[合作变得上海化]

  Dec 22, 2009 6:03 AM

 

合作变得上海化

中国, 俄国, 和这些上合观察员

亚历山大 顾尼

亚历山大 顾尼是哥伦比亚大学伯尔纳学院政治科学副教授, 和是开放社会研
究所成员

最近兴起的上海合作组织 -- 一个包括中国, 俄国, 哈萨克, 塔吉克, 和乌孜别克
的互相(确保)安全的组合 -- 在西方正受到疑虑。

有的害怕它有控制中亚的邪恶意图,  有的担心如果不抗击"上合", 西方会被挤出这
个区域, 自从1996年以谈判中苏边界争论而创立到现在为止,  "上合"的任务已经扩
大到提高地区保安, 经济合作和抗击它的成员声称的"三项邪恶": 分离主义, 极端
主义和恐怖主义,  它的议事日程扩大, 西方的关注也在增长。

在2005年周年峰会中, "上合"会员国的首脑们提出关闭在中我的美军基地的时间表
, "上合"似乎在置自己于一个跟美国在该区域的势力对立的位置。

几日后, 乌兹别克驱逐美军出喀什汗阿巴德军地,  与此同时, "上合"强烈指责有
西方背景, 横扫欧亚大陆的颜色革命和支持颜色革命的非政府组织。

五年之后, 预言"上合"会发展成一个反西方的全同盟已经被证明是夸张的了,

虽然声称广泛合作,  "上合"没有用实际行动去演译它的官方宣言。

虽然中国能够利用这个组织投射它在中亚的影响力, 俄国还是不愿意深化它的参与。

那两个国家在区域保安优先权上有一些微妙但是重要的差别已经表现 出来。

俄国认为中亚是它的特区,  二十年来, 莫斯科寻求以一个俄国控制的团体 -- 集体
安全条约组织(CSTO), 一个互惠的国防同盟, 区亚经济共主体 ((EurAsEC),  一个
关税联合体, 和独联体联邦(CIS), 一个松散的前苏维埃主义国家联邦,  -- 以嵌入
中亚的国家,  与此同时, 它积极封锁西方演员, 例如北约, 相反, 中国在稳定它跟
中亚接壤的西域疆土 -- 新疆 -- 已经不那么聚焦于抗衡西方。

2000 到 2005年之间, 当颜色革命横扫欧亚, 莫斯科和北京的安全议程是一致的,
两者都惧怕西方在欧亚支持的民主运动 -- 莫斯科: 是因为它自己对当地政权的影
响会有所亏缺, 北京: 是因为民主运动会给它的腹地造成危险的范例。

但是2008年的格俄大战显示出中,俄之间安全议程的真正缝隙, 在欧盟中间人停火之
后几天, 俄国总统梅德韦杰夫到达杜尚别的上合周年峰会要求支持俄国承识那 两个格
鲁吉亚分裂出来的省份阿布哈兹和南奥塞梯的独立, 中国和中亚盟国都坚决反对这
个要求, 莫斯科与分离主义实体的交易跟中国的安全利益并不相干， 也不符合不干
涉别国内部事务的原则。

同样， 俄罗斯战前给予在格鲁吉亚战区讲俄语的居民俄国护照的努力， 就震惊了许
多有相当俄罗斯裔人口的中亚国家。

在这个外交指责之后, 莫斯科重新加倍努力促进集体安全条约组织，该组织包括同
中亚国家，但在俄罗斯的"口袋"里总是比较安全一些。

莫斯科的意外事故跟中国在去年七月维吾尔族穆斯林和汉人在新疆乌 鲁木齐市发生
的暴力事件后成功赢得在上海合作组织会员国的支持形成一个强烈的 对比。

在爆发后几个小时之内, 中国外交部给上海合作组织其他成员散发了一份声明，说
明在新疆发生的事件为“中国的内政”， 中国的行动是旨在恢复该地区的秩序。因
为声明内容跟上合在内政上的立场一致,  它很快得到上合成员的签署和被采用为大
会的官方立场。

当上合的任务扩大到包括经济合作, 中国和俄国在利益上的缝隙变得更加明显。

警觉到北京因为经济处于优势地位而能够利用上海合作组织来成就自 身的经济目的，
俄罗斯已阻止了许多深化整合的努力。

莫斯科反对中国总理温家宝创建上合为自由贸易区的提案, 但是它倡导扩大包括俄
罗斯，哈萨克斯坦，吉尔吉斯斯坦，塔吉克斯坦，白俄罗斯, 但明显不包括中国的
欧亚经济共同体。

全球金融危机已经放大俄罗斯和中国在经济潜力和雄心上的差异, 莫斯科在危机中
惨遭打击,  被迫缩减在中亚的许多项目和对无利可图的区域能源交易的条款进行 重
新谈判。

此外, 许多没有放弃的项目 -- 例如在吉尔吉斯斯坦的坎巴拉塔水力发电厂 --  似
乎是基于政治目标多于商业考虑， 将可能成为俄罗斯的财政收入造成重大的流。

相比之下，中国，其金融系统免受危机影响， 已经加强了在中亚的经济活动，透过
上海合作组织的幌子大量布署双边融资。

北京刚刚结束用于与哈萨克斯坦和土库曼斯坦油气处理的巨额贷款, 并增加对沿边
界的上合成员国基础设施的投资, 使他们跟中国西部比以前更加连接, 相近。

北京在上合单方面创建100亿美元的“反危机”稳定基金,  优先为能源和基础设施
部门提供廉价的，短期的融资等, 而莫斯科则多次拒绝对基金提供共同资助的请求。

莫斯科宁愿创立欧亚经济共同体控制基金或可以直接向弱国提供的双 边援助。

除了中俄两国的紧张局势之外,  上合面对的另一个基本的问题是它的中亚成员国是
不能 -- 和有时是不顾意-- 充分同意中俄两国家的计画。

莫斯科和北京仍然是关注美国在该地区的存在, 但是无论如何, 哈萨克, 吉尔吉斯
斯坦，塔吉克斯坦和乌兹别克斯坦已经跟美军达成商业运输契约,  扩展了美国从北
面对阿富汗提供补给之路。

而且, 中亚的不开放边界在关税, 通行费和相关工作上有重要的商业价值 ,  在那
些国家, 那些占统治地位的精英, 常常控制边界操作和别的主要经济活动领域, 例
如电讯业和电力供应,  他们会不会开放给外来竞争的可能性都成疑问。

这样, 无论上合对区域合作和影响有多大的雄心,  成员国之间的协同还远远落在后
面。

作为一个集体化的安全组织, 上合是虚弱的和不是几年前出现的那个气势汹汹的反
西方集团,  因此，美国跟上合合作, 把中国和这几个中亚国家有选择性地卷入一些
阿富汗的问题, 例如保护边境和反毒工作, 作为它更广泛努力增加更多地区和多边
合作伙伴, 是明智的。

此外， 在尽可能多地削弱俄罗斯以集体安全条约组织支配该地区的努力， 任何有关
西方使上海合作组织卷入关于地区安全的问题都是有益的，

在非安全问题事宜上, 上合更加显得虚弱, 它在寻求国际承认它在整合该地区的角
色之同时, 也不清楚它是有没有, 或者会不会取得成功, 在西方七嘴八舌地谴责或
与它合作之前, 上海合作组织最终应该提供一些具体的成果。


原文: Cooperation Gets Shanghaied

Alexander Cooley

Alexander Cooley is an associate professor of international relations at Barnard College at Columbia University. As an Open Society Fellow, Cooley will research the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and its activities in Central Asia. In particular, he is examining the SCO’s impact on regional integration and whether the SCO is sidelining Western actors by providing an alternative source of legitimacy to member states. Cooley has written two books, Logics of Hierarchy: The Organization of Empires, States and Military Occupations, on how Soviet administrative legacies shaped the formation of Central Asian states; and Base Politics: Democratic Change and the US Military Abroad, which examines the political impact of U.S. military bases in overseas host countries, including Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. During his fellowship term, he will write scholarly and popular articles and prepare recommendations for policy makers in Washington, D.C. and Brussels, and NGOs working in Central Asia.

Cooperation Gets Shanghaied

China, Russia, and the SCO

Alexander Cooley

ALEXANDER COOLEY is Associate Professor of Political Science at Barnard College, Columbia University, and a fellow at the Open Society Institute.

The recent rise of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) -- a mutual security assembly comprised of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan -- has been met with skepticism in the West. Some fear that it has nefarious intentions to control Central Asia; others worry that the West will somehow be left behind in the region if it does not engage with the SCO. Since its founding in 1996 as a forum for negotiating lingering Soviet-Chinese border disputes, the SCO's mission has broadened to promote regional security and economic cooperation, and combat what its members call the "three evils": separatism, extremism, and terrorism. As its agenda has expanded, so, too, have Western concerns.

When the heads of the SCO countries called for a timetable for closing U.S. military bases in Central Asia at its annual summit in 2005, the SCO appeared to be positioning itself against U.S. influence in the region. Days later, Uzbekistan ousted American forces from a base in Karshi-Khanabad. And that same year, the SCO strongly condemned the Western-backed color revolutions that were sweeping across Eurasia, along with the Western NGOs that were supporting the movements.
Five years later, however, predictions that the SCO would develop into a full-blown anti-West alliance have proven exaggerated. Despite claims of widespread cooperation, the SCO has failed to translate its official announcements into actual regional cooperation. And although China has been able to use the organization to project its influence across Central Asia, Russia has remained reluctant to deepen its participation. Subtle but key differences in the regional security priorities of the two countries have started to play out.

Russia regards Central Asia as its "zone of privileged interests." For the past two decades, Moscow has sought to embed the states of Central Asia in a system of Russia-controlled institutions -- the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a mutual defense alliance; the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), a customs union; and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), a loose federation of former Soviet countries. At the same time, it has actively worked to block Western actors such as NATO. China, in contrast, has been focused not so much on countering the West as on stabilizing its own western territory: the autonomous province of Xinjiang, which borders the Central Asian states.

When the color revolutions erupted across Eurasia between 2000 and 2005, Moscow's and Beijing's security agendas were aligned. Both feared Western-backed democratization in Eurasia -- Moscow because its own influence over the regimes there would wane, and China because democratization could set a dangerous example for its hinterland.

However, the Russia-Georgia war in 2008 revealed the real gap between Russia's and China's security agendas. Just a few days after the EU-brokered cease-fire, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev arrived at the SCO's annual summit in Dushanbe to request support for Russia's recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the breakaway Georgian provinces. China and the Central Asian states stood firm against the request. Moscow's dealings with separatist entities did not square with China's security interests, nor with the principle of noninterference in countries' internal affairs. Similarly, Russia's efforts to grant passports to Russian-speaking residents in the disputed territories of Georgia just before the war alarmed the Central Asian states, most of which have substantial Russian populations. After this diplomatic rebuke, Moscow redoubled its efforts to promote the CSTO, an organization that includes the same Central Asian states but is safely in Russia's pocket.

Moscow's misadventure can be contrasted with China's success in winning SCO support during the outbreak of violence between the Uighur Muslims and Han Chinese in Urumqi, Xinjiang, last July. Within a few hours of the flare-up, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs circulated a statement to other SCO members describing events in Xinjiang as "China's internal matter" and the Chinese actions as designed to "restore order in the region." Since the statement aligned with the SCO's position on internal affairs, it was quickly endorsed by all SCO members and adopted as the assembly's official position.

As the SCO mission expands to include economic cooperation, the gap between Russian and Chinese interests has become even more apparent. Wary of Beijing's economic predominance, and thus its ability to use the SCO to its own economic ends, Russia has blocked many efforts to deepen integration. Moscow opposes Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's proposal to create an SCO free-trade area. Instead, it champions the expansion of EurAsEC, which includes Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Belarus but notably excludes China.

The global financial crisis has magnified differences in Russian and Chinese economic potential and ambition. Moscow has been hard hit by the crisis; it has been forced to scale back many of its projects in Central Asia and to renegotiate the terms of unprofitable regional energy deals. Moreover, many of the projects that it has not abandoned -- such as the Kambarata hydroelectric power plants in Kyrgyzstan -- seem to be based more on political goals than commercial considerations and will likely be a drain on Russia's coffers.

By contrast, China, whose financial system was shielded from the crisis, has stepped up its economic activities in Central Asia, dispensing substantial bilateral financing under the guise of the SCO. Beijing has recently concluded massive loans-for-hydrocarbon deals with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and has increased its investments in infrastructure in SCO states along its border, connecting them evermore to western China. And Beijing has unilaterally created a $10 billion "anti-crisis" stabilization fund within the SCO, offering cheap, short-term financing for such priority sectors as energy and infrastructure, after Moscow refused multiple requests to co-finance the fund. Moscow prefers to create a EurAsEC-controlled fund or provide what bilateral assistance it can directly to weaker states.

Besides Russia-China tensions, the SCO faces another fundamental problem: its Central Asian members are unable -- and, in some cases, unwilling -- to fully accede to Russia's and China's plans. Moscow and Beijing remain concerned about the United States' presence in the area, but Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan have concluded commercial transit agreements with the U.S. military anyway, expanding northern U.S. supply routes to Afghanistan.

Further, the closed borders of Central Asia have important commercial value -- in the form of customs, tolls, and related jobs. The ruling elites of these countries often control border operations and other major sectors of the economy such as telecommunications and electricity. It is highly doubtful that they will willingly open them up to true external competition.

Thus, whatever the SCO's ambition for regional cooperation and influence, coordination among its members lags far behind. As a security collective, the SCO is weak and not the aggressively anti-Western bloc it appeared to be a few years ago. As such, it makes sense for the United States to work with the SCO to engage China and the Central Asian states on select Afghanistan issues, such as securing borders and combating the narcotics trade, as part of its broader efforts to involve more regional and multilateral partners. Additionally, any Western engagement with the SCO on security matters would be useful, in as much as it undercuts Moscow's efforts to dominate the region with the CSTO.

In nonsecurity matters, the SCO is even weaker. While it seeks international recognition for its role in integrating the region, it is unclear whether it has or ever will succeed. Ultimately, the SCO should deliver some tangible accomplishments before the West rushes to condemn or cooperate with it.