗最大的基础设施项目。
中国显然更愿意阿富汗稳定, 好使这些投资项目得以继续。此外， 中国还大规模投资巴基斯坦并与巴政府和军方在历史性的密切关系。 因为在巴基斯坦的安全问题不断恶化的形势下, 中国也受影响, 从绑架和杀害中国工程师可以看到这怎样影响着它输出的劳动人口。
然而, 中国的参与程度受制于它自己的国家利益。 虽然中国想看见美国成功地稳定阿富汗, 它也担心美国或联合国在该地区的长期存在。
中国的分析师预测美国军事基地好几十年长期在中国边界附近存在会 导致美国控制该地区, 还有的就是警告对中国造成围堵的可能。
中国也想保存它对国际恐怖活动相对性的免疫能力, 因为如果中国在阿富汗更加活跃, 可能会变成国际恐怖活动的袭击目标, 而且它也不想冒险激怒自己的穆斯林少数民族。
尽管有这些限制, 这些也是捉中国加入地区战略的布局的很好机会, 我们可以鼓励中国刺激阿富汗的经济, 这个同时地也是有利于中国的,
更重要的是稳定巴基斯坦对中国最为有利; 当中国可能不顾意在一个多边论坛上跟巴基斯坦周旋,
鼓励它跟巴基斯坦双方共同致力在他们的经济利益所在之处实现稳定 , 毫无疑问是可以做到的。
关于印度
印度在阿富汗的介入一定要打造成一个三国的战略, 搬巴基斯坦到桌上去以缓和国家安全问题的考虑。
印度承认一个稳定的阿富汗对于捍卫它的边界和防止恐怖活动溢到它 的领土去是至关重要, 最近在喀布尔印度大使馆的攻击说明印度对伊斯兰教的恐怖活动是多 么易受攻击的, 如果阿富汗落在塔利班手上, 这种对攻击的敏感性将会恶化, 这种情况是印度要不惜一切代价来避免的。当然， 在塔利班政权被推翻后, 印度已经大大增强对阿富汗的介入, 自从2001年开始, 于重建项目花费了超过1.2 亿美元, 印度是该地区给阿富汗的最大捐献者。
印度也有兴趣利用阿富汗来作为一个得到中亚能源的潜在贸易通道, 已经在寻求跟中亚各国的能源合作。
这种积极的卷入证明印度可以是在该地区内一个有价值的重要国家, 但是一定要小心评估印度在阿富汗日益增长的介入程度,
巴基斯坦已经难以置信地怀疑印度在阿富汗的角色, 如果不正确处理, 印度介入所带来的将会是不稳多于稳。
阿富汗的战略地位在于沿着巴基斯坦那多麻烦的南方边界, 在那里, 印度被指控援助俾路支民族主义者分离主义运动, 印度在阿富汗开设了四家领事馆,
在赫拉特，马扎里沙里夫，贾拉拉巴德和坎大哈, 自从2006年, 印度部署了它的准军事部队守护它在阿富汗的工人, 在2007年,
印度在塔吉克斯坦开设了它第一个海外空军基地, 这些活动都大大提高了巴基斯坦对被印度入侵的恐惧。
阿富汗一直以来都是印巴之间一场博弈中的棋子, 自从2001年起, 敌对变得状态紧张化, 一些分析家警告阿富汗可能变成新的克什米尔。
对巴基斯坦来说, 阿富汗是伊斯兰势力地带, 有利于跟印度保持一定距离; 对印度来说, 阿富汗是一个处于战略位置上的盟友，给它在巴基斯坦搅事的能力, 在某种程度上, 这比在克什米尔抗击巴基斯坦便宜得多。 当印度在阿富汗的影响力不断的日益增长, 巴基斯坦视塔利班为一个有效制衡印度在阿富汗影响力的一个力量, 所以将继续对塔利班对冲下注。
虽然印度在阿富汗的介入提供有利益的, 这种介入必须在一个印度, 巴基斯坦和阿富汗的三角关系下发生。 把印度和巴基斯坦一起带到桌上可能有点困难, 但这是稳定阿富汗的一个中心的的要素。
关于伊朗
如果伊朗跟美国和北约的紧张局势升级, 这个国家在该区的潜在有利角色, 一定要跟它可以起的不稳定作用一起衡量。
积极参与主导阿富汗对伊朗至关重要的利益, 伊朗已经变得更加大规模地介入该地区的事务。
自从2001年起, 伊朗积极参与阿富汗的重建, 特别是在接近它的边界的地方, 它慷慨提供经济援助, 给阿富汗货物的进口税打1折,
伊朗和阿富汗之间的贸易频繁, 2008年几乎相等于十亿美元, 还有望继续增加。此外, 伊朗深受来自阿富汗的严重贩毒问题影响,
已经在该区进行扫毒行动, 反过来阿富汗也热衷于与跟伊朗保持密切关系, 它视伊朗, 如印度一样, 为一份反冲巴基斯坦影响力的潜在力量。
伊朗有时被指责为给塔利班和沿着阿富汗与巴基斯坦边界地区的极端 主义组织提供武器, 在阿富汗已经发现一些伊朗武器的证据, 但是不清楚是伊朗政府正式介入还是由伊朗境内的第三者和流氓分子 走私进去的, 一些分析家争辩说虽然伊朗不支持塔利班重执政权
的, 但是在阿富汗推进"受控的不稳定"政策足以使美军陷于泥淖, 重要的是,
必需记得早在1996年伊朗已经谴责塔利班羞辱了伊斯兰教， 1998年伊朗和塔利班政权之间的敌意几乎升级为军事冲突。 即使不谈核问题,
以阿富汗问题为了关注点, 美国跟伊朗改善关系的潜力是很高的, 相反, 如果美国政策变得敌对和对抗性的,
伊朗一样可以利用阿富汗来回敬美国和北约的军事力量。 伊朗还记得上次支持美国在阿富汗的努力, 却被布希班子定性为是邪恶轴心,
这一次，伊朗正在考虑怎样充分地嵌入更广泛的地区维稳战略， 不是这样, 它是不可能合作的。
关于俄罗斯
要把俄罗斯和中亚各国带到一起互相对话以缓和国家间的安全问题的 恐惧和以发展北方输送网络和其他贸易路线推动前进, 阿富汗是美俄利益最紧密结合起来的一个领域。
俄罗斯需要一个更加和平的阿富汗以阻止可以在俄国起不稳定作用的 极端主义溢进各跟阿富汗有部落和文化关系的中亚共和国。
然而, 与此同时, 俄罗斯感到地位低下,
甚至因美军在该地区存在而感到威胁, 一个主要的例子是在吉尔吉斯坦宣布决定在2009年初逐美军出境 后, 俄罗斯马上提供大量的金钱援助,
俄罗斯想要在中亚占有主导地位, 中亚各国进一步使这种关系变得复杂, 乌兹别克相信俄罗斯想要搅活阿富汗的不稳定元素,
以证明俄军在该地区存在的必要, 这种不安全也阻止中亚各国南方运输走廊的扩张, 使它们只好依赖俄罗斯控制的通道。
跟俄罗斯做点缓和它对美国控制中亚的恐惧的工作, 是确保两国在阿富汗问题上加强合作的关键。跟中亚各国对话,
使他们明白合作的利益同样是他们切身的利益。 一如美国决定是否增兵一样,
在阿富汗能否成功也有赖于透过把物资本从俄罗斯和中亚各国运抵阿 富汗的北方输送网络。由于在这条通道那里还有许多纽结,
美国必需跟俄罗斯和中亚各国在这供给线上加强合作。
关于沙特阿拉伯
沙特阿拉伯可以领导跟塔利班的谈判和运用它对巴基斯坦的影响力, 沙特阿拉伯介入阿富汗事务, 已经有一段很长的历史, 在八十年代,
跟美国和巴基斯坦援助圣战战士打败苏联, 911后, 基于国际压力, 沙特阿拉伯断绝了与塔利班的关系，也跟本拉丹闹翻了。然而,
沙特阿拉伯跟阿富汗新政府的关系显著地改善, 2002年沙特在喀布尔重开它的大使馆, 在该地区的人道援助和投资兴趣明显增加,
沙特阿拉伯必然也有兴趣扩展它在阿富汗的影响力, 那里被视为传播伊斯兰教瓦哈比宗派的肥沃土壤, 和对伊朗影响的制衡。
沙特阿拉伯担当着跟塔利班作中介谈判的角色, 还有, 它声称它几乎有能力完全切断从沙特阿拉伯民间流进基地组织和它的 附属去的资金提供。
沙特阿拉伯也是巴基斯坦的主要投资采访者和盟友, 它可以以这个角色发挥杠杆作用, 说服巴基斯坦采取更多措施解决地区问题, 争取塔利班内一些软一点的, 意识形态比较弱一点的成员同意谈判。
共同的利益和威胁感
讨论显示对地区和广泛的国际社会阿富汗都有许多国家利益和共同关 注, 这些共同关注可以作为形成地区会议和组织团体的根本, 例如一个官方的接触团体,
在共同关注问题上(例如, 贩毒, 难民, 极端主义) 或者总括这些问题为一个更大的议事的一部分, 组织各国一起合作参与;
促进地区贸易也可帮助诱使该地区的主要国家担任一个更加积极的角 色, 与此同时, 好些国家对美国在该地区的政策变得日益多疑,
当美国在议决应当应否对阿富汗作出进一步的投入和承担, 别的国家也在对冲他们的赌注, 对许多地区有份量有影响力的国家来说, 一旦美国离开,
卷入阿富汗的博弈就不再有任何价值。
原文:
Engaging Regional Players in Afghanistan: Threats and Opportunities
Background
This
report is the result of an experts meeting hosted by the Post-Conflict
Reconstruction (PCR) Project on October 15, 2009. The discussion
focused on the role of regional players in Afghanistan and Pakistan –
primarily China, India, Iran, Russia, and Saudi Arabia – in promoting
stability in the region. It was attended by a number of government
officials and non-governmental experts, who underscored how each country
is currently involved in Afghanistan and Pakistan, what the regional
interests are, and how each country can be engaged to work towards an
effective regional strategy. This report summarizes the key conclusions
from the meeting and highlights avenues for further research.
Key Questions
1. What are the national interests of each regional player in Afghanistan?
2. What are regional players currently doing to promote stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan?
3. What national interests may contradict regional cooperation on Afghanistan?
4. What can each regional player bring to the table to promote regional integration and
reconstruction efforts?
5. What incentives can other players offer to induce each country to play a more positive role?
Country Experts
China – Andrew Small, Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund
India – Teresita Schaffer, Director of the South Asia Program at CSIS
Iran – Amin Tarzi, Director of Middle East Studies at the Marine Corps University
Russia – Andrew Kuchins, Director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at CSIS
Saudi Arabia – Frank Anderson, President of the Middle East Policy Council
The Role of Regional Players in Afghanistan
On China
China should expand its role in the region to actively use its
unique influence over Pakistan and advance its investment interests in
Afghanistan.
China’s policy on Afghanistan remains narrowly
defined. The policy focuses mostly on financial support for the UN
mission, protecting China’s investments and personnel in the region, and
maintaining a strong alliance with Pakistan. China is publicly willing
to contribute more but is waiting on a clear strategy. This gap in
China’s policy represents an opportunity to engage China to play a more
constructive role in the region.
China wants stability in Afghanistan in order to further its own economic and security
interests,
as well as to safeguard its alliance with Pakistan. China is benefiting
from the copper, iron, gold and uranium deposits in Afghanistan – its
$3.5 billion investment in the Aynak copper mine is Afghanistan’s
largest infrastructure project. China obviously prefers stability in
Afghanistan so that these investment projects can continue. Moreover,
China has large-scale investments in Pakistan and a historically strong
relationship with the Pakistani government and military. It is therefore
affected by the deteriorating security-situation in Pakistan, which is
affecting its own migrant laborers, as demonstrated by the kidnapping
and killing of Chinese engineers. China’s level of engagement will
remain constrained, however, by its own national interests. Although
China wants to see the United States successfully stabilize Afghanistan,
it is also wary of a long-term U.S. or NATO presence. Chinese analysts
predict U.S. domination of the region and warn of possible encirclement,
with U.S. bases remaining near China’s borders for decades. China also
wants to preserve its relative immunity from international terrorism,
which it may become the target of if it is more active in Afghanistan.
It also does not want to risk angering its own Muslim minorities.
Despite these constraints, there remain significant opportunities for bringing China on
board
with a regional strategy. China can be encouraged to spur economic
development in Afghanistan, which would be simultaneously beneficial for
China. Most importantly, it is in China’s best interest to stabilize
Pakistan. While China may be unwilling to deal with Pakistan in a
multilateral forum, it could certainly be encouraged to work with
Pakistan bilaterally to achieve stability where their economic interests
lie.
On India
India’s
engagement in Afghanistan must be crafted as a three-player strategy,
bringing Pakistan to the table to alleviate national security concerns.
India
recognizes that a stable Afghanistan is vital for safeguarding its
borders and preventing terrorism from spilling over into its territory.
The recent attacks on the Indian embassy in Kabul illustrate how
vulnerable India is to Islamic terrorism. This susceptibility to attack
would aggravate if Afghanistan were to fall to the Taliban, a scenario
that India wants to avoid at all costs. Certainly, India has made its
presence in Afghanistan substantially stronger since the toppling of the
Taliban regime. India is the largest regional donor to Afghanistan,
spending over $1.2 billion in reconstruction since 2001. India is also
interested in using Afghanistan as a potential trade route to
access Central Asian energy, and is already pursuing energy cooperation
with the Central Asian states. This active involvement proves that India
can be an extremely valuable regional player. India’s increasing
presence in Afghanistan, however, must be carefully assessed. Pakistan
is incredibly suspicious of India’s role in Afghanistan and therefore,
if not managed correctly, Indian involvement could be more destabilizing
than stabilizing. Afghanistan is strategically located along the
troublesome southern Pakistani border, where India has been accused of
aiding separatist movements amongst Balochi Nationalists. India has
opened four consulates in Afghanistan, in Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif,
Jalalabad, and Kandahar. Since 2006, India has deployed its own
paramilitary force to guard its workers in Afghanistan, and in 2007
India opened its first military
airbase overseas in Tajikistan. These activities have greatly augmented Pakistan’s fears of encroachment by India.
While
Afghanistan has long been a pawn in the game between India and
Pakistan, the rivalry has intensified since 2001, and some analysts warn
that Afghanistan may become the new Kashmir. For Pakistan, Afghanistan
is a zone of Islamist influence useful to keep India at bay; for India,
Afghanistan is a strategically located ally, giving it the power to
stir up trouble in Pakistan, in a way that is cheaper than engaging
Pakistan in Kashmir. While India’s influence in Afghanistan continues to
grow, Pakistan will continue to hedge its bets on the Taliban, seeing
the Taliban as an effective
counter-weight to the Indian influence in Afghanistan.
Therefore, although India's engagement in Afghanistan offers gainful opportunities, this
engagement must take place as a three-way relationship between India,
Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Bringing Pakistan and India to the table
together may be difficult, but is one of the most central elements to
stability in Afghanistan.
On Iran
Iran’s
potentially beneficial role in the region must be weighed against the
destabilizing role it could play if its tensions with the U.S. and NATO
countries were to escalate.
Iran has vital interests in being a
dominant player in Afghanistan, and has become significantly more
involved in the region. Since 2001, Iran has taken an active part in
reconstruction in Afghanistan, particularly in the areas close to its
border. It has provided generous amounts of economic assistance,
granting Afghan goods a 90 percent discount on import duties. Trade
between Iran and Afghanistan is high, equaling almost $1 billion in
2008, and is expected to increase. Moreover, Iran is seriously affected
by the high level of drug trafficking from Afghanistan, and is working
to combat the drug problems in the region. Reciprocally, Afghanistan is
also keen on having strong ties with Iran. It sees Iran, like India, as a
potential counterweight to
Pakistani influence.
Iran has
sometimes been accused of supplying weapons to the Taliban and other
extremist groups operating along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Some
evidence of Iranian weapons in Afghanistan has been discovered, but it
is unclear if the Iranian government is formally involved or if the
weapons are being smuggled in by third parties and rogue elements within
Iran. Some analysts argue that Iran is promoting a policy of “managed
instability” in Afghanistan to keep U.S. forces bogged down, although
Iran would not favor a return of the Taliban. It is important to recall
that Iran denounced the Taliban as early as 1996 deeming it an affront
to Islam, and hostility
between Iran and the Taliban government almost escalated to a military conflict in 1998.
The
potential for improving U.S.-Iranian relations by focusing on
Afghanistan is high, even if the nuclear issue is not part of the
discussion. In contrast, if U.S. policy becomes more hostile and
confrontational, Iran may well use Afghanistan to target U.S. and NATO
forces in response. Iran also remembers how it was received the last
time it supported U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, by being deemed part of
the "axis of evil" by the Bush administration. This time, Iran is
looking to be fully integrated into the wider regional strategy for
stabilization, without which it is unlikely to cooperate.
On Russia
Russia
and the Central Asian states must be brought to dialogue with one
another to alleviate national security fears and move forward with
developing the Northern Distribution Network and other trade routes.
Afghanistan is an area where U.S.-Russian interests most closely align.
Russia needs a more peaceful
Afghanistan in order to prevent
extremism from spilling over into the Central Asian Republics – which
are tribally and culturally linked to Afghanistan – all of which could
play a destabilizing role in Russia.
Simultaneously, however,
Russia feels sidelined and even threatened by the U.S. military presence
in the region. A key example of this is the way in which Russia offered
large sums of financial aid to Kyrgyzstan as it announced its decisions
to evict U.S. troops earlier in 2009. Russia wants to be the dominant
player in Central Asia. The Central Asian states further complicate this
relationship. Uzbekistan believes that Russia wants to provoke
instability in Afghanistan in order to justify Russian military presence
in the region. This insecurity also prevents the expansion of southern
transit corridors for Central Asian exports, leaving it dependent on
routes controlled by
Russia.
Working with Russia to alleviate
fears of U.S. domination in Central Asia is key to ensuring greater
cooperation on Afghanistan. Dialogue with the Central Asian states to
make them understand the benefits of cooperation is similarly vital. As
the U.S. decides whether or not it will increase troop levels, success
in Afghanistan will also depend on the new Northern Distribution Network
which allows resources to reach Afghanistan though Russia and Central
Asia. As there are still a number of kinks in this route, the United
States will have to work with Russia and the Central Asian states to
increase cooperation on the supply line.
On Saudi Arabia
Saudi
Arabia can lead negotiations with the Taliban, and exercise influence
over Pakistan Saudi Arabia has a long history of engagement in
Afghanistan having worked alongside the United States and Pakistan to
aid the Mujahedeen in defeating the Soviets in the 1980s. Post 9/11
Saudi Arabia severed its ties with the Taliban due to international
pressure and a falling out with bin-Laden. Saudi relations with the new
Afghan government have markedly improved, however, with Saudi reopening
its embassy in Kabul in 2002, increasing humanitarian assistance, and
expressing
interest in investing in the region. Certainly, Saudi Arabia is also
interested in expanding its influence in Afghanistan, which is views as,
fertile ground for the spread of Wahabbi Islam and as a way to balance
the influence of Iran. .
Saudi Arabia has also played a role in brokering talks with the
Taliban and claims that it has almost been able to fully cut-off funding
for al-Qaeda and its affiliates flowing from private Saudi sources.
Saudi Arabia is also a major investor in and ally of Pakistan, and can
leverage this role to convince Pakistan to do more to resolve regional
issues, while also getting the “softer” and less ideologically-committed
elements within the Taliban to agree to negotiate
Common Interests and Threat Perceptions
The discussion demonstrates that there are a number of national
interests in Afghanistan, as well as areas of common concern both in the
region and with the wider international community. These common
concerns can form the basis of regional meetings or organized groups,
such as an official Contact Group, bringing countries together to
cooperate on common concerns (e.g. drugs, refugees, extremism) or
subsuming all of them as part of a larger agenda. Regional trade
promotion could also help to incentivize the major players into playing a
more positive role. At the same time, a number of countries are
becoming increasingly skeptical of U.S. policy in
the region. As the
United States decides whether it is going to commit further in
Afghanistan or not, countries are also hedging their bets. For many
regional players, becoming involved in the Afghan gamble will no longer
be worth it if the United States leaves.
