Saturday, August 31, 2013

誰買平安

誰買平安來源於財新《新世紀》 2012年第50期出版日期2012年12月24日
http://magazine.caixin.com/2012-12-21/100475297_all.html#page2
天下無不散的宴席。中國平安(上海交易所代碼:601318/香港交易所代碼:02318,下稱平安)與第一大股東滙豐控股有限公司(香港交易所代碼:00005,下稱滙豐)十年連理,一朝曲終人散。
平 安創造了很多紀錄。24年前在深圳蛇口成立,平安起步於一家註冊資本僅4200萬元的地區性保險公司,現坐擁2.28萬億元總資產;從保險業兼具競爭力和 規模優勢的佼佼者,到收購深圳市商業銀行、深圳發展銀行進而成立平安銀行,其金融控股架構之全、綜合經營推進之深,屬中國金融業之翹楚。平安也是國內第一 家引入外資的大型金融企業,滙豐佔據第一大股東的位置已長達十年;多年來平安亦大膽引入職業經理人,公司治理被公認比較規範。創始人、董事長,現年57歲 的馬明哲,始終掌舵平安,對其成功居功至偉。
12月5日,滙豐簽訂協議,出售所持全部15.57%中國平安的H股股權。市場對滙豐揮別平安早有預期,一旦公布還是頗為震動:交易規模高達93.85億美元,摺合727.36億港元。
交易分兩步。12月7日,交易第一步完成,約3.5%股權易手,152億港元現金交割已然完成。
舊人退去,新人登場。誰是接盤者?
公開的答案是泰國正大集團(下稱正大)。因多年冠名中國中央電視台的正大綜藝節目,正大為國人熟知,其掌門人謝國民為福布斯雜誌2011年評出的泰國首富。
即使如此,當正大收購滙豐所持全部平安股權的消息傳出,市場人士還是覺得不易理解。正大規模不小,2011年凈資產90億美元,但要一次過吃下這筆作價93.85億美元的平安股權,還是令人難以想像。資金哪裡來?
市場原猜測資金來自正大在國內銀行所獲千億元授信。正大有關人士告訴財新記者,正大曾獲巨額授信,但用於新農村建設方向,與此交易無關。2012年12月下旬,數位國開行官員明確否認首期152億港元資金來自該行貸款。
按照正大公告,國開行將在交易的第二步提供融資。這一步,餘下9.76億股待取得中國保監會批准後轉讓,計價575.36億港元,部分以現金支付,其餘向國開行貸款。
過 去十年,滙豐雖為單一第一大股東,但通過員工持股等安排,創始人及管理層對中國平安的實際控制權從未旁落。如果滙豐退場,新大股東進入,本有可能打破這一 平衡。歷史上與平安頗有淵源、關係良好的正大集團攜身後資金介入,化解了這種風險——以727億港元獲得第一大股東地位的正大,宣布放棄參與經營管理和派 遣董事的權利。
來自保監會高層的消息確認,已完成的交易中,支付給滙豐的資金確從正大的賬戶上轉出,監管當局亦不會對上市金融機構的股東資格再作特別限定。
此交易看似進展風平浪靜,但數個不願透露姓名的消息源告訴財新記者,有關部門已然高度關注。
有調查發現,收購者正大背後,還另有機構,這些機構已參與第一步交易出資。至於第二步交易,尚待審批,具體出資還未發生。
來自不同大型機構投資者的數個消息源告訴財新記者,在第一筆152億港元資金中,有三分之一左右來自泰國他信家族,其餘部分來自由肖建華領銜的中國內地投資者。
他 信家族是泰國政商界的頭號豪門。他信曾為泰國首富,1998年創立泰愛泰黨,2001年2月,當選為泰國總理。2006年,泰國政爭激化,軍隊發動政變, 他信流亡海外,但仍通過其親屬在泰國國內政治中保持強大影響力。2011年7月,泰國大選,他信的妹妹英拉勝選,成為泰國第一位女總理。
今年41歲的肖建華是“明天系”的實際控制人,旗下有信託、銀行等多個金融機構牌照,在多個跨境金融交易中表現活躍,近年來與平安集團董事長馬明哲過從甚密,在前段發生的其他平安股權轉讓案中亦有其角色。
涉及平安的股權轉讓案,近年來一而再再而三,既引人關注,又始終有一層神秘之紗。
值得注意的是,據正大公告稱,第二筆交易因所涉股份超過5%(約12%),還需等待保監會的合規性審批,期限是2013年2月1日晚11點59分。
滙豐撤出 
全球範圍內出售非核心資產,應付美國的巨額罰金,已有內地保險牌照,內資保險股增長瓶頸到來,規避不確定風險——滙豐選擇退出的原因可以有很多。
滙豐稱以727.36億港元將平安15.57%股權轉讓給正大註冊於維京群島的四間全資子公司,作價為每股59港元,較之前停牌價57.65港元略有溢價。交易完成,正大將成為平安第一大股東。
滙豐公告稱,所持平安股權的賬麵價值約65億美元,此番溢價所得約為26億美元。但若累計滙豐十年來在平安共140億港元股權投入,滙豐實際盈利可超過70億美元。
滙豐給出的售股理由是,“為實現向股東提供持續長遠價值的目標,滙豐會根據其制定的策略架構,定期檢討各項業務和投資項目。出售平安保險股權反映滙豐落實其策略的另一進展。”
“平安並非滙豐的核心業務,滙豐CEO歐智華一直在出售非核心資產,平安只是其中的一例。”瑞信香港亞洲部保險研究總監Arjian van Veen對財新記者分析。
2011年初歐智華上任後,滙豐就宣布將在2013年底前節省最多達35億美元成本,以達到股東權益回報率在12%-15%之間的目標。
2011 年以來,滙豐頻頻出售其在全球各地的非核心資產業務。截至2011年末,已出售累計12.28億美元的財險業務給法國安盛保險集團(AXA)和澳大利亞昆 士蘭保險集團(QBE)。2012年滙豐又陸續將香港、新加坡、墨西哥及阿根廷的一般保險業務出售給了安盛保險及昆士蘭保險,資產總計9.14億美元。有 報道稱,滙豐正洽售上海銀行8%股權,交易接近達成,可能出售給建銀投資參與的投資團。
市場上也有觀點認為,滙豐選擇在此時出售平安,乃因受困於今年以來各國監管機構對其的巨額罰款。巴黎Alpha Value的分析師David Grinsztajn告訴財新記者,“滙豐出售平安股權所得,正好緩解近來滙豐在美國被罰帶來的現金壓力。”
2012 年7月16日,美國參議院調查報告指控滙豐涉嫌在墨西哥、伊朗、開曼群島、沙特阿拉伯及敘利亞等中東國家為恐怖分子和毒梟轉移資金。報告中除指控滙豐涉嫌 轉移資金和隱瞞巨額交易外,還細數了滙豐在防控洗黑錢體系方面存在的七項重大漏洞。12月11日,滙豐同意支付19.2億美元,與美國反洗錢調查達成和 解,創下美國歷來洗錢案和解金額的“新高”。滙豐首席合規官(CCO)巴格利已經引咎辭職。
滙豐控股(美國)紐約商業銀行副總裁Earl Carr Jr.告訴財新記者,滙豐出售平安還因為在中國內地已經有了自己的保險牌照,與平安存在同業競爭之嫌。滙豐在2009年6月得到保監會批准,與國民信託成 立合資保險公司滙豐人壽,各佔50%股權。據財新記者了解,去年滙豐人壽在國內保費收入2.97億元,業績增長主要來源於銀行保險業務,佔到公司總業績的 89%。
不過,滙豐人壽規模太小。平安2012年三季度報財務數據顯示,平安壽險業務累計實現規模保費1575.68億元,信託資管規模達2315.15億元,銀行業務為集團增利52.46億元,證券業務前三季度完成16個IPO項目和31個債券主承銷項目。
也 有觀點認為,中資保險股的增長瓶頸已經來臨,外資股東撤出為數不少。中信建投研究報告持此看法。2011年以來中國壽險業保費增長陷入低迷,預計2013 年亦不會好轉。2011年開始,外資投行已陸續撤出中資保險股。UBS、BlackRock、凱雷、金駿投資在港股先後減持了新華保險、中國人壽、中國太 保和中國平安。
對於滙豐在內地持有股權的另一重量級金融機構交行,滙豐CEO歐智華近日重申,“滙豐將繼續與交行構建長遠的銀行業務策略關係。”今年8月,滙豐斥資133億港元增持交行股份,目前持有交行18.7%股權,保住第二大股東的地位。
滙豐退出平安,也有解讀為規避不確定因素——12月中旬,紐約、倫敦等地的滙豐員工都對財新記者表示內部對此確實存在顧慮。外資銀行對此類風險尤為敏感。
平安股權變遷
上市之前股權轉讓頻繁,上市以後則保持穩定
平安保險於1988年4月成立於深圳蛇口,最初僅有兩家股東,一家是深圳招商局社會保險公司(後由招商局蛇口工業區持有,下稱招商局),還有一家是中國工商銀行深圳分行信託投資公司(下稱工行),分別持股51%和49%。
其後四年間平安又引入三個新股東,中國遠洋運輸(集團)總公司(下稱中遠集團)、深圳市財政局和平安職工合股基金(後來的新豪時投資發展公司),截至1992年12月31日,分別持有平安25%、14.91%和10%的股權。
1992年,平安獲得全國保險牌照。第二年,平安增資擴股,股東數由原來的5家迅速增加到114家。當年底,摩根士丹利和高盛分別以1.2億元購得平安8.01%的股權,平安成為第一家引入外資的國內保險企業和金融企業。
隨後基於國內金融機構的大幅整頓,在從1992年至1995年的三年間,平安清退了過半數股東,最後保留54家。截至1995年12月,公司股本增加到15億元。
此時,前七大主要股東分別是工行持有26.4%、招商局17.79%、中遠集團11.55%、新豪時9.22%、深圳市財政局8.09%和兩家外資(摩根士丹利和高盛)分別持有8.01%。
1997年初,平安開始了新一輪的股份制改造,註冊資本從1997年的15億元增至22.2億元,引入新股東深圳市江南實業(下稱江南實業,認購12.14%股權),其他除持股比例略有變動外,主要股東均未發生變化。
1999 年,平安身陷財務困境,但化險為夷,也安全渡過可能遭拆分的危機。就在平安穩步壯大之時, 2000年至2002年兩年間,前三大股東招商局、工行和中遠集團陸續退席。2000年,工行最先將手中持有的18%(3.96億股)的平安股份轉讓給了 深圳市投資管理公司(下稱深圳投資)。招商局和中遠集團則在2002年尾隨其後,都將股份轉讓給了三家新的投資方。
2002年,招商局把所 持17.09%(3.75億股)的平安股份轉讓給了寶華投資、源信行投資和上海銀峰投資。這三家公司背後的控制人鄭建源浮出水面。據媒體早前的報道,寶華 投資和源信行同屬沒有任何經營活動的殼公司,上海銀峰投資是鄭建源在2001年成立並控制的公司。(點擊查看大圖
中遠集團也於2002年12月將手中持有11.1%(2.44億股)的平安股份出讓給了三家公司:廣州市恆德貿易、中投創業投資和天津泰鴻,分別持股4.54%、3.02%和3.63%(其中,天津泰鴻的持股份額數還包含從大連遠洋運輸公司手上購入的221萬股)。
同期,平安引進了最為重要的戰略股東。2002年9月,滙豐以6億美元買下了平安10%(2.46億股)的股權。
於 是,平安的未上市股權一年三價。照當時外匯牌價計算,滙豐是以每股20元人民幣買入平安股份。而據媒體報道,滙豐入股一個月前,鄭建源從招商局手中拿到的 價格是每股約6.4元;同年12月,中遠集團轉讓給包括天津泰鴻等三家投資方的價格約為每股6.5元左右,均比當時平安的賬面凈資產略高。
滙豐成為第一大股東,收購股權有溢價在情理中。
但另外幾家內資股東入股價只有滙豐入股價的四分之一強,招致外界議論紛紛。招商局有關人士則稱自己是滙豐最早的原始股東,凈資產積累豐厚,當時出讓亦有利潤,程序公開合法。“出讓股份的老股東都是有利潤入袋的。”一位市場人士如此評價。
2004年6月,平安於香港證券交易所上市。2007年3月1日,平安登陸上海證券交易所。
平安A股歷來年報顯示,平安上市至今,股權結構相對穩定,五年間前十大股東及持股情況均沒有發生重大變化,惟有2008年報中出現了一家名為深圳登峰投資集團的股東,持有4398萬平安A股。
員工持股歷史
員工持股為主要股東之一的治理結構,保持了20年
從股權變遷可見,平安從成立之初就是一家員工持股公司,持股合計比例一直位於主要股東之列。自2002年起,平安的單一第一大股東為滙豐,幾家員工持股公司合計持股一直緊隨其後,其他股份則相對分散。
平安公開確認,員工持股有三家實體,分別是新豪時投資、景傲實業和江南實業。員工投資集合的權益持有人以平安工會、平安證券工會、平安信託工會的名義,分別擁有新豪時投資和景傲實業100%股權。
享 有員工投資集合的參與者,包括平安的董事、監事、高級顧問、專職員工和若干保險銷售代理人。參與者購買的集合單位數額取決於其資歷、工作年限以及對平安的 貢獻等多種因素。員工的購買價格為新豪時投資資產凈值與景傲實業資產凈值之和。根據持有的員工投資集合中的比例獲得紅利。如發生回購,價格為上年度單位賬 目凈資產。
新豪時投資前身是平安職工合股基金, 1992年成立之初出資2236萬元認購平安10%的股權,1993年和1996年分別二度增資認購平安股份,1996年12月新豪時投資以1.76元/ 股認購平安5654萬股,加之2004年平安H股上市前夕的10轉10轉增股本,截至2006年12月31日,新豪時投資共持有平安3.89億股,持股比 例為6.29%。
景傲實業1996年12月31日註冊成立,平安證券工會及平安信託工會分別持有80%及20%股權。2004年12月,景傲實業受讓江南實業所持平安3.31億股份,截至2006年12月31日,景傲實業持有平安3.31億股,佔A股上市前總股本的5.34%。
平 安副總經理王利平代理平安全體委託人托持江南實業。其中,王利平和北京金裕興電子技術有限公司(下稱金裕興)分別持有63.34%及36.66%的股權。 1997年,江南實業認購平安2.69億股,占平安增資後總股本2.22億股的12.14%。從2001年至平安A股上市前夕,江南實業減持平安股權至 2.25%,持有1.39億股平安股權。
2004年平安H股上市前夕,滙豐為避免上市後股權比例被相應攤薄,斥資12億港元以招股價認購平 安股份,維持持股比例在9.99%,進而穩坐平安上市後第一大股東的交椅。平安H股上市第二年,滙豐又花10.39億美元從摩根士丹利和高盛手中買下平安 9.91%的股權,持股量躍升至19.9%,更加穩固了單一大股東的地位。
2007年平安A股上市後,新豪時投資、景傲實業與江南實業合計持有平安13.88%的股份。單一大股東滙豐的股權則從19.9%被攤薄到此次交易前的狀態,15.57%。
員 工持股最終需要變現。上市滿三年後,新豪時投資和景傲實業持有的8.59億股限售股上市流通前夕,平安公布了員工所持解禁股減持方案,兩家公司將在未來五 年內減持,每年減持總數不超過總份額的30%。此舉將產生高達逾40%的稅賦,因新豪時投資需繳納22%-25%的企業所得稅;新豪時投資向員工支付收益 時還要代扣代繳20%的個人所得稅。
受此刺激,有員工不惜提起訴訟,要求將新豪時投資代持的股權過戶到自己名下。
為此,新豪時投資和景傲實業於2010年7月將註冊地由深圳遷至了西藏,更改後的公司名為林芝新豪時投資和林芝景傲實業,以享受西藏自治區新設相關行業企業免徵企業所得稅兩年的優惠政策。
截至2011年底,新豪時投資和景傲實業已累計減持平安1.27億股A股。
稅負問題雖然暫時緩解,但員工的套現壓力帶來的另一個後果,是員工所持股份稀釋後,如何保證管理層對公司的控制權?
今 年5月15日平安公告稱,四家投資者正式接手平安員工持股機構,平安的員工持股問題暫告一段落。新豪時投資60%、景傲實業60%和江南實業38%的股權 將轉讓給四家投資公司,涉及約4.08億平安股權(A股),交易金額約在170億元左右。其餘3億多股員工股也與這四家投資方達成轉讓意向。
這四家投資方分別是北京豐瑞股權投資基金(下稱北京豐瑞)、天津信德融盛商貿有限公司(下稱天津信德融盛)、中國對外經濟貿易信託(下稱對外經貿信託)以及林芝正大環球投資有限公司(下稱林芝正大)。
中國平安工會將持有的新豪時55%股權轉讓給北京豐瑞;景傲實業持有的新豪時5%股權轉讓給天津信德融盛;平安證券工會持有的景傲實業60%股權轉給對外經貿信託;中國平安執行董事王利平持有的江南實業38.004%的股權轉讓給林芝正大。
至此,新豪時由平安工會、北京豐瑞以及天津信德融盛三家持有,持股比例分別是40%、55%和5%。
景 傲實業的股權比例則是,對外經貿信託持有60%股權,剩餘40%股權仍由平安證券工會和平安信託工會分別持有20%;最後一家員工持股公司江南實業的股東 背景則相對複雜,此前控制人王利平現持25.33%,38%交由林芝正大持有,其餘部分由裕興科技通過全資子公司金裕興持有(36.66%股權)。
北京豐瑞和林芝正大的工商資料顯示,兩家公司均在此次交易轉讓前兩個月剛剛成立。
正大、肖建華的身影此時已出現。林芝正大是正大的全資子公司,通過控股江南實業,間接持有平安已發行股份的1.11%。肖建華是對外經貿信託等的實際控制人。正大和肖建華,被認為傾向於鼓勵管理層控股,為平安管理層的盟友。
正大與平安
從林芝正大接手部分平安員工持股,到此次全面接盤滙豐所持股份,正大與平安素有合作
財新記者了解到,滙豐有意退出,也曾找過國內的大型機構投資者如中信集團等,探詢其接盤意向。如果成事,於滙豐於平安都不失為一個“體面的結局”。中信集團向上打了報告,最終無果。
“有關部門沒有同意國有背景的機構去接盤。”接近交易的知情者透露。
近 年來,中國投資有限責任公司(CIC)和全國社保基金等常常聯袂出現在國有金融機構的改制入股過程中。不過,CIC旗下的匯金公司在所投金融機構中表現強 勢,與平安管理層風格不易兼容,且一旦國有控股,就要遵守財政部的限薪規定等。若非不得已,中投入股不是平安的最佳選擇。
還有分析認為,滙豐賣股份需要合理避稅,設立BVI公司接盤就有此考慮,但國有背景公司不很方便做此安排。
“滙豐要賣股份,首先需要與管理層商議,得到其支持。”一位接近滙豐的法律人士表示。
大股東易主,這是平安治理結構的頭等大事。正大集團最終站到了前台。
正 大集團是世界最大的農牧業公司之一,由華人謝易初創立於泰國,現任董事長為謝國民,2011年福布斯所評泰國首富。正大年收入311億美元,凈資產90億 美元,在華投資超過50億美元,旗下有多家上市公司,如在泰國上市的卜蜂食品企業有限公司、True Corporation Public Company Limited、CP ALL Public Company Limited、Siam Makro Public Company Limited;在香港上市的卜蜂國際、卜蜂蓮花、中國生物製藥。正大旗下的易初蓮花超市(2008年更名為卜蜂蓮花超市),在中國大陸現有75家門店。
“謝國民和馬明哲的關係很好。正大在中國內地的很多融資都是平安幫忙做的,平安為正大介紹了不少生意。”一位律師背景的業內人士說。
有海外市場人士透露,之前謝國民找過海外的機構投資者,希望通過QFII渠道,拿出幾億美元購買平安的A股,認為平安A股價格太低,有利可圖。“沒想到謝最終吃下這麼大口。”他說。
平安此次公告稱,此次接盤滙豐股份的是四家公司:同盈貿易、隆福集團、商發控股以及易盛發展。這四家公司均成立不久,尚未從事任何經營活動,註冊地是在英屬維京群島,均是正大集團的附屬子公司。
正大集團人士曾表態稱,此次交易後,正大集團對中國平安的持股僅在投資層面,不會參與經營。平安則表示,可藉助正大集團開展農村金融業務,通過農業金融保險品擴大範圍。
一名美資基金的機構投資者這樣理解正大接盤,“就是幫忙”。正大過去在中國發展得好,建立了良好關係。“這次大股東從滙豐換到正大,平安相當於換了個婆婆,日子還是要照樣過。但是之前是一個有discipline(紀律)的婆婆,新婆婆就是‘甩手掌柜’了。”
肖建華入平安
部分資金騰挪自肖能影響的三家城市商業銀行
正大收購平安股權,目前已經完成第一步交易,作價152億港元。出資有三分之一左右來自泰國他信家族,其餘三分之二中,主要來自中國內地的投資者。據數位不願透露姓名的消息人士向財新記者表示,領銜者是“明天系”掌門人肖建華。
肖 建華,1971年出生於山東肥城,15歲考入北大法律系,曾任北大學生會主席。1993年在北京創立公司,1999年成立明天控股有限公司,以購買法人股 或發起設立方式參股了多家上市公司,以“明天系”在資本市場風聲水起。“德隆系”崩盤後,“明天系”一度低調,但在2006年後再度活躍,旗下有多家上市 公司及銀行、證券、信託金融機構。
肖建華一向神龍見首不見尾,從不接受任何媒體採訪,很少公開曝光,但近年活躍在多起跨國金融機構收購案中,有時為中介,有時為投資。
2006 年魯能集團私有化未果,“明天系”旗下的新時代信託等參與其中;2006年深發展股改,“明天系”旗下三家證券公司入股並投反對票;2007年末,太平洋 證券(601099.SH)借股改捷徑上市,“明天系”是其主要股東;2009年AIG出售台灣南山人壽保險股份,“明天系”參與收購戰。
2012年6月,內蒙古的ST明科(上海交易所代碼:600091)與西水股份(上海交易所代碼:600291)發佈公告,明天控股收購第一大股東股權,成為實際控制人。
肖建華此次參與出資,資金騰挪自肖具備影響力的三家城市商業銀行,分別為哈爾濱商行、山東濰坊商業銀行、內蒙古包頭商業銀行。
截至2011年末,哈爾濱銀行資產總額2024.99億元,存款餘額1416.38億元,不良率0.67%,凈利潤17.08億元;小額信貸餘額360.88億元,佔全行信貸資產總額的61%。
濰坊銀行總資產458億元,存款餘額為378億元,各項貸款餘額268億元,不良貸款率為0.88%。
包頭商業銀行總資產1819.4億元,存款餘額1170.67億元,不良貸款率0.43%,凈利潤20.93億元。
這三家銀行均與肖建華都有着錯綜複雜的關係。
哈 爾濱銀行的股東之一黑龍江天地源遠網絡科技,早在2003年就與肖建華控股的華資實業有過股權交易。濰坊銀行第一大股東融信達,其控股的遠東證券和新產業 投資股份有限公司,也均是肖建華“明天系”旗下的公司。業內人士告訴財新記者,這三家城市商業銀行都在肖建華的影響所及。
值得注意的是,20天後,這筆出去的資金又回到了這三家銀行賬上。
按照交易完成的進展,在股權完成轉移後,即可以股權抵押向商業銀行貸款,抵押率一般為50%左右。目前上海交易所和港交所均未顯示平安有超過5%的股權在質押中。
誰提供了接下來的資金騰挪?雖然有人懷疑資金來源於平安集團的管理層。但截至本刊發稿,尚無證據支持這一懷疑。
“未來肖建華和馬明哲之間還會有很多故事。”一位市場人士這樣說。
平安何處去
國內投資者認為平安仍在風口浪尖,海外投資者認為平安大的發展方向不受影響
交易公布當日,平安A股和H股分別暴漲逾4%(A股報收38.92元,H股報收60.50港元)。早在半個月前,滙豐減持平安的猜測聲就已在市場上流傳開來,平安股價一度出現暴跌,後漸回升。
紛亂之中,外部投資者十分關心平安的去向和價值重估。H股和A股投資者的看法出現了明顯的分歧,平安A股和H股價格倒掛加劇。
不少內地投資者仍認為平安還在風口浪尖。在這一問題沒有水落石出之前,他們認為平安的估值還有風險。
一位美資基金的分析師告訴財新記者,內地投資者對於中國的政治敏感度要優於海外的投資者,他們切實知道中國的問題;另一方面,最近因量化寬鬆政策,海外熱錢湧入香港,流動性泛濫,較易流入平安這種大藍籌。
不過,幾乎所有海外投行都認為對平安影響較小,既因為滙豐沒有介入平安的日常管理,也因為普遍預期滙豐要退出,對股價造成壓力,現在不過是靴子落地。
“平安本身是有價值的,過去這段時間的風波不會影響到公司大的發展方向。”私募基金上善若水有限合夥公司的投資總監兼合伙人侯安揚持此態度,他傾向於在A股和H股之間套利。
平安在國內綜合金融走得最遠。收購深發展,與平安銀行合并,與高層良好的關係有助於走過各艱難審批環節,客觀上推動了一個有價值的重大交易產生,對公司發展、行業進步均有益。
平安的員工持股和管理層控制機製取向比較明確,由此建立了一個有效的激勵機制和高效的決策機制,很多保險業內的高管自嘆弗如。機構投資者均表示,認同平安的員工持股,股權激勵對公司的影響是正面的。
也有人擔心,平安創建的金融控股綜合經營之路會遭遇挫折。就綜合金融的發展戰略,一位歐資基金經理表示,放眼全球,亦難找出普適性的成功模式。術業有專攻,不同的業務和文化間,整合未必容易。金融危機後,全球都有回到向精細化、獨特化發展的趨勢。
不過,“從目前平安公開資料看,平安發展良好。”東方證券一位保險分析師對財新記者說。
前述歐資基金經理稱,大家擔心的是平安未來可能會失去政策的優先性,也擔心馬明哲對平安的控制力經歷此次股權變動後會不會受損,因為資本市場還是認可馬明哲對平安的正面作用。

總理家人隱秘的財富

Oct 26, 2012 6:58 PM

总理家人隐秘的财富

By DAVID BARBOZA
This is a Chinese-language version of an investigation by The New York Times showing that the family of Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, who has staked a position as a populist and a reformer, owns about $2.7 billion in assets.
北京 — — 中国总理温家宝的母亲曾是华北的一名教师,他的父亲在毛泽东时代的政治运动中曾被送去养猪。在去年的一次演讲中,温家宝总理说,他的童年被打上了“穷苦、动荡和饥荒”的印记。
然而,公司与监管记录显示,现年90岁的总理母亲杨志云不仅不再贫穷,而且绝对富裕。记录显示,仅她名下一项对中国一家大型金融企业的投资就曾在5年前价值1.2亿美元(约合7.6亿元人民币)。
没人知晓丈夫已经去世的杨志云是如何积累这笔财富的。但这一过程发生在她儿子被提拔进中国的统治精英阶层之后。温家宝先在1998年升任国务院副总理,并在五年后出任总理。
《纽约时报》的调查显示,温家宝担任领导职务期间,他的很多亲属变得极为富有。其中包括温家宝的儿子、女儿、弟弟及妻弟。对公司与监管记录的调查显示,在 总理的亲属中,有些人的生意风格十分强势,他们掌控了价值不低于27亿美元(约合170亿元人民币)的资产。
很多情况下,这些亲属的名字都掩藏在多层涉及朋友、同事、商业伙伴与远亲的合伙企业和投资载体背后。此番财务解析细致而不同寻常地揭示出,在经济高速发展、政府影响和私人财富重叠交错的中国,拥有政治人脉的人物是如何利用自己沟通政商的能力谋取利益。
资料显示,与大多数中国的新企业不同,这个家族的生意不时从国有企业获得金融支持,包括中国最大的电信运营商之一中国移动。其他时候,这些企业得到了一些 亚洲最富有的商业巨头的支持。《纽约时报》发现,温家宝的亲属在银行、珠宝公司、度假村、基础设施项目和电信公司中持有股份,其中部分股权是通过离岸机构 持有的。
他们持股的对象包括位于北京的一处别墅开发项目、中国北方的一家轮胎工厂、一家曾参与修建包括标志建筑“鸟巢”(Bird’s Nest)在内的一些北京奥运场馆的公司,以及平安保险,世界上最大的金融服务公司之一。
今年70岁的温家宝,作为一个仍然严重依靠政府带动的经济体的总理, 在为其亲属带来巨大财富的主要行业中拥有广泛的权力。比如,中国公司如果不经过他手下的机构审批,就不能在证券交易所上市。他在决定是否批准能源与电信等 战略行业中的大型投资项目方面,也起着关键作用。
由于中国政府甚少公开自己的决策过程,所以还不清楚温家宝在大多数政策或法规决策中是否施加了影响,或施加了什么影响。但在一些情况下,他的亲属却试图从这些决策带来的机会中获利。
例如,根据基于政府记录进行的估算,他弟弟的公司曾从政府那里得到了价值超过3千万美元(约合1.89亿元人民币)的合同与补贴,负责处理一些中国大城市 的污水和医疗垃圾。这些合同都是在2003年非典型肺炎(SARS)疫情之后温家宝下令对医疗垃圾处理加强监管之后宣布的。
2004年,温家宝领导下的国务院免除了平安保险等公司所受经营范围上的限制之后,该公司在其首次公开发行股票中募资18亿美元(约合113亿元人民 币),其当下的市值超过了600亿美元。而由温家宝的亲属和他们的朋友、同事控制的合伙人公司在公开发行之前对平安保险公司进行了投资,并从中获取巨额利 润。
2007年,也就是对相关持股进行公开披露的最后一年,《纽约时报》一份经过外部审计人员核实的调查报告显示,这些合伙人公司持有股票的总价值在当时高达22亿美元(约合139亿元人民币)。
中国平安保险在一份声明中表示,该公司不知晓股东背后投资实体的背景。声明还说,中国平安保险无法获悉股东买卖股份背后的动机。
尽管中国共产党的条例要求高级官员公开自己和直系亲属的财产,但却没有法律法规对哪怕是最高层官员的亲属做出禁令,禁止他们成为交易撮合者或者主要投资 人,而这一漏洞实际上让一些人可以打着家族的名号做生意。一些中国人认为,允许共产党领导人的家人从中国长期的经济繁荣中获利,对确保精英阶层支持市场化 改革十分重要。
但是,提交给中国监管机构的资料显示,温家宝亲属的商业交易有时被掩盖了起来。其运作方式暗示,他们急切地想回避公众的关注。调查发现,他们拥有的股权通常掩盖在错综复杂的股权网络当中,其所有权可能距实际运营的公司有五层控股公司之遥。
在温家宝母亲的案例中,《纽约时报》通过调查公开记录和政府颁发的身份证,并对三家中国投资公司的所有权进行追踪之后,估算出她在平安保险持有的股份在 2007年价值1.2亿美元(约合7.6亿元人民币)。他母亲在平安持有的股票被登记在一家名为泰鸿(Taihong)的控股公司名下,该公司注册地是总 理的故乡天津。
这些看上去是在掩饰自身财富的努力显示,围绕着中国精英统治阶层的政治氛围相当紧张,很多人坐拥巨富,却不愿引人注目。6月份,彭博资讯社 (Bloomberg News)报道,中国下届国家主席的既定人选、副主席习近平的亲属积累了数亿美元的财产,中国政府随即在国内屏蔽了彭博社的网站。
“高层领导中,没有哪家没有这样的问题,”与温家宝相识20多年的一位前同事在不具名的条件下表示,“他的政敌正在有意泄露这些消息给他抹黑。”
《纽约时报》将调查发现交给了中国政府,并请求置评。中国外交部拒绝回答有关这些投资和涉及总理及其亲属的问题。温家宝的亲属也拒绝置评或没有回复置评请求。
女富商段伟红的泰鸿公司就是总理母亲与其他亲属持有的平安股份的投资平台。段伟红说,这些投资实际上都是她自己的。段伟红是总理的同乡,也是总理夫人的好朋友。她表示,这些股份之所以放在总理亲属的名下,是为了隐藏她自己持股的规模。
她表示,“我在投资平安的时候,不希望被媒体关注,”段女士表示,“所以我让亲戚找了一些人代我持有这些股份。”
她说,自己的公司选了这些亲属作为名义股东,只是一个“巧合”。股权登记过程需要股东提供自己的身份证号码与签名。直到《纽约时报》向她展示了这些投资者的姓名,她一直表示,她不知道这些人和温家宝有亲戚关系。
此次调查的公司与监管记录的时间跨度为1992年到2012年,调查中没有发现温家宝名下有任何财产。从这些材料中无法看出,温家宝是否曾对任何可能会给亲属的财产带来影响的决定进行回避,也不能断定这些亲属是否在投资上得到过优待。
在任期内的很长时间里,温家宝一直被关于其亲属试图利用其职位谋利的谣言和猜测缠身。但截止到《纽约时报》此次调查为止,并没有出现任何关于这个家族财富的详细报道。
他的妻子张蓓莉是中国珠宝与宝石领域的权威人士之一,自己本身就是一位成功的女商人。《纽约时报》发现,她通过管理后来被私有化的国有钻石公司,帮助亲属戚将一些少数股权扩充为价值十亿美元级别的投资组合,涵盖保险、科技和房地产行业。
温家宝夫妇唯一的儿子曾将自己开创的一家科技公司以1千万美元(约合6千3百万元人民币)的价格卖给香港首富李嘉诚(Li Ka-shing)家族,并利用另一个投资平台成立了新天域资本公司(New Horizon Capital)。相关记录与对银行业人士的采访显示,目前,该公司是中国最大的私募股权公司之一, 其投资合伙人包括了新加坡政府。
记录显示,总理的弟弟温家宏(Wen Jiahong)掌控着2亿美元(约合12.6亿元人民币)的资产,其中包括污水处理厂与回收企业。
作为总理,温家宝阐明了自己是一个平民主义者和改革派的立场。他平易近人,经常接触普通百姓,尤其是在发生自然灾害的危急时刻。官方媒体将他爱称为“人民的总理”和“温爷爷”。
尽管还不清楚温家宝对自己家族的财富知道多少,但在维基解密(WikiLeaks)2010年公布的美国国务院(State Department)外交电文中,有一份电文显示,温家宝对其亲属的商业交易有所了解,且相当不满。
根据这份2007年发送的电报,一名在中国出生并供职于上海一家美国公司的高管告诉美国外交官,“温家宝对家人的活动很反感,但他无力或不愿限制他们。”
中国的钻石女王
在中国的精英圈子里,总理夫人张蓓莉很有钱而且在一定程度上控制着中国的珠宝贸易,这一点不是秘密。但《纽约时报》在查阅了公司和监管记录之后发现,只是在她丈夫步入中国的最高领导层后,她那些利润丰厚的钻石生意才变得异常成功。
张蓓莉是一名专门研究宝石的地质学家,普通中国人基本上不知道她。她很少和总理一起出行或公开露面。目前几乎没有几张这对夫妇在一起的正式照片。尽管曾和 她共事的人说,她喜欢翡翠和精美的钻石,但他们也表示,和其他高级领导人的亲属很像,她的着装通常都很低调,并没有表现得魅力四射,而是宁愿在幕后施展影 响。
维基解密公布的美国国务院文件还表明,温家宝曾因张蓓莉在钻石贸易中利用了两人之间的关系而考虑过离婚。台湾的电视台2007年报道称,张蓓莉在北京的一 个贸易展上购得了一对价值约为27.5万美元(当时约合200万元人民币)的翡翠耳环。但根据当时的新闻报道,透露此消息的那名台湾展商后来否认了该说 法,中国官方新闻审查部门迅速封锁了国内对该事件的报道。
一位曾和温家宝的亲属合作过银行业人士称,“在领导层的圈子里,她的商业活动是众所周知的。”这位银行业人士还表示,张蓓莉的办公室致电商业人士也不是什么不寻常的事,“如果你接到了电话,怎么能说不呢?”
张蓓莉最初得势是在上世纪90年代,当时她还是地质部的一名监管人员。那时,中国的珠宝市场尚处于起步阶段。
当她丈夫在中国的最高领导机构所在地中南海任职时,张蓓莉正在制定珠宝与宝石贸易的行业标准。她协助在北京成立了国家珠宝玉石质量监督检验中心,在上海成立了上海钻石交易所。这是该行业内权力最大的两家机构。
在中国,政府长期以来控制着市场,珠宝行业监管部门常常决定着哪家公司可以开设钻石加工厂,谁可以获准进入珠宝零售市场。国家监管部门甚至还制定了规则, 要求钻石出售方要为在中国售出的钻石购买鉴定证书,而那些认证书就来自北京那家由张蓓莉管理的国营检验中心。
因此,当卡地亚(Cartier)和戴比尔斯(DeBeers)的主管来到中国,并希望能在这里销售钻石和珠宝时,他们经常拜访人称中国“钻石皇后”的张蓓莉。
总部设在瑞士的世界珠宝联合会(World Jewelry Confederation)的主席加埃塔诺·卡瓦列里(Gaetano Cavalieri)已经认识张蓓莉很多年了,他表示:“在中国,她是最重要的人。她就是中外合伙人之间的桥梁 。”
曾和张蓓莉共过事的人说,她早在1992年就开始游走在官员和女商人这两个角色之间了。作为国有的中国地矿宝石总公司负责人,她开始用国有资金投资新兴企业。在1998年她丈夫被任命为副总理时,她正忙着和亲戚朋友一起开办企业。
根据公开披露的信息,她经营的那家国有企业投资了数家下属钻石企业。在这些公司当中,有好几家是由张蓓莉的亲戚或她在国家珠宝玉石检验中心的前同事经营的私有企业。
比如,1993年,张蓓莉负责的那家国企帮助成立了北京戴梦得宝石公司,这是一家大型的珠宝生产商。股东名册显示,一年后,她的一个弟弟张剑鸣和她的两名 在政府的同事以个人的名义购得了该公司80%的股份。北京戴梦得投资的深圳戴梦得宝石公司则是由她丈夫的弟弟温家宏所控制。
中宝戴梦得是她最大的成功之一。这家企业的出资方包括由她担任一把手的国有企业中国地矿宝石总公司。中宝戴梦得和另外一家由她弟弟张剑鹍管理的国企有生意往来。张剑鹍曾是浙江嘉兴的一名官员,那里也是张蓓莉的家乡。
1999年夏,在达成了从俄罗斯和南非进口钻石的协议后,中宝戴梦得在上海证券交易所(Shanghai Stock Exchange)上市,募集到了3.25亿元人民币。根据公司文件,这次募股为张蓓莉的家人带来了大约800万美元(当时约合6600万元人民币)。
尽管她从未被列为股东,但她以前的同事和生意伙伴表示, 张蓓莉早年成立的钻石合伙企业最终成为了一系列企业的核心,她帮助自己的家族和同事获得了那些企业的股份。
《纽约时报》没有发现,温家宝曾利用自己的政治影响力对亲属所投资的钻石公司进行关照。然而,之前的生意伙伴表示,温家宝家族在钻石行业和其他领域的成功往往都得到了富有商人的资金扶持,那些商人试图借此讨好总理一家。
“温家宝成为总理后,他妻子出售了部分钻石相关的投资,转而进入新的领域,” 一名同该家族有过生意往来的中国高管说。 因为怕遭政府报复,这位高管请求匿名。公司记录显示,从上世纪90年代末开始,一群富商轮番买进这些钻石公司的大量股份。出售方通常是温家宝的亲戚,然 后,在这些商人的帮助下,他们将所得再投资到房地产和金融等有利可图的项目中。
根据公司记录,富商通常会向由这些亲戚部分控制的投资合伙公司提供会计人员和办公地点。
“当他们合伙成立公司时,”一位和温家成员一起成立过公司的商人说,“张蓓莉留在幕后。这就是他们的模式。”
唯一的儿子
今年早些时候的一个晚上,总理的独子温云松坐在一个名为“秀”的雪茄吧里,这是一间位于北京柏悦酒店的顶级酒吧。在场的两位客人透露,他当时正喝着鸡尾酒,身边围绕着北京的新贵们。这些人提着名牌包,身着昂贵的西装。
在中国,人们普遍认为高层领导人的下一代构成了一个特殊的阶层,人称“太子党”。这些人往往持有常青藤(Ivy League)名校的文凭,享受贵宾待遇,甚至能在热门股票发行时以优惠价格获得股票。
在市场准入受到政府严格控制的中国,人们都认为太子党好办事。而近几年,还没有几个太子党像年届不惑的温云松这样有魄力。他的英文名是温斯顿(Winston)。
经过调查温云松的各种投资,并采访了与他相识多年的人士,《纽约时报》发现他涉足的交易领域极其广泛,获利甚丰,这即使是在他太子党同辈中也是出类拔萃的。
诸如中国移动这样的国有大机构都和他合作成立了新公司。在近些年,温云松还和好莱坞(Hollywood)制片商就融资活动展开洽谈。
苦恼于中国尚无精英级别的寄宿学校,温云松最近雇佣了康涅狄格州的乔特罗斯玛丽中学(Choate)和霍奇科斯学校(Hotchkiss)的校长来负责成立一所位于京郊、投资1.5亿美元的私立学校,这所学校目前正在建设中。
另外,根据公司记录及熟悉其家庭投资情况的人士的陈述,温云松与其妻还拥有珠宝公司、网络公司和动画公司的股份,他们甚至通过非直接的方式,拥有政府鼎力 支持的在线支付企业联动优势科技有限公司(Union Mobile Pay)的股份。一直以来,他们住在位于北京市中心的总理官邸内。
一位与温云松经常见面的风险投资家说:“他不会对用自己的影响来办事感到不好意思。”
温云松拒绝接受采访,但他的妻子杨小萌在一次电话采访中表示,针对自己丈夫的商业活动的批评并不公平。
“所有关于他的报道都是错误的,”她表示,“他真的已经不怎么做生意了。”
温云松毕业于北京的精英学校,并在北京理工大学(Beijing Institute of Technology)取得工科学位。他后来出国,在加拿大温莎大学(University of Windsor)取得了材料科学的硕士学位,并在美国伊利诺伊州埃文斯顿的西北大学(Northwestern University)凯洛格商学院(Kellogg School of Business)取得了工商管理硕士学位。
熟悉温云松生意的人透露,他2000年回国后,在五年时间里和别人一起成功打造了三家科技公司。随后他将其中两家公司出售给了香港的企业家,其中包括亚洲首富李嘉诚(Li Ka-shing)的家族。
经查阅香港与北京的公司注册信息发现,温云松在2000年成立了他的第一家公司优创科技(Unihub Global),提供互联网数据服务,启动资金为500万美元。资金来源于一些关系密切的亲戚与他母亲以前在政府和钻石行业的同事,以及香港第二富有家族 的家长郑裕彤(Cheng Yu-Tung)身边的一个人。这家公司的最早客户是一些国有证券公司和平安保险。总理的亲属持有大量平安保险股份。
2005年,他进行了更大胆的尝试,开始进军私募股权行业,和一群西北大学的中国同学成立了新天域资本公司。公司很快从各方投资者募集了1亿美元的资金。 投资人中有日本软银集团(Softbank)旗下的思佰益控股(SBI Holdings)和新加坡政府的投资基金淡马锡(Temasek)。
在温云松的领导下,新天域迅速蹿升为私人股本行业的佼佼者,公司在生物科技、太阳能、风能和建筑设备制造领域投资。据思佰益控股,迄今为止,该公司已经向投资者返还了4.3亿美元,相当于逾四倍的获利。
香港行业出版物《亚洲私募股权评论》(Asia Private Equity Review)的主编凯瑟琳·吴(Kathleen Ng)说:“他们的第一个基金就一炮打响。这使得他们可以募得更多资金。”
目前,新天域管理着逾25亿美元的资金 。
然而,温云松的一些交易却给总理带来了一些不必要的关注。
2010年,就在一家名为四环医药的企业公开发行股票仅两个月前,新天域收购了该公司9%的股权。香港证交所做出裁定,这笔后期投资违反了相关规定,并强迫新天域退回股权。即便这样,该公司还是在这笔交易中获利4650万美元。
不久以后,新天域宣布,温云松已经不再负责公司的日常运作。他转而加入了国有的中国卫星通信集团公司。这家公司和中国的空间项目有联系,目前,他已经成为了该公司的董事长。
富豪们
在上世纪90年代末期,段伟红通过自己的泰鸿地产公司在总理的家乡天津管理着一幢办公楼与几处房产。她当时还不到30岁,拥有南京理工大学的学位。
在2002年,段伟红与几位温家宝的亲戚展开了商业合作,将自己的房地产公司转换成为了同名的投资公司。这家公司最终使段伟红变得非常富有。
现年43岁的段伟红与总理的关系尚不明朗。在数次采访中,她先是表示,自己并不认识温家任何人,但随后又承认自己是总理夫人张蓓莉的朋友。与其他几位中国 企业家一样,在和这些亲属以及他们的关系网中的朋友与同事展开合作后,她的财富规模急速上升。然而她表示,自己和这些人在平安股权上的关系只存在于纸面 上,并没有真正的金钱往来。
段伟红与另外几个商人一直以来都在帮助温家宝家族,他们的作用至关重要,在关键时刻启动大型项目,以帮助温家宝家族成员设立投资平台,并从中获利。这些生意伙伴里包括6位来自中国各地的亿万富豪。
成立于天津的泰鸿获得了惊人的回报。公司披露信息与段伟红的研究生论文显示,2002年,在平安保险首次公开发行股票之前,泰鸿以6500万美元购得了平安3%的股份。5年后,这些股票的市值为37亿美元。
随后,通过自己在香港的一家公司,段伟红和两家国有企业成立了一个合资公司,并在北京首都国际机场附近购得了一大块土地。如今,在这片土地上,坐落着一个 不断壮大的货运物流中心。去年,泰鸿将这一项目中该公司拥有的53%股权出售给了一家新加坡企业,售价为近4亿美元。
《纽约时报》通过查阅公司披露材料发现,这笔交易,连同她对豪华酒店、北京的别墅开发项目,以及在香港上市的北京金隅股份有限公司的投资,对段伟红的财富积累起到了至关重要的作用。北京金隅是中国最大建筑材料企业之一。
通过查阅报表还发现,在过去10年中,泰鸿有着三十多位个人股东,其中很多人要么是温家宝的亲属,要么是张蓓莉的前同事。
其他与总理的亲属合作过的富商拒绝就本报道置评。段伟红强烈否认自己与总理或其亲属存在任何金钱往来,并表示,将平安股票放在他人名下,只为避免媒体关注。“投资平安的钱全是我自己的” ,曾经是平安监事会成员的段伟红表示。“我做的一切都是合法的。”
与温家宝的亲属进行合作的另一位富商是掌握着香港集团企业新世界发展公司的郑裕彤(Cheng Yutung)。《福布斯》(Forbes)数据显示,他的身价为150亿美元,是亚洲最大的富豪之一。
在20世纪90年代,新世界正在中国内地为一家专门经营高档珠宝的姊妹公司寻找落脚点。1998年,这家名为周大福(Chow Tai Fook)的连锁珠宝零售企业在中国内地开设了第一家门店。
相关记录与对当事人的采访显示,郑裕彤的手下向背后有温家宝的亲属支持的钻石企业进行了投资。还与这些企业一起,共同投资了一系列企业实体,其中包括生命 人寿 (Sino-Life)、国民信托(National Trust)和平安保险。企业披露的报表显示,郑裕彤作出的这些投资现在至少价值50亿美元。连锁珠宝企业周大福也得到了蓬勃发展。今天,该公司42亿美 元的年收入中,60%来自中国市场。
本报未能联系到87岁的郑裕彤。新世界发展公司也没有回复打过去的电话。
对温家宝的影响
2007年冬,就在温家宝开始第二个总理任期之前,他呼吁采取新措施打击腐败,尤其是高级官员的腐败。
“各级主要负责同志要……带头执行中央关于党政干部廉洁自律的各项规定。”在北京举行的一次党内高层官员参加的会议上,温家宝说:“领导干部特别是高级干部要严格管束子女、亲属和身边工作人员,防止他们利用自己的影响谋取不正当利益。”
上述讲话,与温家宝较早前推动对公务员实行更严格的财产申报规定,要求高级官员公布家庭资产的行动是一致的。
由于中国共产党并不公布此类信息,并不清楚温家宝是否进行过关于自己家庭财产的申报。尽管如此,《纽约时报》发现的温家宝亲属持有的资产中,很多可能并不需要进行披露,因为那些资产并不是以温家宝,及他的妻子和子女的名义持有的。
《纽约时报》通过调查发现并经由外部审计人员核查的27亿美元资产中,约有80%是由温家宝的母亲、弟弟、弟媳、温家宝妻子的两名兄弟、温家宝的儿媳及亲 家等人所持有的。他们都不受中国共产党公开财产的规定所限制。《纽约时报》对相关亲属的中国平安保险持股总规模进行了计算,其结果得到了审计师的确认。总 额包括亲属曾经持有但在2004年至2006之间售出的股票,以及2007年末剩下的股票。在此之后,他们平安保险的持股状况就没有再进行过公开披露。
法律专家表示,估测准确的价值并不容易,因为可能存在一些并不对外披露、指定真正受益者的附加协议。
哥伦比亚大学法学院(Columbia University Law School)教授克提斯·米尔哈特(Curtis Milhaupt)曾研究过中国公司架构,他表示:“复杂的企业架构并不一定有阴谋诡计。但在企业所有权和政治权力紧密交织的中国体制之下,壳公司就会放 大资产所有人不明、资金来源不明的问题。”
在温家宝的家族所控制的企业中进行投资的人里,有很多长期的商业伙伴、前同事,以及大学同学,其中包括温云松在西北大学的同学于剑鸣,以及温家宝的弟弟温家宏长期以来的同事张玉宏。这些人都没有回复就本报道置评的请求。
披露温家宝家族持有的财富,可能会给温家宝带来政治上的打击。
下个月,中共十八大将在北京召开,共产党将宣布下一届领导人人选。但是这个筛选过程却已经陷入几十年来最严重的政治丑闻中 — — 试图进入最高层的重庆市委书记薄熙来倒台。
在北京,因已到退休年龄,温家宝即将卸任总理一职。数位政治分析人士表示,即使在离任之后,作为党内老领导,他还将在幕后保有强大的政治力量,但这些显示其亲属曾在他任期内积累巨额财富的材料,几乎肯定会削弱他在党内的地位。
“这将影响他手中剩下的政治力量,” 研究中国领导层的专家、加州克莱蒙麦肯纳学院(Claremont McKenna College)的政府学教授裴敏欣(Minxin Pei)表示。
温家宝的支持者表示,他本人并没有从家族的商业往来中获利,甚至可能也不太了解这些商业往来的规模。
今年3月,温家宝暗示,他至少是知晓自己的亲属引发了不少传言。在北京举行的一场向全国电视直播的新闻发布会上,温家宝坚称,自己担任公职期间“没有谋过私利”。
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/26/business/global/family-of-wen-jiabao-holds-a-hidden-fortune-in-china-chinese-version.html?ref=china&pagewanted=all
October 25, 2012

Billions in Hidden Riches for Family of Chinese Leader

By DAVID BARBOZA
BEIJING — The mother of China’s prime minister was a schoolteacher in northern China. His father was ordered to tend pigs in one of Mao’s political campaigns. And during childhood, “my family was extremely poor,” the prime minister, Wen Jiabao, said in a speech last year.
But now 90, the prime minister’s mother, Yang Zhiyun, not only left poverty behind, she became outright rich, at least on paper, according to corporate and regulatory records. Just one investment in her name, in a large Chinese financial services company, had a value of $120 million five years ago, the records show.
The details of how Ms. Yang, a widow, accumulated such wealth are not known, or even if she was aware of the holdings in her name. But it happened after her son was elevated to China’s ruling elite, first in 1998 as vice prime minister and then five years later as prime minister.
Many relatives of Wen Jiabao, including his son, daughter, younger brother and brother-in-law, have become extraordinarily wealthy during his leadership, an investigation by The New York Times shows. A review of corporate and regulatory records indicates that the prime minister’s relatives — some of whom, including his wife, have a knack for aggressive deal making — have controlled assets worth at least $2.7 billion.
In many cases, the names of the relatives have been hidden behind layers of partnerships and investment vehicles involving friends, work colleagues and business partners. Untangling their financial holdings provides an unusually detailed look at how politically connected people have profited from being at the intersection of government and business as state influence and private wealth converge in China’s fast-growing economy.
Unlike most new businesses in China, the family’s ventures sometimes received financial backing from state-owned companies, including China Mobile, one of the country’s biggest phone operators, the documents show. At other times, the ventures won support from some of Asia’s richest tycoons. The Times found that Mr. Wen’s relatives accumulated shares in banks, jewelers, tourist resorts, telecommunications companies and infrastructure projects, sometimes by using offshore entities.
The holdings include a villa development project in Beijing; a tire factory in northern China; a company that helped build some of Beijing’s Olympic stadiums, including the well-known “Bird’s Nest”; and Ping An Insurance, one of the world’s biggest financial services companies.
As prime minister in an economy that remains heavily state-driven, Mr. Wen, who is best known for his simple ways and common touch, more importantly has broad authority over the major industries where his relatives have made their fortunes. Chinese companies cannot list their shares on a stock exchange without approval from agencies overseen by Mr. Wen, for example. He also has the power to influence investments in strategic sectors like energy and telecommunications.
Because the Chinese government rarely makes its deliberations public, it is not known what role — if any — Mr. Wen, who is 70, has played in most policy or regulatory decisions. But in some cases, his relatives have sought to profit from opportunities made possible by those decisions.
The prime minister’s younger brother, for example, has a company that was awarded more than $30 million in government contracts and subsidies to handle wastewater treatment and medical waste disposal for some of China’s biggest cities, according to estimates based on government records. The contracts were announced after Mr. Wen ordered tougher regulations on medical waste disposal in 2003 after the SARS outbreak.
In 2004, after the State Council, a government body Mr. Wen presides over, exempted Ping An Insurance and other companies from rules that limited their scope, Ping An went on to raise $1.8 billion in an initial public offering of stock. Partnerships controlled by Mr. Wen’s relatives — along with their friends and colleagues — made a fortune by investing in the company before the public offering.
In 2007, the last year the stock holdings were disclosed in public documents, those partnerships held as much as $2.2 billion worth of Ping An stock, according to an accounting of the investments by The Times that was verified by outside auditors. Ping An’s overall market value is now nearly $60 billion.
Ping An said in a statement that the company did “not know the background of the entities behind our shareholders.” The statement said, “Ping An has no means to know the intentions behind shareholders when they buy and sell our shares.”
While Communist Party regulations call for top officials to disclose their wealth and that of their immediate family members, no law or regulation prohibits relatives of even the most senior officials from becoming deal-makers or major investors — a loophole that effectively allows them to trade on their family name. Some Chinese argue that permitting the families of Communist Party leaders to profit from the country’s long economic boom has been important to ensuring elite support for market-oriented reforms.
Even so, the business dealings of Mr. Wen’s relatives have sometimes been hidden in ways that suggest the relatives are eager to avoid public scrutiny, the records filed with Chinese regulatory authorities show. Their ownership stakes are often veiled by an intricate web of holdings as many as five steps removed from the operating companies, according to the review.
In the case of Mr. Wen’s mother, The Times calculated her stake in Ping An — valued at $120 million in 2007 — by examining public records and government-issued identity cards, and by following the ownership trail to three Chinese investment entities. The name recorded on his mother’s shares was Taihong, a holding company registered in Tianjin, the prime minister’s hometown.
The apparent efforts to conceal the wealth reflect the highly charged politics surrounding the country’s ruling elite, many of whom are also enormously wealthy but reluctant to draw attention to their riches. When Bloomberg News reported in June that the extended family of Vice President Xi Jinping, set to become China’s next president, had amassed hundreds of millions of dollars in assets, the Chinese government blocked access inside the country to the Bloomberg Web site.
“In the senior leadership, there’s no family that doesn’t have these problems,” said a former government colleague of Wen Jiabao who has known him for more than 20 years and who spoke on the condition of anonymity. “His enemies are intentionally trying to smear him by letting this leak out.”
The Times presented its findings to the Chinese government for comment. The Foreign Ministry declined to respond to questions about the investments, the prime minister or his relatives. Members of Mr. Wen’s family also declined to comment or did not respond to requests for comment.
Duan Weihong, a wealthy businesswoman whose company, Taihong, was the investment vehicle for the Ping An shares held by the prime minister’s mother and other relatives, said the investments were actually her own. Ms. Duan, who comes from the prime minister’s hometown and is a close friend of his wife, said ownership of the shares was listed in the names of Mr. Wen’s relatives in an effort to conceal the size of Ms. Duan’s own holdings.
“When I invested in Ping An I didn’t want to be written about,” Ms. Duan said, “so I had my relatives find some other people to hold these shares for me.”
But it was an “accident,” she said, that her company chose the relatives of the prime minister as the listed shareholders — a process that required registering their official ID numbers and obtaining their signatures. Until presented with the names of the investors by The Times, she said, she had no idea that they had selected the relatives of Wen Jiabao.
The review of the corporate and regulatory records, which covers 1992 to 2012, found no holdings in Mr. Wen’s name. And it was not possible to determine from the documents whether he recused himself from any decisions that might have affected his relatives’ holdings, or whether they received preferential treatment on investments.
For much of his tenure, Wen Jiabao has been at the center of rumors and conjecture about efforts by his relatives to profit from his position. Yet until the review by The Times, there has been no detailed accounting of the family’s riches.
His wife, Zhang Beili, is one of the country’s leading authorities on jewelry and gemstones and is an accomplished businesswoman in her own right. By managing state diamond companies that were later privatized, The Times found, she helped her relatives parlay their minority stakes into a billion-dollar portfolio of insurance, technology and real estate ventures.
The couple’s only son sold a technology company he started to the family of Hong Kong’s richest man, Li Ka-shing, for $10 million, and used another investment vehicle to establish New Horizon Capital, now one of China’s biggest private equity firms, with partners like the government of Singapore, according to records and interviews with bankers.
The prime minister’s younger brother, Wen Jiahong, controls $200 million in assets, including wastewater treatment plants and recycling businesses, the records show.
As prime minister, Mr. Wen has staked out a position as a populist and a reformer, someone whom the state-run media has nicknamed “the People’s Premier” and “Grandpa Wen” because of his frequent outings to meet ordinary people, especially in moments of crisis like natural disasters.
While it is unclear how much the prime minister knows about his family’s wealth, State Department documents released by the WikiLeaks organization in 2010 included a cable that suggested Mr. Wen was aware of his relatives’ business dealings and unhappy about them.
“Wen is disgusted with his family’s activities, but is either unable or unwilling to curtail them,” a Chinese-born executive working at an American company in Shanghai told American diplomats, according to the 2007 cable.
China’s ‘Diamond Queen’
It is no secret in China’s elite circles that the prime minister’s wife, Zhang Beili, is rich, and that she has helped control the nation’s jewelry and gem trade. But her lucrative diamond businesses became an off-the-charts success only as her husband moved into the country’s top leadership ranks, the review of corporate and regulatory records by The Times found.
A geologist with an expertise in gemstones, Ms. Zhang is largely unknown among ordinary Chinese. She rarely travels with the prime minister or appears with him, and there are few official photographs of the couple together. And while people who have worked with her say she has a taste for jade and fine diamonds, they say she usually dresses modestly, does not exude glamour and prefers to wield influence behind the scenes, much like the relatives of other senior leaders.
The State Department documents released by WikiLeaks included a suggestion that Mr. Wen had once considered divorcing Ms. Zhang because she had exploited their relationship in her diamond trades. Taiwanese television reported in 2007 that Ms. Zhang had bought a pair of jade earrings worth about $275,000 at a Beijing trade show, though the source — a Taiwanese trader — later backed off the claim and Chinese government censors moved swiftly to block coverage of the subject in China, according to news reports at the time.
“Her business activities are known to everyone in the leadership,” said one banker who worked with relatives of Wen Jiabao. The banker said it was not unusual for her office to call upon businesspeople. “And if you get that call, how can you say no?”
Zhang Beili first gained influence in the 1990s, while working as a regulator at the Ministry of Geology. At the time, China’s jewelry market was still in its infancy.
While her husband was serving in China’s main leadership compound, known as Zhongnanhai, Ms. Zhang was setting industry standards in the jewelry and gem trade. She helped create the National Gemstone Testing Center in Beijing, and the Shanghai Diamond Exchange, two of the industry’s most powerful institutions.
In a country where the state has long dominated the marketplace, jewelry regulators often decided which companies could set up diamond-processing factories, and which would gain entry to the retail jewelry market. State regulators even formulated rules that required diamond sellers to buy certificates of authenticity for any diamond sold in China, from the government-run testing center in Beijing, which Ms. Zhang managed.
As a result, when executives from Cartier or De Beers visited China with hopes of selling diamonds and jewelry here, they often went to visit Ms. Zhang, who became known as China’s “diamond queen.”
“She’s the most important person there,” said Gaetano Cavalieri, president of the World Jewelry Confederation in Switzerland. “She was bridging relations between partners — Chinese and foreign partners.”
As early as 1992, people who worked with Ms. Zhang said, she had begun to blur the line between government official and businesswoman. As head of the state-owned China Mineral and Gem Corporation, she began investing the state company’s money in start-ups. And by the time her husband was named vice premier, in 1998, she was busy setting up business ventures with friends and relatives.
The state company she ran invested in a group of affiliated diamond companies, according to public records. Many of them were run by Ms. Zhang’s relatives — or colleagues who had worked with her at the National Gemstone Testing Center.
In 1993, for instance, the state company Ms. Zhang ran helped found Beijing Diamond, a big jewelry retailer. A year later, one of her younger brothers, Zhang Jianming, and two of her government colleagues personally acquired 80 percent of the company, according to shareholder registers. Beijing Diamond invested in Shenzhen Diamond, which was controlled by her brother-in-law, Wen Jiahong, the prime minister’s younger brother.
Among the successful undertakings was Sino-Diamond, a venture financed by the state-owned China Mineral and Gem Corporation, which she headed. The company had business ties with a state-owned company managed by another brother, Zhang Jiankun, who worked as an official in Jiaxing, Ms. Zhang’s hometown, in Zhejiang Province.
In the summer of 1999, after securing agreements to import diamonds from Russia and South Africa, Sino-Diamond went public, raising $50 million on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. The offering netted Ms. Zhang’s family about $8 million, according to corporate filings.
Although she was never listed as a shareholder, former colleagues and business partners say Ms. Zhang’s early diamond partnerships were the nucleus of a larger portfolio of companies she would later help her family and colleagues gain a stake in.
The Times found no indication that Wen Jiabao used his political clout to influence the diamond companies his relatives invested in. But former business partners said that the family’s success in diamonds, and beyond, was often bolstered with financial backing from wealthy businessmen who sought to curry favor with the prime minister’s family.
“After Wen became prime minister, his wife sold off some of her diamond investments and moved into new things,” said a Chinese executive who did business with the family. He asked not to be named because of fear of government retaliation. Corporate records show that beginning in the late 1990s, a series of rich businessmen took turns buying up large stakes in the diamond companies, often from relatives of Mr. Wen, and then helped them reinvest in other lucrative ventures, like real estate and finance.
According to corporate records and interviews, the businessmen often supplied accountants and office space to investment partnerships partly controlled by the relatives.
“When they formed companies,” said one businessman who set up a company with members of the Wen family, “Ms. Zhang stayed in the background. That’s how it worked.”
The Only Son
Late one evening early this year, the prime minister’s only son, Wen Yunsong, was in the cigar lounge at Xiu, an upscale bar and lounge at the Park Hyatt in Beijing. He was having cocktails as Beijing’s nouveau riche gathered around, clutching designer bags and wearing expensive business suits, according to two guests who were present.
In China, the children of senior leaders are widely believed to be in a class of their own. Known as “princelings,” they often hold Ivy League degrees, get V.I.P. treatment, and are even offered preferred pricing on shares in hot stock offerings.
They are also known as people who can get things done in China’s heavily regulated marketplace, where the state controls access. And in recent years, few princelings have been as bold as the younger Mr. Wen, who goes by the English name Winston and is about 40 years old.
A Times review of Winston Wen’s investments, and interviews with people who have known him for years, show that his deal-making has been extensive and lucrative, even by the standards of his princeling peers.
State-run giants like China Mobile have formed start-ups with him. In recent years, Winston Wen has been in talks with Hollywood studios about a financing deal.
Concerned that China does not have an elite boarding school for Chinese students, he recently hired the headmasters of Choate and Hotchkiss in Connecticut to oversee the creation of a $150 million private school now being built in the Beijing suburbs.
Winston Wen and his wife, moreover, have stakes in the technology industry and an electric company, as well as an indirect stake in Union Mobile Pay, the government-backed online payment platform — all while living in the prime minister’s residence, in central Beijing, according to corporate records and people familiar with the family’s investments.
“He’s not shy about using his influence to get things done,” said one venture capitalist who regularly meets with Winston Wen.
The younger Mr. Wen declined to comment. But in a telephone interview, his wife, Yang Xiaomeng, said her husband had been unfairly criticized for his business dealings.
“Everything that has been written about him has been wrong,” she said. “He’s really not doing that much business anymore.”
Winston Wen was educated in Beijing and then earned an engineering degree from the Beijing Institute of Technology. He went abroad and earned a master’s degree in engineering materials from the University of Windsor, in Canada, and an M.B.A. from the Kellogg School of Business at Northwestern University in Evanston, Ill., just outside Chicago.
When he returned to China in 2000, he helped set up three successful technology companies in five years, according to people familiar with those deals. Two of them were sold to Hong Kong businessmen, one to the family of Li Ka-shing, one of the wealthiest men in Asia.
Winston Wen’s earliest venture, an Internet data services provider called Unihub Global, was founded in 2000 with $2 million in start-up capital, according to Hong Kong and Beijing corporate filings. Financing came from a tight-knit group of relatives and his mother’s former colleagues from government and the diamond trade, as well as an associate of Cheng Yu-tung, patriarch of Hong Kong’s second-wealthiest family. The firm’s earliest customers were state-owned brokerage houses and Ping An, in which the Wen family has held a large financial stake.
He made an even bolder move in 2005, by pushing into private equity when he formed New Horizon Capital with a group of Chinese-born classmates from Northwestern. The firm quickly raised $100 million from investors, including SBI Holdings, a division of the Japanese group SoftBank, and Temasek, the Singapore government investment fund.
Under Mr. Wen, New Horizon established itself as a leading private equity firm, investing in biotech, solar, wind and construction equipment makers. Since it began operations, the firm has returned about $430 million to investors, a fourfold profit, according to SBI Holdings.
“Their first fund was dynamite,” said Kathleen Ng, editor of Asia Private Equity Review, an industry publication in Hong Kong. “And that allowed them to raise a lot more money.”
Today, New Horizon has more than $2.5 billion under management.
Some of Winston Wen’s deal-making, though, has attracted unwanted attention for the prime minister.
In 2010, when New Horizon acquired a 9 percent stake in a company called Sihuan Pharmaceuticals just two months before its public offering, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange said the late-stage investment violated its rules and forced the firm to return the stake. Still, New Horizon made a $46.5 million profit on the sale.
Soon after, New Horizon announced that Winston Wen had handed over day-to-day operations and taken up a position at the China Satellite Communications Corporation, a state-owned company that has ties to the Chinese space program. He has since been named chairman.
The Tycoons
In the late 1990s, Duan Weihong was managing an office building and several other properties in Tianjin, the prime minister’s hometown in northern China, through her property company, Taihong. She was in her 20s and had studied at the Nanjing University of Science and Technology.
Around 2002, Ms. Duan went into business with several relatives of Wen Jiabao, transforming her property company into an investment vehicle of the same name. The company helped make Ms. Duan very wealthy.
It is not known whether Ms. Duan, now 43, is related to the prime minister. In a series of interviews, she first said she did not know any members of the Wen family, but later described herself as a friend of the family and particularly close to Zhang Beili, the prime minister’s wife. As happened to a handful of other Chinese entrepreneurs, Ms. Duan’s fortunes soared as she teamed up with the relatives and their network of friends and colleagues, though she described her relationship with them involving the shares in Ping An as existing on paper only and having no financial component.
Ms. Duan and other wealthy businesspeople — among them, six billionaires from across China — have been instrumental in getting multimillion-dollar ventures off the ground and, at crucial times, helping members of the Wen family set up investment vehicles to profit from them, according to investment bankers who have worked with all parties.
Established in Tianjin, Taihong had spectacular returns. In 2002, the company paid about $65 million to acquire a 3 percent stake in Ping An before its initial public offering, according to corporate records and Ms. Duan’s graduate school thesis. Five years later, those shares were worth $3.7 billion
The company’s Hong Kong affiliate, Great Ocean, also run by Ms. Duan, later formed a joint venture with the Beijing government and acquired a huge tract of land adjacent to Capital International Airport. Today, the site is home to a sprawling cargo and logistics center. Last year, Great Ocean sold its 53 percent stake in the project to a Singapore company for nearly $400 million.
That deal and several other investments, in luxury hotels, Beijing villa developments and the Hong Kong-listed BBMG, one of China’s largest building materials companies, have been instrumental to Ms. Duan’s accumulation of riches, according to The Times’s review of corporate records.
The review also showed that over the past decade there have been nearly three dozen individual shareholders of Taihong, many of whom are either relatives of Wen Jiabao or former colleagues of his wife.
The other wealthy entrepreneurs who have worked with the prime minister’s relatives declined to comment for this article. Ms. Duan strongly denied having financial ties to the prime minister or his relatives and said she was only trying to avoid publicity by listing others as owning Ping An shares. “The money I invested in Ping An was completely my own,” said Ms. Duan, who has served as a member of the Ping An board of supervisors. “Everything I did was legal.”
Another wealthy partner of the Wen relatives has been Cheng Yu-tung, who controls the Hong Kong conglomerate New World Development and is one of the richest men in Asia, worth about $15 billion, according to Forbes.
In the 1990s, New World was seeking a foothold in mainland China for a sister company that specializes in high-end retail jewelry. The retail chain, Chow Tai Fook, opened its first store in China in 1998.
Mr. Cheng and his associates invested in a diamond venture backed by the relatives of Mr. Wen and co-invested with them in an array of corporate entities, including Sino-Life, National Trust and Ping An, according to records and interviews with some of those involved. Those investments by Mr. Cheng are now worth at least $5 billion, according to the corporate filings. Chow Tai Fook, the jewelry chain, has also flourished. Today, China accounts for 60 percent of the chain’s $4.2 billion in annual revenue.
Mr. Cheng, 87, could not be reached for comment. Calls to New World Development were not returned.
Fallout for Premier
In the winter of 2007, just before he began his second term as prime minister, Wen Jiabao called for new measures to fight corruption, particularly among high-ranking officials.
“Leaders at all levels of government should take the lead in the antigraft drive,” he told a gathering of high-level party members in Beijing. “They should strictly ensure that their family members, friends and close subordinates do not abuse government influence.”
The speech was consistent with the prime minister’s earlier drive to toughen disclosure rules for public servants, and to require senior officials to reveal their family assets.
Whether Mr. Wen has made such disclosures for his own family is unclear, since the Communist Party does not release such information. Even so, many of the holdings found by The Times would not need to be disclosed under the rules since they are not held in the name of the prime minister’s immediate family — his wife, son and daughter.
Eighty percent of the $2.7 billion in assets identified in The Times’s investigation and verified by the outside auditors were held by, among others, the prime minister’s mother, his younger brother, two brothers-in-law, a sister-in-law, daughter-in-law and the parents of his son’s wife, none of whom is subject to party disclosure rules. The total value of the relatives’ stake in Ping An is based on calculations by The Times that were confirmed by the auditors. The total includes shares held by the relatives that were sold between 2004 and 2006, and the value of the remaining shares in late 2007, the last time the holdings were publicly disclosed.
Legal experts said that determining the precise value of holdings in China could be difficult because there might be undisclosed side agreements about the true beneficiaries.
“Complex corporate structures are not necessarily insidious,” said Curtis J. Milhaupt, a Columbia University Law School professor who has studied China’s corporate group structures. “But in a system like China’s, where corporate ownership and political power are closely intertwined, shell companies magnify questions about who owns what and where the money came from.”
Among the investors in the Wen family ventures are longtime business associates, former colleagues and college classmates, including Yu Jianming, who attended Northwestern with Winston Wen, and Zhang Yuhong, a longtime colleague of Wen Jiahong, the prime minister’s younger brother. The associates did not return telephone calls seeking comment.
Revelations about the Wen family’s wealth could weaken him politically.
Next month, at the 18th Party Congress in Beijing, the Communist Party is expected to announce a new generation of leaders. But the selection process has already been marred by one of the worst political scandals in decades, the downfall of Bo Xilai, the Chongqing party boss, who was vying for a top position.
In Beijing, Wen Jiabao is expected to step down as prime minister in March at the end of his second term. Political analysts say that even after leaving office he could remain a strong backstage political force. But documents showing that his relatives amassed a fortune during his tenure could diminish his standing, the analysts said.
“This will affect whatever residual power Wen has,” said Minxin Pei, an expert on Chinese leadership and a professor of government at Claremont McKenna College in California.
The prime minister’s supporters say he has not personally benefited from his extended family’s business dealings, and may not even be knowledgeable about the extent of them.
Last March, the prime minister hinted that he was at least aware of the persistent rumors about his relatives. During a nationally televised news conference in Beijing, he insisted that he had “never pursued personal gain” in public office.
“I have the courage to face the people and to face history,” he said in an emotional session. “There are people who will appreciate what I have done, but there are also people who will criticize me. Ultimately, history will have the final say.”
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/26/business/global/family-of-wen-jiabao-holds-a-hidden-fortune-in-china.html?_r=1&ref=china
“我敢于面对人民、面对历史。”温家宝动情地说:“知我罪我,其惟春秋。”

一筆隱藏在香港的平安股權

一筆隱藏在香港的平安股權

報道 2012年11月27日
http://cn.nytimes.com/article/china/2012/11/27/c27pinganside/zh-hk/

溫家寶家人與平安之間的關係主要是通過持有一家位於總理家鄉天津的公司的股份實現的。但此外,他們似乎還與香港有聯繫。
鄭建源曾是平安的主要投資人之一。據平安前高管稱,他曾是香港富豪鄭裕彤(Cheng Yu-tung)的商務助理及投資經理人,鄭裕彤同時掌管着新世界發展集團(New World Development Group)以及世界最大的珠寶連鎖店之一周大福(Chow Tai Fook)。
2000年到2004年之間,在平安公司在香港證券交易所(Hong Kong Stock Exchange)上市之前,鄭裕彤及其新世界集團手下的五家公司從招商局集團和其他國有企業手中購買到了平安20%的股份。這五家公司一度都由鄭建源管理或掌控。
公司和其他公開記錄顯示,在投資平安前後,鄭建源掌控的投資工具與溫家寶的家人之間形成了多種商業合作關係,還曾為總理之子溫雲松的兩家創業公司提供資金。

此外,監管記錄顯示,2001年中期,鄭建源手下的一個投資工具從一家鑽石公司藉資900萬美元(約合5600萬元)。這家鑽石公司部分是由溫家寶 家人及其妻子以前在鑽石行業工作的政府同事控制的。之後不久,該投資工具——寶華——就在平安首次公開募股之前購入了平安約2000萬股的股票。

平安的高管拒絕對此發表評論。記者也無法聯繫到現年87歲的鄭裕彤。聯繫鄭建源的努力也沒有成功。

據那些熟悉平安將股份出售給鄭裕彤手下的人稱,1999年,一家周大福的合資公司在武漢被重組,在中國大陸還成立了其他幾個投資工具,以規避中國對外資公司持股的限制。

當時,高盛(Goldman Sachs)和摩根斯坦利(Morgan Stanley)持有平安約15%的股份。到2002年,滙豐銀行(HSBC)還持有平安10%的股份。根據1998年中國保險業監管機構發佈的規定,平 安的外商投資上限設在25%。由於香港自治,香港投資人也被看做是外商,所以這些規定也適用於香港投資人。

鄭建源利用中國政府頒發的身份證,在平安香港首次公開募股前,就通過多家公司持有平安10億股以上的股票,占平安總股份的20%以上。

“這幾方受控於同一個力量,”曾與鄭裕彤及溫家寶親屬共事過的一位高管稱。他因害怕遭到報復而要求不具名。“它隱藏在表面之下,就像希格斯玻色子理論一樣,是經濟暗物質:它有一股引力,但你卻看不到它。”
《紐約時報》查閱的一份平安公開文件顯示,該公司從未披露過鄭裕彤以及鄭建源曾持有股份,也沒有公開披露與他們有關的那些公司之間存在緊密連繫。對香港方面記錄的查詢以及對鄭建源身份證上所示的家鄉廣東省陸河縣的訪問表明,鄭建源事實上是香港公民。

陸河縣當地民警在搜索了政府數據之後稱,該縣查無此人,而他的身份證號也不在記錄中。在陸河縣編纂家史的鄭程宇(Zheng Chengyu,音譯)說:“我從沒聽過這個名字。”

Another Big Stake in Ping An, Hidden in a Hong Kong Investment

November 27, 2012
http://cn.nytimes.com/article/china/2012/11/27/c27pinganside/en/

The main connection to Ping An for relatives of Wen Jiabao was through their stakes in a company based in the prime minister’s hometown, Tianjin, in northern China. But there was also apparently a Hong Kong connection.

One big investor in Ping An was Zheng Jianyuan, who former Ping An executives said worked as a business associate and an investment manager for Cheng Yu-tung, the Hong Kong billionaire who controls both the New World Development Group and Chow Tai Fook, one of the world’s largest jewelry store chains.

Between 2000 and 2004, five companies affiliated with Mr. Cheng and his New World Group acquired 20 percent of Ping An’s stock from the China Merchants Group and other state entities ahead of Ping An’s listing on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. At one time, all five companies were managed or controlled by Mr. Zheng.

Corporate and other public records show that the investment vehicles controlled by Mr. Zheng formed numerous business partnerships with the relatives of Mr. Wen, around the time of the Ping An investments, and financed two start-ups run by the prime minister’s son, Wen Yunsong.

In mid-2001, moreover, one of Mr. Zheng’s investment vehicles borrowed about $9 million from a diamond company partly controlled by relatives of the prime minister, and his wife’s former government colleagues in the diamond trade, according to regulatory filings. Soon after, that vehicle — Baohua — bought about 20 million Ping An shares before its initial public offering.

Ping An executives declined to comment. Cheng Yu-tung, who is now 87, could not be reached for comment. Efforts to reach Mr. Zheng were also unsuccessful.

People familiar with the sale of Ping An shares to associates of Mr. Cheng say that in 1999 a Chow Tai Fook joint venture was restructured in the Chinese city of Wuhan and several other investment vehicles were set up in mainland China in order to avoid a Chinese restriction on foreign ownership.

At that point, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley owned about 15 percent of Ping An’s shares, and by 2002, the British bank HSBC held 10 percent. Under rules issued in 1998 by China’s insurance regulators, total foreign investment in Ping An was capped at 25 percent. Those rules also applied to investors from Hong Kong, who are still considered foreign because Hong Kong is governed separately.
Using a Chinese government-issued identity card in his name, Mr. Zheng was able to control companies that held more than one billion shares of Ping An stock at the time of the Hong Kong I.P.O. — just over 20 percent of Ping An’s shares.
“These several parties were under common control,” said one executive who worked with Mr. Cheng and relatives of Mr. Wen, but who asked not to be named for fear of retribution. “It was under the surface, like the Higgs boson theory, economic dark matter: It has a gravitational pull, but you can’t see it.” 

A New York Times review of Ping An’s public filings indicates that the company never publicly disclosed that Mr. Cheng or Mr. Zheng controlled the stakes — or that the various companies they were linked to were closely related. And a search of Hong Kong records and a visit to Luhe County, in Guangdong Province — the county listed as Mr. Zheng’s hometown on his identity card — suggests that Mr. Zheng was in fact a Hong Kong resident.

After searching the local government database, police in Luhe County said no such person existed in the county, and that the ID number was not in their records. And Zheng Chengyu, who compiles family histories in Luhe County, said: “I’ve never heard of this name.”

The Historical Significance of Mao Zedong

The Historical Significance of Mao Zedong
http://www.henryckliu.com/page260.html

By
Henry C.K. Liu (廖子光)
The protracted history of the Chinese socialist revolution started 94 years ago in 1919 on May 4, when 5,000 students from Beijing University and twelve other schools held a political demonstration in front of Tiananmen, the focal point of what is today known as Tiananmen Square. The demonstration sparked what came to be known in history as the May Fourth Movement of 1919-21, an anti-imperialism movement rising out of patriotic reactions to dishonorable foreign relations of the government of China’s then warlord Yuan Shi-kai (袁世凯) that led to unjust treatment of China by Western powers at the Versailles Peace Conference. May Fourth was a political landmark that consolidated the nation's collective awareness that Western democracy is as imperialistic as the Western monarchy it overthrew. This national collective awareness turned China from Western democracy towards the path of modern socialism through Marxist-Leninist proactive revolution.
Mao Zedong at the time of the May 4th Movement was 26 years old and a librarian assistant in Beijing University where he spent time in the stacks reading about heroic nationalist leaders such as George Washingon, Napoleon and Bismark and became inspired by their world-changing patriotic deeds."
As a son of a small farming family that enjoyed comfortable living on three arces of land in rural Shao-shan in Hunan province, Mao in his youth spent his spare time after working in the field reading Chinese history and literature in the newly-opened public library in nearby Changsha. He was particularly inspired by the legalist policies of Qin Shi Wang (秦始皇; 259 BC – 210 BC) and the theme of Water Margin (水浒传), a 14th century novel of uiversal brotherhood and one of the Four Great Classical Novels of Chinese literature
Before going to Beijing, Mao attended First Normal School of Changsha, coming under the influenced of several progressive teachers there, including a professor of ethics named Yang Changji (杨昌济 1871-1920), who urged Mao and other students to read a radical newspaper, New Youth (新青年) founded by Marxist Chen Duxiu (陈独秀1879–1942), Dean of the Faculty of Letters at Beijing University.
In 1918, after graduating from First Normal School of Chansha, Mao moved to Beijing, to join Yang Changji who had been recently appointed professor at Peking University by Cai Yuanpei (蔡元培1868-1940), the progressive president. Yang recommended Mao to be an assistan to university librarian Li Dazhao (李大钊1889–1927), a Marxist intellectual in China who later participated the the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai in 1921.
Li wrote a series of articles in New Youth on the October Revolution which had just taken place in Russia, during which the Bolshevik Party under the leadership of Vladimir Lenin (1870–1924) seized state power. Lenin had put forth the theory of imperialism as the final stage of capitalism based on the writings of John Atkinson Hobson (1858-1940), building on the socio-economic-political theory of Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820–1895) in the mid-19th century from observation on turbulent European conditions.
Li's articles helped create interest in Marxism in the Chinese revolutionary movement, as an alternative to Western-style democracy that had been subscribed by the 1911 bourgeios Revolution led by Sun Yat-sen, but had proved wanting in the behavior of Western democracies at the 1919 Versailles Peace Conference. Marxism was then recognized by Chinese revolutionary intellectuals as a more effective ideology in the struggle against Western imperialism even when many of the concepts of Marxism apply only to Euroepan situations
The May Fourth Movement marked a turn by anti-imperialist Chinese intellectuals towards revolutionary Marxism. The success of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia was a major factor in forming the views of Li Dazhao on the revolutionary role of the state. Li initiated the Peking Socialist Youth Corps in 1920 and in July 1921 co-founded the Communist Party of China (CPC) with Chen Duxiu, who had been exposed to socialist ideas in Japan, as a political institution with the secular program to seize power of the state to carry out socialist revolution in China. A revolutionary state is the rationale for a one-party government, provided that the ruling party represents the interest of the people. Li was a mentor to Mao Zedong who openly acknowledged having been influenced by Li’s ideas.
The first edition of Stalin’s Problems of Leninism, which appeared in April 1924, seven years after the October Revolution of 1917, asks: “Is it possible to attain the final victory of socialism in one country, without the combined efforts of the proletarians of several advanced countries?” The answer was: “No, it is not. The efforts of one country are enough for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie [in one country]. This is what the history of our revolution tells us. For the final victory of socialism, for the organization of socialist production, the efforts of one country, especially a peasant country like ours, are not enough. For this we must have the efforts of the proletariat of several advanced countries.”
The strategic key words on socialist internationalism are ‘final victory’ which cannot be achieved with just ‘socialism in one country’, and the phrase “the proletariat of several advanced countries”. But ‘final’ implies not immediate but in the future, even the distant future. And international communism was focused not on the whole world, but on “the proletariat of several advance countries” where evolutionary conditions were considered as ripe. It was not focused on the peasantry still living under agricultural feudal societies outside of Europe or the oppressed people of imperialist colonies and semi-colonies.
To both Lenin and Stalin, the path to liberation in the colonies of the Western empire was to strengthen the only socialist country in the world, namely the Soviet Union, and to weaken capitalism at the core, namely industrialized economies, to end its final stage of imperialism. In theory, the liberated industrial workers of the Western advanced economies would in turn help liberate the oppressed peasants in the colonies and semi-colonies in the still not industrialized economies.
Unfortunately, actual events failed to support this theory. There was no worker uprising in the advanced economies. In fact, unionism in the advanced economies sided with management and turned anti-communist. These trends support the truth that liberation cannot be delivered by others and must be won by the victims themselves. Each oppressed group must struggle for self liberation through internal political consciousness.
Both Lenin and Stalin failed to recognize the inherently powerful but latent revolutionary potential of the peasants of the pre-industrial colonies and semi-colonies of the Western Empires, which had to wait until the emergence of Mao Zedong in China to force the world to acknowledge this truth in history. Mao, in placing his faith in the revolutionary potential of the Chinese peasantry, redefined the term “proletariat” to mean those deprived of property, a property-less class, away from the European idea of the proletariat as the class of urban industrial workers.
The October Revolution of 1917 was launched on the slogan: “All Power to the Soviets” through which the minority Bolsheviks won political leadership in the Soviets, which were workers councils that constituted the power behind the new socialist state. Bourgeois liberal democracy was not an objective of the October Revolution, but rather a target for elimination in order to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat in the context of socialist revolution through class struggle.
This was because in feudal Russia in 1917, the proletariat as a dominant class was an abstraction yet to be created as a reality by industrialization. The proletariat in its infancy, small in number, could not possibly command a majority under universal suffrage in a feudal agricultural society. Therefore dictatorship of a minority proletariat is the only revolutionary path towards socialism.
In pre-industrial societies, liberal representative democracy is by definition reactionary in the absence of a dominant working class. Lenin considered the revolution in Russia as a fortuitous beginning of an emerging socialist world order that required and justified a dictatorship of the proletariat to sustain revolutionary progress.
Leninists work for the acceleration of socio-economic dialectics by the violent overthrow of capitalism just as capitalism had been the violent slayer of feudalism. Evolutionary Marxists, such as social democrats, believe in scientific dialectic materialism which predicts the inevitability of the replacement of capitalism by socialism as a natural outcome of capitalism’s internal contradiction.
But the evolutionary process requires the emergence of capitalism as a natural outcome of feudalism’s internal contradiction. Marx saw the process of evolution toward socialism as taking place in the most advanced segment of the world, in capitalistic societies of industrialized Western Europe when the ruling bourgeoisie had replaced the aristocracy as a result of the French Revolution. The Russian Revolution showed that geopolitical conditions have opened up opportunities for revolutions in pre-industrialized nations and it is in these pre-industrial societies that radical revolution is needed to bring about instant socialism by short-circuiting the long evolutionary process from feudalism to capitalism to socialism.
In Germany, the most industrialized country in the second half of the 19th century, Social Democrat icons such as Karl Kautsky and Eduard Bernstein, titans of Marxist exegesis, favored gradual, non-violent and parliamentary processes to effectuate inevitable dialectic evolution towards socialism because of the existence in Germany of a large working class. These Marxists subscribed to the doctrine of evolutionary Marxism which renders revolution unnecessary as socialism would arrive naturally from capitalism as an evolutionary process of dialectic materialism.
On the other end of the spectrum were radical revolutionaries such as Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, leaders of the Spartacists, founded in the summer of 1915 when they withdrew from the German Social-Democrat Party (SDP) because of SDP support for Germany’s participation in the First World War. The Spartacists staged an abortive coup to overthrow the young social democratic government in Germany. For communists, revolution is necessary in order to short circuit the long stage of capitalism during which the evolutionary process can be halted by unionism and the introduction of a mixed economy through the injection of socialist dimension in the capitalist system. This is particularly true for pre-industrial feudal societies when a capitalist system with socialist dimension can be employed to ward off any revolutionary pressure.
The call by radical Leninists for worldwide coalition of the browbeaten proletariat majority in the industrial societies in the West, who were still deprived of political power beyond the structural dialectical process, and the agitating proletariat minority in the agricultural societies in whose name radical Leninists had gained state power in Russia, was most threatening to the rulers of the capitalist order in the advanced imperialist countries.
Reaction to this threat gave rise to insidious anti-communism in the imperialist West to prevent the arrival of socialism in the strongholds of industrial capitalism ahead of its evolutionary schedule. In the advanced economies, state-sponsored capitalist propaganda was conditioning workers into an active anti-communist force through industrial unionism and the addictive appeal of individualistic bourgeois freedom to neutralize collective working class solidarity.
Still, all Marxists share the belief that the structural antagonism between a capitalist bourgeoisie class and a proletariat class in advanced economies was a necessary precondition for creating socialism. It required the resolution of the contradiction between the efficient productivity of capitalism and the economic dysfunctionality of the mal-distribution of wealth inherent in capitalism. The good of capitalism is its efficiency in creating wealth; the bad is that the way wealth is created in capitalism requires wealth to go to the wrong places, to those who need it least, namely the rich rather than the poor who need it most. Also, awareness was increasing that capital in the modern financial system comes increasingly from the pension funds of workers in capitalist society with socialist dimensions - the welfare state.
Wealth is Good
Wealth is good; it is the mal-distribution of it that is bad and creates socio-economic conflicts. And if that mal-distribution is carried out through class lines, then struggle must be part of a socialist revolution.
The internal contradiction of capitalism is that it creates wealth by widening the gap between rich and poor. Wealth disparity is a polluting socio-economic by-product of capitalist wealth creation, like the nuclear waste in nuclear energy.
While capital cannot create wealth without labor, the proletariat in advanced economies, oppressed by a pro-capital legal-political regime, never managed to gain control of ownership of the means of production financed by their own wealth, stored in worker pension funds. Thus oppressed workers remained silently, docile victims of capitalist exploitation by capitalists using workers’ own retirement money as capital.
Apologists for capitalism then create the myth of capital being needed to create employment, ignoring the fact that it is the saved income from employed workers that creates capital. In other words, employment creates capital, not the other way around. Chinese reformers have yet to understand this truism when they accept low wages in order to attract capital investment.
The global financial crisis that began in 2007 in New York is a live demonstration of the self-destructive potential of finance capitalism when not supported by full employment with rising wages, which then forces needed consumption to be financed by consumer debt which inevitably will become unsustainable.
The current financial crisis of unsustainable debt around the world has ignited populist demand for socio-political changes in all countries. These populist changes will transform the existing socio-economic world order, even though it is too early to predict what shape his new world order will take. Suffice to observe that changes in government toward progressive populism are now taking place in every nation, except perhaps China where a one-party government lead by the communist party still governs. But many Western-trained Chinese neoliberal economists continue to argue for more free markets that uses market forces to keep wages low.
The agraraian socio-eonomic conditions in czarist Russia and dynastic China, while not congruent to each other, were fundamentally different from the industrial conditions in Europe where the Industrial Revolution had taken place to bring into existence a large working class of factory workers that was supposed to be ripe for the revolutionary class struggle as envisioned by Marx at the start of the 1848 Democratic Revolutions.
Tragically, the socialist movements were crushed and their revolutonary leaders murdered by reactionary forces in both Germany and France. The capitalist democratic regimes that followed inherited and embraced with renewed vigor Western imperialism and its colonies around the world.
Russia and China, both great nations with glorious histories that had fallen socio-economically and technologiaclly backward, were not touched by Industrial Revolution to bring forth a class of industrial workers. The oppressed classes in these two agrarian societies were rural peasants which constitued over 80% of the population.
However, in semi-colonial China, a powerful domestic comprador class had emerged to serve advancing Western imperialism. Compradors in China were Chinese managers or senior local employees that worked for large transnational foreign commercial enterprises active in China. These compradors, becoming rich and powerful serving foreign economic and political interests against China's national interest, had close symbiotic connection with Western imperialism and its exploitative foreign capital and businesses. This comprador class flourished in Western colonies in China such as Hong Kong and the five Open Port Cities established by unfair terms of the unequaled treaties forced on China by Western imperialist powers after China repeatedly lost the Opium Wars of 1839-42.
Under the current market economy in present-day China, a large new comprador class has re-emerged to again serve foreign corporate interest backed by US global geopolitical strategy to defuse revolutionary pressure while transferring wealth from China to the West in the name of free trade denominated in paper fiat dollars. Even Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have become leading compradors for foreign commercial and financial enterprises in China's increasingly open markets since the introduction of the "reform and open" policy in 1978. The full implementation of WTO rules will strengthen the comprador role of Chinese state-owned banking institutions
These SOEs having been tutored by experienced Chinese compradors from Hong Kong which had became a British colony in 1841 and not returned to Chinese sovereignty until 1997. Even after Hong Kong's return to Chinese sovereignty, its compradors have continue to provide traitorous advice to Chinese leaders who did not know better, having been involuntarily isolated from the economic process of the modern world through decades of US anti-communist total embargo. These Hong Kong compradors have profited obscenely from bridging the gap in the different levels of development between China and the advanced Westion nations while locking China by policy into another century of semi-colonial fate.
The two most grevious errors made by China's "reform and open" policy of 1978 by following poisonous advice of Hong Kong compradors are:
1) China by policy tries to modernize and develop its economy through the exploitation of low-wage labor for export, leading Chinese society to structural faults of low income and wealth disparity as well as uneven locational development. China has now developed not regions where China needs most, but regions where Western markets find most convenient from which to exploit the Chinese economy.
2) China by policy volntarily opens its market to domination by Western capital, and returns its national economy to semi-colonial status while being idiotically pleased with comprador earnings from commission while massive amount of wealth are leaking into foreign pockets.

This kind of bad addvice naturally came from Hong Kong compradors to reflect the limit of their own slave mentality. It was like asking a house slave for advice on liberation by armed uprising. The answer is always: "Don't even think about it."
These are the structural reasons why the Chinese economy built on the "reform and open" policy is plighted with inequality and unevenness, not to mention corruption. While "reform and open" can be good policy for all nations in the modern interconnected world, the strategy and implementation of China's "reform and open" policy needs to be reconsidered to correct its foundation of prenacious new compradorism and to prevent this unsavory practice from siphoning more wealth into foreign pockets in a zero sum game.
Mao Zedong wrote the following words in Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society (March 1926) to combat two deviations then found in the Party:
The exponents of the first deviation, represented by Chen Duxiu, were concerned only with cooperation with the ruling Kuomindang and neglecting the peasants.
This was Right opportunism.

The exponents of the second deviation, represented by Zhang Guotao, were concerned only with China's [non-existent] industrial labor movement, also neglecting the peasants. This was Left opportunism
Both were aware that they were lacking in mass support, but neither knew where to seek reinforcements or to generate popular support on a mass scale.
Mao pointed out that the Chinese peasantry was the most oppressed and numerically the largest force of the Chinese proletariat (无产阶级), defined in Chinese political nomenclature as property-less class, not just factory workers, and placed class struggle in the Chinese revolution as one between the peasant proletariat class and the comprador class as local agents of Western imperialism
Moreover, Mao saw that the national bourgeoisie is actually a vacillating class, while being antagonistic to stronger foreign competition and being quick studies of imperialist modes of operation to in turn oppress a small but growing new working class of factory workers in the home market. Mao predicted that the national bourgeoisie as a class would disintegrate in an upsurge of popular revolution, with its right-wing going over to the side of Western imperialism. This prediction had been borne out a year later by political events surrounding Jiang Jieshi's counter-revolutionary coup d'état in 1927.
Today, the national bourgeoisie in China contitutes what General Secretary Xi Jinping calls "special interest groups" (特殊利益群体) which present themselves as formidable organized obstacles to true reform. Many of them are modern-day compradors.

Mao asks: "Who are our enemies? Who are our friends? This is a question of the first importance for the revolution."

It is a question that needs to be asked today by all Chinese patriots.
"The landlord class and the comprador class are our enemies," Mao answers.
In China today, a new landlord class is emerging as real estate developers and speculator, and a new comprador class is firmly in charge of the Chinese economy to serve the benefit of foreign institutions of neo-liberalism, the new face of Western imperialism around the world.
In the first general study meeting of the Politburo of the 18th Party Congress, General Secretary Xi Jinping talked emphatically about "firmly upholding the socialist road (坚持社会主义道路), firmly upholding the people's democratic dictatorship (坚持人民民主专政), firmly upholding leadership of the Communist Party of China (坚持中国共产党的领导) and firmly upholding Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought (坚持马列主义、毛泽东思想).
Echoing Deng Xiaoping's famous 1992 Southern Tour (南巡) 20 years ago to reaffirm the policy of "reform and open", Xi Jinping as new leader, conducted his own new Southern Tour to Shenzhen shortly after assuming office as Party General Secretary to reaffirm the continuation of China's policy of "reform and open".
Large in Xi Jinping's reform policy are new emphases on anti-corruption (反腐) and attack on special interest groups (打击特殊利益群体), adjustment in income disparity and aggressive improvement in the living standard of the people by promoting common prosperity (共同富裕). The compromise of "letting some people get rich first" which the comprador and national bourgeoisie classes have conveniently dropped the word "first" in practice appears to be ending under the new leadership of Xi Jingping.

Mao said that in economically backward and semi-colonial China, the landlord class and the comprador class were appendages of the international bourgeoisie, depending on imperialism for survival, prosperity and growth. These classes represented the most backward and most reactionary relations of production in China and hindered the development of her own productive forces. Their existence is utterly incompatible with the aims of the Chinese revolution, Mao emphasized. He went on to crushed them as enemy classes early after gaining state power.
The big landlord and big comprador classes in particular always sided with imperialism and constituted an extreme counterrevolutionary group. They made counter-revolutionary careers for themselves by opposing the Communist Party and received subsidies from various groups of reactionaries in power, from imperialists and the right-wing of the Kuomindang, Mao added.
Under the "reform and open" policies since 1978, a new landlord class has re-emerged made up of real estate developers and speculators, and a new comprador class has re-emerged in the commercial and financial markets in China. The nation's best young talents after having been educated in top Chinese universities and foreign graduate schools have mostly been co-opted by Western companies to act as compradors in all sectors in the Chinese economy: industry, commerce, technology, journalism, and even national security analysis. China's "reform and open" policy has legalized foreign infiltration into every aspect of its economy and society, allow Hong Kong, now officially under Chinese sovereignty, to continue to be an anti-China foreign base and a hot-bed safe haven for corruption on the mainland.

The greatness of Mao Zedong lies in his revolutionary insight that socialist revolution in China must come from liberating the peasants and that the purpose of revolution is to rid China of Western imperialistic oppression to revive China's historcal greatness as an prosperous, independent great power. Mao understood clearly that such pupose can only be fulfilled with the support of all Chinese people around the world who have not sold out mentally or financially to foreign enemies.
The task of the Chinese Communst Party is to galvanize the power of the masses for a victorious revolution, to unite all who can be united and to crush traitorous special interest gorups, the new compradors. A harmonious society has no room for comprador traitors and other enemies of the people. The revolution cannot be won by catering to the democratic politics of special interest groups acting as agents of a new global imperialism.
Mao understood that the path of reviving China to its historical greatness as a nation lies in creating a harmonious society of equality within China before China can gain equaility among nations of the world. Harmony and inequality are not compatible conditions in any society. Harmony cannot be achieved by appeasing new compradors who are bad elements that create disharmony and inequality by helping foreign interest exploit the Chinese people. A harmonious organism cannot tolerate a growing cancer in its body.
Mao saw Marxism as the most appropriate and effective ideology to implement the national goal of harmonious revival. Mao was the first Chinese revolutionary to advocate an approach which later came to be known as "socialism with Chinese characteristics". To Mao, Marxist-Leninist ideology must be adjusted to Chinese situations to serve the revitalization of China's historical greatness, not the other way around. The Chinese characterisitcs Mao had in mind is not the same of Chinese charateristics of the "reform and open" policy since 1978. Mao never entertained the fantasy that letting enemies of the revolution into the Party Central Committee is the path to revolutionary victory. Victory by Surrenderism is merely self-deception. The Party must purge such self-deception from the highest level of its leadership for the Party to continue to derserve the support of the people.
Mao's post as a librarian assistant in Beijing University in 1918 gave him the opportunity to discovering firsthand newly-translated socialist writings in Chinese, further expanding his understanding and commitment to the revolutionary socialist cause. He read Chinese translation of Thomas Kirkup's A History of Socialism, Karl Kautsky's Karl Marx's Ökonomische Lehren (translated from German) and most importantly, Marx and Engels' political pamphlet, The Communist Manifesto.
Mao also read widely beyond Marxist works. He read the translated works of Western classical liberalism such as Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations which deals with the necessary role of government to restrict monopolitic international trade, ideas that influenced Alexander Hamilton's protectionist, nationalist industrial policies, modeled after Colbert's dirigism in France under Louis XIV to resist British monopolisitc dominance over New World commerce in the United States during its infancy. For the first hundred years in US history of two centuries, the young nation resisted British and French domination to build its own prosperity through protecionism and nationalist industrial policies of support national industries.
Mao also read Montesquieu's The Spirit of the Laws, which identifies environmental influence as a material condition of national socio-political culture. He read John Stuart Mill's On Liberty, in which Mill addresses the nature and limits of the power that can be legitimately exercised by society through government over the political rights of individuals, and that individuals need to be restrained by government from doing lasting and serious harm to themselves and to the community by the "no harm" principle. Because no individual can exist in isolation, harm done to oneself or one's own property or well-being also harm others and the ccommunity as a socio-economic organism. The destruction of even one's own property deprives as well the community of its communal interest in that very property.
Mill also holds the opinion that dictaorship is an acceptable form of government for those societies that are still developing, as long as the dictator serves the best interests of the people, because existing barriers to spontaneous socio-economic progress can only be overcome by strong and effective political leadership. Mill argues aganst the danger of "tyrany of the majority" in democratic systems. Mao's view on political rights runs parallel to Mill's view on the necessity of strong leadership for a good cause. All revolutionary governments are dictatorial governments by definition. They turn democratic only after the revolution has been solidly won. On economic development, democracy is a product, not a cause of prosperity, US neoliberal propaganda notwithstanding.
Without Mao's heroic leadership in the historic Zunyi Meeting (遵义会议 on January 15-17, 1935) in the midst of the most critical low point in Long March when the Chinese revolution faced imminent danger of total military defeat, in which Mao regained military leadership of the guerrilla war against Jiang Jieshi's regular army in the face of overwhelming odds, and Mao's military strategy from an established revolutionary base to provide an living example of a working socialist society to produce the resource necessary to carry on the revolution, the Communist Party of China would have been annihilated by vastly superior Guomindang forces as only a matter of time.
The popular slogan: "Without Mao Zedong, there would be no New China" is a historical fact. By extension, without Mao Zedong Thought, there will be no New China. Those who seek the removal of reference to Mao Zedong Thought in Party and State documents should reexamine their own thinking. Even in the US, no self-respecting citizen dares challenge the central place of Jeffersonian ideals in its national psyche.
A leader like Mao Zedong is a fortuitous gift from Heaven to the Chinese nation. Such a leader appears only once in a millennium. For the foreseeable future, Mao Zedong will be a political icon that will hold the Chinese people together and Mao Zedong Thought will live as an indispensable classic on which to rebuild the Chinese nation into a socialist society.
Mao also read Jean-Jacques Rousseau on the political philosophy of basic human nature which influenced the political discourse in the French Revolution. Mao read Charles Darwin on biological evolution and even Herbert Spencer on Social Darvinism of survival of the fittest as a self-renewing evolutionary process in Anarcho-Capitalism.
While often misinterpreted as ultra-conservative, Spencer opposed private ownerhip of land, claiming that each person has an inherent claim to participate in the use of the earth. He was sympathetic to Georgism, a US economic philosophical ideology advocated by Henry George, that people can own what they create, but have no right to own things found in nature, most specifically, land, which belong equally to all. Spencer advocated the organization of voluntary labor unions as a bulwark against "exploitation by bosses", and favored an economy organized primarily in free worker co-operatives as a replacement for wage-labor in a labor market in which worker have no market power. Such Spencerean progressive ideas have been selectively purged by modern-day capitalist propoaganda.
As China mounts an urbanization program as a dynamo for economic development, Gerogist ideas can serve as a guide to avoid allowing urbanization be captured by special interest groups for private gain at the expense of the community
There is no record of Mao having read Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881) Scottish philosopher who advocated benevolent authocratic govenment and showed how a heroic leader can forge a strong state, and help create a new moral culture for a nation. Yet Mao came to the same conclusion on his own about China led by the Chinese Communist Party on behalf of the people.
Mao understood that Confucianism (儒家) had permeated Chinese society perniciously and hindered its advancement in modern times. On another front, capitalist revisionists will attempt to subvert the socialist revolution with the false notion that capitalist exploitation and inequality are the necessary ingredients of private wealth creation. Mao tried to combat both by launching mass movements, culminating in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1966.
But even after a decade of enormous social upheaval, tragic personal sufferings, fundamental economic dislocation and unparalleled diplomatic isolation, Confucianism stood its ground in Chinese societal mentality. The Cultural Revolution failed to achieve its spiritual goal and degenerated into factional power struggle, with serious damage to the nation’s physical and socio-economic infrastructure and to the prestige of the Communist Party of China (CPC), not to mention the decline of popular support and near total bankruptcy of revolutionary zeal among even loyal party cadres. The fault is not with the spirit of the Cultural Revolution, but in allowing it to fall into the trap of factional power struggle that lost sight of the revolutionary purpose. The lesson for future cultural revolutions is not that they are no longer needed, but that they should never again be allowed to mutate into a factional power struggle.
Confucianism will have to wait for many more future cultural revolutions before it will be restrained in its negative influence on the Chinese civilization and to have its positive elements revived. A culture that took two millennia to develop cannot be modernized in just one century.
Realistically, nostalgia aside, the feudal system under imperial monarchy cannot be restored in modern China. Once a political institution is overthrown, all the king’s men cannot put it back together again. Nor would that be desirable. Yet the modern political system in China, despite its revolutionary clothing and radical rhetoric, is still fundamentally feudal, both in the manner in which power is distributed and in its administrative structure. This is why more cultural revolutions are necessary and will be necessary to move Chinese civilization forward in the modern world
Mao Zedong understood this need and that until China succeeds in a thorough cultural revolution, it cannot revive itself to restore its historical greatness,
However, violent revolutions cannot be regular events without destroying the very purpose that justifies them. China needs a continuous non-violent cultural revolution to ensure that its revolutionary path toward national revival through socialism is not reversed. Future cultural revolutions must be insulated from factional power struggle instigated by political opportunists in the name of ideology correctness.
Cultural revolutions do not need destructive factional political violence in the name of ideological vaccination that ends up disrupting the national purpose. Mao Zedong never condoned political violence among the people as he clearly stated in On Pracice (August 1937) and again in On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People (February 27, 1957).
In Chinese Confucianism (儒家) politics, loyalty is traditionally preferred over competence. The ideal is to have both in a minister. Failing that, loyalty without competence is preferred as being less dangerous than competence without loyalty - the stuff of which successful insurrection and revolts are made. Therein lies the seed of systemic corruption in Chinese Confucianism (儒家) politics.
For socialist China, loyalty by definition is to the socialist cause, not personal relations. It is imperative that leaders remain loyal to socialist ideals. Yet loyalty to socialist ideals alone is not enough. It must be augmented by competence and virtuousness.
Confucianism (儒家), by placing blind faith in a causal connection between virtue and power, has remained the main cultural obstacle to modern China’s attempt to evolve from a society governed by men into a society governed by socialist legalism (法家) which should not be confused with the Western bourgeois concept of Rule of Law. The danger of Confucianism (儒家) lies not in its aim to endow the virtuous with power, but in its tendency to label the powerful as virtuous.
In order to change Chinese feudal society toward a communist social order, which is understood by all communists as a necessary goal of human development, Mao Zedong developed out of abstract Leninist concepts specific operational methods that took on special Chinese characteristics necessary for Chinese civilization and historical-cultural conditions, its strengths and also shortcomings. These methods, above all the system of organized mass movements to achieve the advancement of the mass interest, stress the change of socio-political consciousness, i.e., the creation of new men for a new cooperative society, as the basis for changing reality, i.e., the replacement of private ownership of the mode of production by collective ownership. The concept of mass politics, relevant in Chinese political thought from ancient time, is implemented by an elite cadre corps within the party which is the political instrument of the people.

Deng Xiao is right when he said that to get rich is glorious, The fault in his declaration lies in that he should have said that to get everybody rich equally is even more glorious.

The means of production must always belong to the people. This is true also in finance. At the present time, the complex working of modern finance is kept as secret knowledge of the comprador elite in today's China. Modern finance, being an indispensable wealth creation process in the modern world, should be introduced to the people as a mass line, and not kept as exclusive intellectual property of the elite as it is in the West.
Modern finance is the most important means of production in the modern economic order; it is needed not only in capitalist markets, but also in socialist markets. The distinction between the two types of markets is to whom the created wealth belongs and to whom this created wealth should flow. In a capitalist market, the wealth flows to the privileged elite while in a socialist market, the wealth should flow to the people and distributed equally. In that sense, China is still not a socialist market economy by far. "
Mao’s mass line
Mass movement as an instrument of political communication from above to below is unique to Chinese communist organization. This phenomenon, developed by Mao, is of utmost importance in understanding the nature and dynamics of the governance structure of the CPC as the ruling Party.
The theoretical foundation of mass movement as a means of mediation between the leadership and the will of the people pre-supposes that nothing is impossible for the masses, quantitatively understood as a collective unit, if their power is concentrated in and represented by a political party of correct thought and ideology and responsible actions.
This concept comes out of Mao’s romantic yet well-placed faith in the great strength of the masses who are capable of developing the nation in the interest of their own well-being and future destiny. So the “will of the masses” has to be articulated with the help of the Party but by the masses and within the masses, which the CPC calls the “mass line”.
Mao’s mass-line theory requires that the leadership elite be close to the people, that it is continuously informed about the people’s will and that it transforms this will into concrete actions by the masses. “From the masses back to the masses” is more than just a slogan. It means: take the scattered and unorganized ideas of the masses and, through study and intellectual guidance, turn them into focused and systemic programs, then go back to the masses and propagate and explain these ideals until the masses embrace them as their own and give them full support.
Thus mass movements are initiated at the highest level – the Politburo, announced to party cadres at central and regional work conferences, subject to cadre criticism and modification, after which starts the first phase of mass movement. Mass organizations are held to provoke the “people’s will”, through readers’ letters to newspapers and rallies at which these letters are read and debated. In the digital age, expressions on the Internet have augmented the role of the print media. The results are then officially discussed by the staff of leading organs of the State and the Party, after which the systematized “people's will” is clarified into acts of law or resolutions and policy and programs, and then a mass movement spreads to the whole nation.
The history of Chinese socialist politics is a history of mass movements. Mass movements successfully implemented Land Reform (1950-53); Marriage Reform (1950-52); Collectivization (1953) - the General Line of Socialist Transformation (from national bourgeois democratic revolution to proletarian socialist revolution); and Nationalization (1955 - from private ownership of industrial means of production into state ownership).
The method used against opposition was thought reform through “brainwashing” (without derogatory connotation since given in the anticommunist West), which is a principle of preferring the changing of the political consciousness of political opponents instead of physically liquidating them. The impressive opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics that television audiences saw around the world was a manifestation of Chinese socialist mass movement. It had the legacy of Mao Zedong Thought written all over it.
Before 1949, the Chinese peasant had been deprived of basic health services for over a millennium. One of the Party's first steps in medical reform called for mass campaigns against endemic infectious diseases. Tens of thousands of health workers were trained with basic hygienic and medical skills and sent out into the countryside to examine peasants and treat patients, and organize sanitation campaigns with mass movement techniques.
Health teams examined 2.8 million peasants in 1958, the first year of the schistosomiasis program. One team examined 1,200 patients in a single day. Some 67 million latrines were built or repaired, and over the next few years, hundreds of thousands of peasants were set to work day and night, drying out swamps and building drainage ditches to get rid of the infectious snail's habitat. Party workers claimed schistosomiasis cure rates of 85 to 95 percent in some areas, and that the disease had been wiped out in more than half of previously endemic areas along the Yangtze River.
Mao's Mass Movements Succeeded until 1957
The Hundred Flower Movement of 1957 was launched on February 27 by Mao with his famous four-hour speech, “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People”, before 1,800 leading cadres. In it, Mao distinguished “contradiction between the enemy and ourselves” from “contradiction among the people”, which should not be resolved by dictatorship, i.e., not by force, but by open discussion with criticism and counter-criticism. Up until 1957, the mass-movement policies of Mao achieved spectacular success in both social and economic construction.
Land reform was completed, the struggle for women’s emancipation was progressing well, and collectivization and nationalization were leading the nation towards socialism. Health services were a model of socialist construction in both cities and the countryside. The party’s revolutionary leadership was accepted enthusiastically by society generally and the peasants specifically. By 1958, agricultural production almost doubled from 1949 (108 million tons to 185 million tons), coal production quadrupled to 123 million tons, and steel production grew from 100,000 tons to 5.3 million tons. ...
The only problem came from bourgeois intellectual rebellion. On May 25, 1957, Mao expressed his anxiety at a session of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, and gave his approval to those who warned against too much reactionary bourgeois liberty. That afternoon, Mao told cadres at a Conference of Communist Youth League that “all words and deeds which deviate from socialism are basically wrong.”
At the opening session of the People’s Congress on June 26, Zhou Enlai initiated the “counter criticism” against the critics. Mao’s call for open criticism was serious and genuine, but the discussion he had conceived as a safety valve reached a degree of intensity he had not anticipated. Mao overestimated the stability of the political climate and underestimated the residual influence of Confucianism (儒家) and that of Western liberalism.
At the Crossroads: Soviet model or independent path
Against this background, the CPC stood at the crossroads of choosing the Soviet model of development or an independent path. Economy development was based on three elements:
• Build up heavy industry before mechanization of agriculture.
• Establish an extensive system of individual incentives by means of which productive forces could be developed from a conviction that the superiority of socialist modes of production would be vindicated by a visible rise in living standards.
• The acceleration of the socialist transformation of society in order to create the precondition required by the CPC for establishing a socialist order.

Two paths were opened to the CPC leadership in 1958:
Consolidation or,
Pushing forward toward permanent revolution

Mao was forced by geopolitical conditions (the abrupt withdrawal of Soviet aid in 1960 and the US Cold War embargo from 1951 to 1973) to overcome the lack of capital and technology through mobilization of China’s vast labor reservoir. The strategy was to connect political campaigns to production campaigns. Under pressure from orthodox Leninists within the party apparatus, with the surprise failure of the “Hundred Flower Movement”, Mao concluded it was impossible to create a socialist consciousness through a gradual improvement of material living conditions; that consciousness and reality had to be changed concurrently and in conjunction through gigantic new efforts at mobilization. There was no real alternative open if new socialist China was to survive.
This conclusion has been proven correct in the past 30 years. As living standard of the people improved, inequality widened and corruption became rampant, generating intense discontent among the masses. In the nation, a blanket of spiritual decay and cynicism permeate all of society with a visible loss of revolutionary and national pride. Such loss of national spirit is harder to restore than environmental corrosion.
All of Mao's strategies and programs were designed to ensure the survival of the independence of the Chinese nation through confidence building in the people's faith in socialism. They were necessary decisions of accepting high degree of hardship and sacrifice to refuse surrender to an extremely hostile geopolitical adversary. It was a test of national will of a garrison state to survive, not an egotistic ideological experiment.
Under different geopolitical conditions, Mao would have adopted very different policies. The proof of this is the fact that it was Mao who invited US President Nixon to China as soon as Nixon realized that US national interest would be better served with an opening to China. It was a view that Mao had repeatedly made to the US all through the Cold War but were repeated rejected by the anti-communist fixation of Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy. It was Mao who rehabilitated the purged Deng Xiaoping to run the Chinese economy when China no longer needed to behave like a garrison state with the end of US hostility.
The garrison state mentality (警备状态心态) led to the Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957-58, followed by "Three Red Banners" in the spring of 1958, initiating simultaneous development of industry and agriculture through the use of both modern and traditional methods of production under the “General Line of Building Socialism” through Self Reliance (自力更生) which had been the only option under US total embargo. The strategy was to be implemented through a labor-intensive development policy by a “Great Leap Forward” and by establishing a comprehensive collectivization with the establishment of “People's Communes”. The real purpose of the Great Leap Forward program was a defiant collective show of self confidence. That implement errors were made does not detract from its spiritual necessity. ...
While Mao headed the CPC, leadership was based on mass support; and it is still, the chairmanship of the CPC is analogous to the position of Pope in the Roman Catholic Church, powerful in moral authority but highly circumscribed in operational power. The Great Leap Forward was the product of mass movement, not of a single person. Mao’s leadership extended to the organization of the party and its policy-formulation procedures, not the dictation of particular programs.
Without Mao’s leadership, the Communist Party of China would not have survived the extermination campaign by the well-equipped Nationalist army under Jiang Jieshi. It was Mao who recognized the invincible potential of the Chinese peasant masses as the fountainhead of revolution. It is proper that the fourth-generation leaders of the PRC are again focusing on priority promotion of the welfare of the rural peasants farmers.
In Europe, the failure of the democratic revolutions of 1848 led eventually to World War I, which destroyed all the competing monarchal regimes that had collaborated to successfully suppress the democratic revolutions six decades earlier. The full impact of Mao’s revolutionary spirit is yet to be released on Chinese society. A century from now, Mao’s high-minded principles of mass politics will outshine all his anti-communist and neo-liberal critics.
The People’s Republic of China, established in 1949 under the leadership of the Communist Party of China headed by Mao Zedong, is today a rapidly developing nation of over 1.3 billion people with the world’s highest growth rate. The Chinese economy is on track to be the largest in the world. Yet until China moves expeditiously toward policies that put equality and high wages as a national goal in an independent economy, rather than one controlled by export sector special interest groups who are at the mercy of foreign consumer markets, China’s road toward achieving the highest per capita income for its economy will be agonizingly long. Without a rapid increase in Chinese wages, there will not be a vigorous domestic market to replace China's excessive dependence on export. The Chinese exporting economy will continue to be the kitchen serving the other economies as dining rooms.
The dissolution of the USSR in 1991 led to a precipitous socio-economic decline for Russia since 1990 as it went through shock treatment to rush headlong into market capitalism as advised by US neo-liberal economists. In contrast, China’s economic reform since 1978 has produced spectacular growth, albeit along with a host of unsustainable socio-economic penalties and problems. This is primarily because China has not yet totally refuted Mao Zedong Thought as Khrushchev did with de-Stalinization.
In comparison with the poor results in Russia, the question inevitably arises on why reform towards a socialist market economy by world’s largest remaining socialist state has produced comparatively positive results. What are the “Chinese characteristics” that Deng Xiaoping had identified that led to the impressive economic growth of the past three decades since 1979?
The answer leads directly to the revolutionary policies launched by Mao Zedong during the three decades between 1949 and 1979 acting as a principle that had provided a potent spiritual platform, without which Deng’s "reform and open" policy would not and could not have succeeded. Still the attempt to deemphasize Mao Zedong Thought has weaken Deng's "reform and open" policy to allow the nation to be infested with a level of corruption and inequality that even the current and coming leadership are forced to admit as dangerous for the survival of the Party.
Without the strong and broad basis for China’s revolutionary socio-economic development laid in the three decades before 1979, as part of Mao’s strategy of building essential institutional prerequisites based on a revolutionary collective awareness of the power of an organized masses and carried out through mass movement programs such as comprehensive land reforms followed by the formation of agricultural co-operatives and later people's communes, the reform policies after 1979 could not be implemented successfully.
Despite all the neo-liberal hyperboles about efficient resource allocation through the market mechanism and all the capitalist ideological anathema against egalitarianism, the solid and rational contribution by “Mao Zedong Thought” on China’s national collective consciousness of confidence in the people and self reliance remains the light source in the dark and strenuous path of the historic revival of the four-millennia-old Chinese civilization.
It was Mao who taught a thoroughly discouraged China, despite having been reduced to abject poverty materially, hopeless bankruptcy spiritually and total deprivation of confidence, to not be intimidated by temporary foreign imperialist dominance and to struggle for national revival through self-reliance by placing faith in the invincible power of the Chinese masses.
Yet despite Mao’s indispensable contribution to the Chinese collective consciousness of the dormant prowess of the masses and to the methodology of achieving economic and social development through mass movements that had enabled the economic miracle of new China, his contributions continues to be insufficiently appreciated by many Chinese revisionists and neoliberal social scientists, particularly foreign trained and supported free-market economists, who once again are falling into the heinous propaganda spell of Western cultural imperialism in the name of neo-liberal market fundamentalism.
For example, an important element of innovation in Mao’s revolutionary strategy is the capturing of the full economic advantages of abundant labor in the Chinese economy for nation-wide socialist construction on a scale never attempted in modern history in the context of hostile foreign embargo. Mao aimed to make full use of surplus labor in the Chinese socialist economy by banishing unemployment deemed necessary in Western capitalist doctrine as a required evil for combating inflation.
Unfortunately, Mao's strategy of full employment has been distorted since 1979 to turn into a policy of bringing into existence a new laboring class of exploited, poorly paid migrant workers from rural regions to overcrowded urban export sectors that depend on foreign capital to finance overblown export enterprises whose task is to ship real wealth created by low-wage Chinese labor to foreign countries in exchange for paper money in the form of fiat US dollars, leaving rural regions underdeveloped for lack of domestic capital despite, or because of, a national trade surplus denominated in fiat dollars that cannot be used domestically in China, a new imperialist monetary US strategy I call dollar hegemony.
Inequality of income and wealth has deterred China from its effort to increase the rate of domestic capital formation without undue restriction on the rate of rise in mass consumption. China today is faced with a serious unemployment and underemployment problem. This most serious underemployment comes in the form of low wages on all levels.

Many great advances, and in some sectors of the Chinese economy continued to outperform the West. The foundation of this progress can be traced to the platform built during the Cultural Revolution period. During the Cultural Revolution, China successfully test-exploded its fully functional, full-scale, three-stage hydrogen bomb (June 17, 1967), launched the Dong Fang Hong satellite (January 30, 1970) and 8 satellites more by 1978, commissioned its first nuclear submarines in 1967 which was completed in 1974, and made various other advances in science and technology. There was also progress in lasers, semiconductors, electronics, and computing technology. Even in theoretical research there was the breakthrough of synthesizing the world’s first biologically active protein, crystalline pig insulin, using the method of X-ray diffraction. This development laid the groundwork for Shanghai becoming the cradle for biotechnology in China.

Jon Sigurdson, cultural attaché in the Swedish Embassy in Beijing (1964-67), expert on rural industrialization in China at Lund University and Director of the East Asia Science & Technology and Culture Programme, at the European Institute of Japanese Studies at the Stockholm School of Economics, pointed out in 1980, this biotech work had been initiated in the late 1950s, during the Great Leap Forward (1958–61). The discovery represented “man’s great effort to unveil the secrets of life and provides powerful new evidence for the materialist-dialectical theory on the origin of life.” The report in Beijing Review accurately described it as the “first crystalline protein” and “the largest biologically active natural organic compound ever to be synthesized” (Peking Review 1967a). In an article published on December 25, 1970, the Peking Review reported another achievement: the trial production of a Shanghai electron microscope capable of 400,000-times magnification. Although the Shanghai Electronics and Optics Research Institute had been working on such microscopes since 1958, this latest, most advanced model was presented as a result of the Cultural Revolution. The Peking Review adds that such a precision instrument is a culmination of science and technology in “radio electronics, electron optics, high electric voltage, high vacuum and precision mechanical engineering” (1970)
The Post-Mao leadership typically tried to paint the Cultural Revolution as an unmitigated catastrophe for China. Sigrid Schmalzer of the University of Massachusetts at Amherst cautions that “there are compelling reasons why we should not entirely abandon the earlier, positive accounts and follow the post-Mao narrative too slavishly.” ...
The Peking Review reports reveal scientific innovation during the Cultural Revolution as not fully interrupted. Universities shut down and academic research came to a halt, but state-protected science related to defense and national prestige continued. Innovation continued, but it was primarily related to production in an Edison manner of tinkering, rather than broad based theoretical exploration, due to insufficient resources and substandard facilities.
Inquiry into the physics of relativity and the science of genetics took major hits from interruption of funding and ignorant harassment, but the mass line proved to have benefits in areas where millions of field assistants could be mobilized, such as seismology and weather monitoring.
Future decades would witness a gap between science and talent among professionals, due to the “dead weight” of the poorly prepared Cultural Revolution generation; however, the truly talented overcame the loss of time to become productive after the years of turmoil.
On the positive side millions of rural peasants gained access to science and technology for the first time. Despite the general disaster of the Cultural Revolution, it may be argued that, in some ways, Chairman Mao’s science policy did have benefits to scientific innovation and that the mass line emerged better prepared to meet a technological future in the final decades of the twentieth century.
Havard China scholar Roderick MacFarquhar opined: "What Mao accomplished between 1949 and 1956 was in fact the fastest, most extensive, and least damaging socialist revolution carried out in any communist state." ...
Mao's writings on military strategy continue to commnd influence among insurgency leaders and anti-insurgency experts, particularly on guerrilla warfare, at which Mao is popularly regarded as a genius on the level of Sunzi (孙子).
After 30 years of reform, the Chinese economy is visibly infested with glaring inequality in income and wealth, and the means of production have been increasingly privatized under the control of a minority financial elite for its own benefit. The CPC now officially represents all the peoples, including capitalists, rather than the dictatorship of the proletariat. All this is officially accepted in the name of modernization and following global neoliberal trends.
Yet in 1919, the anti-imperialist socialist revolutionary movement in China had been launched to reverse global imperialist trends, not to follow them. At any rate, these global trends of capitalist free market fundamentalism had been halted abruptly since 2007 with the global collapse of finance capitalism, the recovery of which is by no means certain in the foreseeable future. The options available to the world now are whether state capitalism or socialism will end up as the legitimate replacement of finance capitalism.
The revolutionary momentum of the Communist Party of China (CPC) has been put on hold since 1978 as socialist market economy was promoted by the Party leadership as a deliberate policy of ideological compromise, presumably to allow evolutionary dialectics towards socialism to work itself out in due time.
There is a rising danger that even the normal pace of dialectic evolution from capitalism toward socialism has been deliberately slowed down by this compromised policy. Deng’s famous dictum of letting some people get rich first along the path to national prosperity had gradually been changed by quietly dropping the word “first”. China is now a country in which some people can get super rich before others permanently. Forbes Magazine annually publishes a list of China’s richest.
Ironically, the socialist revolution that had been started by the 1911 May Fourth student movement had been torpedoed by a misguided counterrevolutionary interpretation of the student demonstration of 1989, both having taken place at Tiananmen but 78 years apart. Since 1987, under intense international pressure in reaction to the Chinese government's handling the of Tiananmen incidence, Deng’s "open and reform" policy has been forced by geopolitics to take shift from a NEP-type transitional economic strategy to kick-start modernization, to a permanent policy contaminated with dubious neoliberal dimensions to appease geopolitical pressure from the US whose markets were deemed indispensable for an overgrown Chinese export sector financed mostly by foreign capital and benefited mostly foreign investors, at the expense of Chinese workers who will be condemned to low wages unnecessarily longer.
Yet with the outbreak of the global financial crisis of 2007, ample evidence now exists to show that the economic achievements in China came not from unregulated markets opened to neo-imperialism, but from the fact that Communist Party of China has wisely and fortunately retained essential control of its socialist market economy by limiting the actual opening up of the economy to foreign capital and by slowing the privatization of state-owned enterprises, in contrast to what Russia had done following US shock treatment advice. Most importantly, China has managed to insulate its financial sector from the wild turmoil of global markets since 2007 because it resisted both internal and external pressure to fully open and deregulate its own financial sector and to make its currency free floating and fully convertible.
In the final analysis, Chinese Communist Party leaders would do well if they would follow the advice urged on their predecessors in 1944 by Mao Zedong: Serve the People (为人民服务).
Written for The First Annual Conference on Mao Zedong - January 1, 2013.