JPMorgan’s Fruitful Ties to a Member of China’s Elite

NOVEMBER 13, 2013, 10:00 PM.  New York Times

JPMorgan’s Fruitful Ties to a Member of China’s Elite

By DAVID BARBOZA, JESSICA SILVER-GREENBERG and BEN PROTESS

To promote its standing in China, JPMorgan Chase turned to a seemingly obscure consulting firm run by a 32-year-old executive named Lily Chang.

Ms. Chang’s firm, which received a $75,000-a-month contract from JPMorgan, appeared to have only two employees. And on the surface, Ms. Chang lacked the influence and public name recognition needed to unlock business for the bank.

But what was known to JPMorgan executives in Hong Kong, and some executives at other major companies, was that “Lily Chang” was not her real name. It was an alias for Wen Ruchun, the only daughter of Wen Jiabao, who at the time was China’s prime minister, with oversight of the economy and its financial institutions.

JPMorgan’s link to Ms. Wen — which came during a time when the bank also invested in companies tied to the Wen family — has not been previously reported. Yet a review by The New York Times of confidential documents, Chinese public records and interviews with people briefed on the contract shows that the relationship pointed to a broader strategy for accumulating influence in China: Put the relatives of the nation’s ruling elite on the payroll.

And the Wen family’s sway was not just political. After Ms. Wen’s father joined the inner circle of China’s rulers as vice prime minister in 1998, the family amassed a secret fortune through a series of partnerships and investment vehicles, a 2012 investigationby The Times found.

Now, United States authorities are scrutinizing JPMorgan’s ties to Ms. Wen, whose alias was government approved, as part of a wider bribery investigation into whether the bank swapped contracts and jobs for business deals with state-owned Chinese companies, according to the documents and interviews. The bank, which is cooperating with the inquiries and conducting its own internal review, has not been accused of any wrongdoing.

The investigation began with an examination of the bank’s decision to hire the daughter of a Chinese railway official and the son of a former banking regulator who is now the chairman of a state-controlled financial conglomerate. The contract with the consulting firm of Ms. Wen, 40, indicates that the bank’s hiring practices also touched the highest rungs of political power in China. Her father was prime minister from 2003 until earlier this year. Her mother has served as a government official with oversight of the nation’s gem and diamond industry. And since 2006, Ms. Wen’s husband has been an official at the China Banking Regulatory Commission, according to China Vitae, an online database.

For Ms. Wen’s consulting firm, Fullmark Consultants, the JPMorgan deal was lucrative. While many Hong Kong investment bankers were earning as much as $250,000 a year, JPMorgan paid Ms. Wen’s firm $900,000 annually from 2006 to 2008, records show, for a total of $1.8 million.

JPMorgan appeared to benefit from the relationship as well. Fullmark claimed in a confidential letter to the bank that it “introduced and secured” business for JPMorgan from the state-run China Railway Group, a construction company that builds railways for the Chinese government. The bank was an underwriter in the company’s 2007 initial public offering, which raised about $5 billion.

It is not known whether Ms. Wen’s father, Wen Jiabao, played any role in that deal. But as prime minister, he would have had ultimate responsibility for state-owned companies and their regulators.

Efforts to reach Ms. Wen and other members of her family were unsuccessful.

A spokesman for JPMorgan declined to comment. In a previous regulatory filing, the bank disclosed that authorities were examining “its business relationships with certain related clients in the Asia Pacific region and its engagement of consultants.”

Executives at JPMorgan’s headquarters in New York did not appear to be involved in retaining Fullmark, a decision that seemed to have fallen to executives in Hong Kong. And the documents reviewed by The Times do not identify a concrete link between the bank’s decision to hire children of Chinese officials and its ability to secure coveted business deals, a connection that authorities would probably need to demonstrate that the bank violated anti-bribery laws.

The Securities and Exchange Commission and the United States attorney’s office in Brooklyn, which are leading the investigation, both declined to comment on the case.

Underpinning their investigation is the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which effectively bars United States companies from giving “anything of value” to foreign officials to obtain “an improper advantage” in retaining business. In recent years, the S.E.C. and the Justice Department have stepped up their enforcement of the 1977 law, which is violated if a company acts with “corrupt” intent, or with an expectation of offering a job in exchange for government business.

It is unclear whether JPMorgan ever had such an upfront agreement. But the bank did briefly keep a document that tied some of its well-connected hires in China to revenue it earned from deals with Chinese state-owned companies, according to interviews and records that JPMorgan turned over to federal authorities.

The investigation comes at a difficult time for the bank, which is already under scrutiny from a number of agencies in Washington and abroad. JPMorgan recently reached a tentative deal with the Justice Department to pay a record $13 billion over its sale of troubled mortgage securities. It is also facing an investigation into its role as Bernard L. Madoff’s primary bank. The bribery investigation could take years. The S.E.C. and prosecutors have expanded their focus to other Asian countries, including Singapore and South Korea, looking at whether hiring practices that have become commonplace on Wall Street crossed a line at JPMorgan.

For the last two decades, Wall Street banks and multinational corporations operating in China have sought out so-called princelings as employees, consultants or partners in major Chinese business deals. Many banks talk freely about the ability of princelings to open doors and offer insights into government policies and regulations.

In 2006, JPMorgan established a program, called Sons and Daughters, according to interviews with people in New York and China, to have better control over such hires. But documents that the bank turned over to investigators showed that there were less stringent hiring standards for applicants from prominent Chinese families.

The children of China’s ruling elite, according to experts, have occasionally used government-approved aliases to protect their privacy while studying or traveling abroad. Ms. Wen used her alias for both schooling and business. According to government records, Ms. Wen holds two national identity cards with matching birth dates, one issued in Beijing under the name Wen Ruchun and a second issued in the northeastern city of Dalian, as Chang Lily.

Lily Chang was the name she used while studying for an M.B.A. at the University of Delaware, where she graduated in 1998, and also when she lived in Trump Place, the luxury apartment complex overlooking the Hudson River in Manhattan, according to public and university records.

Like the children of other senior Chinese leaders, she was courted by Wall Street. After securing her M.B.A., regulatory records show, she worked at Lehman Brothers and later Credit Suisse First Boston as Lily Chang. Separately, she held a stake in several private companies.

Ms. Wen’s work for JPMorgan was tied to her company, Fullmark Consulting. According to the documents reviewed by The Times, Fullmark was located on the ninth floor of Tower C2 at Oriental Plaza, a high-end retail and office complex in central Beijing.

Over the last decade, corporate filings show that the location also housed private companies that were either controlled by or affiliated with the Wen family. Some of those companies have held indirect stakes in Baidu, China’s biggest Internet search engine, and Ping An Insurance, the financial services giant.

Ms. Wen’s apparent partner at Fullmark, and a signatory to the JPMorgan consulting agreements, was a woman named Zhang Yuhong, a longtime Wen family friend and business partner who at one time held a large but indirect personal stake in Ping An. She also helped control Wen family assets in other industries, including diamond and jewelry ventures.

Little else is known about Fullmark or its other clients. When JPMorgan hired the firm in 2006, people briefed on the contract said, the consulting firm had already worked with at least one other major financial institution.

JPMorgan’s contract with Fullmark called for the consultant to “to promote the activities and standing” of the bank in China. According to Fullmark’s letter to JPMorgan, the consulting firm had three main tasks. One, it helped JPMorgan secure the underwriting job on the China Railway deal. It also advised JPMorgan about forming a joint venture with a Chinese securities firm and provided counsel on the “macroeconomics policy in mainland China.”

In that letter, which was undated but almost certainly sent to the bank once the contract had expired, Fullmark declared that it did not “have the intention to continue the consultancy service.” The letter, signed by Lily Chang and Zhang Yuhong, cited “personal reasons.”

During her two-year consulting stint, JPMorgan executives struck a series of deals with Chinese companies closely affiliated with Ms. Wen and her family. Like other big banks, JPMorgan held a stake in New Horizon Capital, a private equity firm co-founded by her brother, Wen Yunsong.

JPMorgan also invested its clients’ money in Ping An and served as an adviser to the giant company. Today, on behalf of clients, JPMorgan owns nearly $1 billion worth of the company’s shares. At the time of JPMorgan’s initial investment for clients, members of the Wen family held a large, hidden stake in Ping An through a complex network of Chinese investment vehicles, a stake that in 2007 was worth more than $2 billion, according to corporate filings reviewed by The Times.

JPMorgan also won an assignment in 2009 to help underwrite an initial public offering of BBMG, a large Chinese building materials company. BBMG’s largest shareholders included New Horizon Capital, the private equity firm of Ms. Wen’s brother, and Beijing Taihong, an investment vehicle controlled by a longtime business associate of the Wen family. After the shares rose after the company’s I.P.O., Ms. Wen became the largest shareholder in Beijing Taihong, according to a filing.

There is no indication from the documents reviewed by The Times that Ms. Wen brokered any of the deals or investments between JPMorgan and companies affiliated with her family. And it is unclear whether JPMorgan employees even knew about her family’s ties to some of those companies, because the Wen family often held secret stakes in companies through little-known investment vehicles.

Ms. Wen also kept some distance from the Fullmark documents. Her name does not appear in the contract, though she was a signatory on the undated letter concluding the relationship with JPMorgan.

The letter, sent around the time of the financial crisis, struck an optimistic tone. “We hope JPMorgan Chase will grasp the opportunities and become to be the winner in the financial crisis,” it read.

屈人何須舉戰 - 每個時代有每個時代的蔣介石

蔣介石和美國是怎樣通過訂立許多公開和秘密條約，明文規定美國享有各種特權，把中華民國殖民地的地位加以合法化: 
《美國在華空中攝影協議》：
一九四五年十一月二十一日駐滬美軍參謀長馬道克“照會”蔣政府，要允許“美軍在我國內地各省及台灣等地從事空中攝影”，及“我國准予使用以沖繩島為基地之美國飛機，在我國蒙古，東北各地作空中照相飛行”，蔣介石親自“電示”：“除新疆仍應緩議外，餘準如擬辦理。 ”（注：蔣政府外交部對行政院呈文，在民​​國三十五年七月二十九日，前報。）美國於此取得了美機在中國領空作軍事調查的充分權利。
《國際貨幣基金協定》：
一九四五年十二月二十七日美蔣參加簽訂，加強美國對中國貨幣的獨占權。
《成渝​​鐵路修建協定》：

一九四六年五月成立，規定美國有修建此鐵路權利。　
《中美航空協定草案》：
一九四六年八月三十日成立，規定“設立並發展中美兩國領土間定期空運飛行”，由美國指定西北航空公司、泛美航空公司、寰球航空公司在中國天津、上海、廣州各線飛行。與這“草案”議定同一天，陳納德又與蔣政府成立一個“陳納德空運大隊”在各地飛行的合同。這是美國對中國領空權全面攫得的開始。
《中美三十年船塢秘密協定》：

一九四六年九月披露，同月二十二日上海報紙轉載美國雜誌世界報消息：“中國為了購買八億餘元美軍剩餘物資，已允許美軍艦在卅年內，可在中國沿海船塢中修理。”又英文雜誌新聞通訊同月二十八日載：“美國剩餘物資附有三十年秘約船塢協定，依此協定，三十年內，中國所有海港，美軍艦皆可自由入使用。”（注：民國三十五年十月十九日，前報。）這是美國又霸占了中國全部海港。
《中美憲警聯合勤務議定書》：

一九四六年十月八日在北京簽訂。規定設立“中美憲警聯絡室”，據北京警察局外事科長告記者：以後美軍肇事，依“議定書”規定，“須由美憲警處理，警局有旁聽權而已”。在這以前，美國與蔣政府就已成立美軍事人員刑事案件條例，不久，又成立所謂“中美商務仲裁會”（後改為“中美商務公斷會”），這是美帝國主義在華治外法權的複活。
《粵漢鐵路借款協定》：

成立於一九四六年十月，規定美國有投資修建權。
《中美友好通商航海條約》：

一九四六年十一月四日在南京簽訂，全文共二十六條又一項“議定書”。設想周到，無微不至，從第二條到第五條是關於“通商”的規定，第六條到第八條詳細規定保護僑民辦法，第九條到二十條規定應受保護的許多特別事項，第二十一條到二十四條專講航業。其全部內容，用蔣駐美“大使”顧維鈞的話來說，就是“中國全部領土、全部事業一律對美國開放”（注：一九四七年十一月二十日，顧維鈞在紐約美全國對外貿易會議上的演辭。）。

美國人在中國的經濟利益與中國人無異。美國人可以在中國居住，購買土地、房屋及一切財產，但美國限制中國人的“移民律”則仍舊有效。美國向中國輸入商品徵稅與中國人相同。凡是中國開放港口，美船皆可通行，並能沿途起卸貨物，自由選擇“捷徑”。條文上寫的是中美“雙方”，實際上處處只對“此方”的美國適用。這是美國侵略者利用它的走狗蔣介石寫出來的中國人民的賣身契，是中國人民新的國恥。
《中美航空協定》：

一九四六年十二月二十日成立。所定內容比過去協定“草案”不同的是：第一，除原定美機能在上海等地起卸外，又增加了一個“及以後隨時同意之地點”裝卸轉運客貨。美機可在中國到處飛行不受限制。第二，增加美機在中國領土內可作“非交通之停靠”，即除平常交通外，美機還有軍事性的降落權（注：民國三十五年十二月二十九日，前報。）。中國領空主權，從此全部歸入美國掌握。
《青島海軍基地秘密協定》:

一九四七年一月宣露，據合眾社報導，其內容為：“根據這一協定，一日發生戰爭時，美國與中國將共同使用青島海軍基地。” （注：民國三十六年二月四日，前報。）這除了強迫中國承認美軍久已佔踞青島這一既成事實，還含有挑撥中國軍事反甦的性質。
《滇越鐵路管理與川滇鐵路修築協定》：

一九四七年七月成立，規定美國對兩鐵路有權管理建築。
《國際關稅與貿易一般協定》：

一九四七年十月十六日在哈瓦那（日內瓦）成立，由中美兩國參加，據同日美國國務院公佈的“分析報告”披露，協定規定中國應允許美國“最為重要”的一百一十項物品減免進口關稅，美國則答應對中國軍用原料如鎢礦等物品作某些關稅“讓步”（注：民國三十六年十二月四日，前報。）至一九四八年五月四日美蔣雙方同時宣布：本協定自同月二十日起生效。從此美國可以一方面用減免關稅向中國繼續大量傾銷各種消費品，特別是大量傾售軍火，一方面又用關稅“讓步”，來掠奪中國戰略原料，接著中美通商航海條約之後，使中國關稅自主權更加掃地無餘。
《美軍駐華美蔣秘密協定》：

一九四七年十月十七日為蔣政府所宣布，其內容在同日蔣政府“國務會議”宣讀的外交部報告書中有：“美國軍隊留駐中國已為中國政府所接受。”“美軍留駐中國，將直至兩方政府認為無繼續留駐必要時為止。”這個會議隨即通過一“美國駐華武裝部隊係由中國政府之同意而駐案”。法國新聞社也同時宣布：美蔣關於此事已訂有“協議”，蔣當局已把這事“照會”遞交美國大使館（注：民國三十六年十月二十二日，前報。 ）。美國就這樣攫得了對中國作無限佔領的“合法”權利。
《中美救濟協定》：

一九四七年十月二十七日宣布成立，規定蔣介石必須同意美國“監督”援蔣基金與物資使用，並控制蔣政府財政經濟的行政部門。此“監督權”與控制辦法，由美國一個“專使”使團來執行，它可以享受與大使館相同的特殊待遇，自由在蔣區來往，收集情報材料等，不受中國司法與行政管轄。
此外，美國對“中央”的何應欽，華中的白崇禧，台灣的孫立人，西北的馬鴻逵等也不斷培植，特別是對困踞華北的傅作義，還打算單獨供給大量軍火，從軍事上來扶植他，一九四八年八月中美“文化交流”和“親善”活動。美國訂立這個協定用意，是為取得在中國進行奴化教育的領導權。附帶藉此掩蓋它過分露骨的侵略罪行。
《中美海軍協定》：

一九四七年十二月八日成立，規定：
“（一）由美國幫助中國建立海軍機構，包括組織、艦隊、軍港、基地學校等；（二）由美國幫助中國培養訓練幹部，包括控制監督；（三）由中國供給美國以海軍情報，並報告一切。 ”（注：民國三十七年一月八日，前報。）　

　這是同年十月公佈的美軍駐華協定的擴大。
《雙邊協定》：

一九四八年七月三日由司徒雷登與王世傑代表美蔣政府在南京簽訂，作為美國援蔣四億元中二億七千五百萬元“經濟援助”部分的代價。規定：

一，美國援蔣款項、物資、及與這批款項，物資相等的“中國貨幣”有最高監督權和決定權。
二，“中國政府對美利堅合眾國，因其本國資源中缺乏或可能缺乏而需要之中國所產物資轉移於美利堅合眾國，無論係為儲蓄或其他目的，將予以便利”。蔣政府並按時向美國供給有關這些物資“所必要之情報”。
三，蔣政府要作一切努力，“減少與他國間貿易之公私困難”。便於美國和各美佔領區商品來華傾銷。
四，駐華執行直接監督的美國經濟合作局特別代表團及所屬職員“須視為美利堅合眾國駐中國大使館之一部分，俾得享受…優例及豁免（按：即身體財產不可侵犯權、免稅權、治外法權……等）”（注：民國三十七年七月十四日，前報。）

《中美農業協定》：

一九四八年八月五日在南京以“換文”方式成立，規定由美國總統委派美國人二名，加入蔣政府三人組成“中國農村復興委員會”，這個委員會可以“擬訂”和“督察”實行各項農業計劃，從農業生產、銷售、灌溉、畜牧到家庭與鄉村工業，農村教育等，無所不包。又可以任命“所認為必要之執行官吏行政人員”，和與“適當的中國政府機構及在中國之國際或私人機構”訂立“合作”辦法……。另外還規定從美國給蔣政府的二億七千五百萬美元“經濟援助”中，再撥出百分之
十，專作美帝國主義對中國農業侵略的經常費用（注：民國三十七年八月十五日，前報。）
美國扶持的“中華民國”，實際上已成為美國的殖民地。把這些條約合在一起，美國從蔣介石手中取得了中國領土權、領空權、領海權、內河航行權、鐵路管理權、軍權、財權、警察權、司法權、國家秘密權、農業權、工礦權、商業權、海關權、文化教育權、內政“最後決定權”，外交指揮權等等。真是從天上到地下，從海上到陸上，從政治到經濟，從物質到文化，從現在到將來，無所不包，應有盡有，所有“中國”主權云云，實際上盡成美國主權了。

誰買平安

誰買平安來源於財新《新世紀》 2012年第50期出版日期2012年12月24日

http://magazine.caixin.com/2012-12-21/100475297_all.html#page2

天下無不散的宴席。中國平安（上海交易所代碼：601318/香港交易所代碼：02318，下稱平安）與第一大股東滙豐控股有限公司（香港交易所代碼：00005，下稱滙豐）十年連理，一朝曲終人散。

平 安創造了很多紀錄。24年前在深圳蛇口成立，平安起步於一家註冊資本僅4200萬元的地區性保險公司，現坐擁2.28萬億元總資產；從保險業兼具競爭力和 規模優勢的佼佼者，到收購深圳市商業銀行、深圳發展銀行進而成立平安銀行，其金融控股架構之全、綜合經營推進之深，屬中國金融業之翹楚。平安也是國內第一 家引入外資的大型金融企業，滙豐佔據第一大股東的位置已長達十年；多年來平安亦大膽引入職業經理人，公司治理被公認比較規範。創始人、董事長，現年57歲 的馬明哲，始終掌舵平安，對其成功居功至偉。

12月5日，滙豐簽訂協議，出售所持全部15.57%中國平安的H股股權。市場對滙豐揮別平安早有預期，一旦公布還是頗為震動：交易規模高達93.85億美元，摺合727.36億港元。

交易分兩步。12月7日，交易第一步完成，約3.5%股權易手，152億港元現金交割已然完成。

舊人退去，新人登場。誰是接盤者？

公開的答案是泰國正大集團（下稱正大）。因多年冠名中國中央電視台的正大綜藝節目，正大為國人熟知，其掌門人謝國民為福布斯雜誌2011年評出的泰國首富。

即使如此，當正大收購滙豐所持全部平安股權的消息傳出，市場人士還是覺得不易理解。正大規模不小，2011年凈資產90億美元，但要一次過吃下這筆作價93.85億美元的平安股權，還是令人難以想像。資金哪裡來？

市場原猜測資金來自正大在國內銀行所獲千億元授信。正大有關人士告訴財新記者，正大曾獲巨額授信，但用於新農村建設方向，與此交易無關。2012年12月下旬，數位國開行官員明確否認首期152億港元資金來自該行貸款。

按照正大公告，國開行將在交易的第二步提供融資。這一步，餘下9.76億股待取得中國保監會批准後轉讓，計價575.36億港元，部分以現金支付，其餘向國開行貸款。

過 去十年，滙豐雖為單一第一大股東，但通過員工持股等安排，創始人及管理層對中國平安的實際控制權從未旁落。如果滙豐退場，新大股東進入，本有可能打破這一 平衡。歷史上與平安頗有淵源、關係良好的正大集團攜身後資金介入，化解了這種風險——以727億港元獲得第一大股東地位的正大，宣布放棄參與經營管理和派 遣董事的權利。

來自保監會高層的消息確認，已完成的交易中，支付給滙豐的資金確從正大的賬戶上轉出，監管當局亦不會對上市金融機構的股東資格再作特別限定。

此交易看似進展風平浪靜，但數個不願透露姓名的消息源告訴財新記者，有關部門已然高度關注。

有調查發現，收購者正大背後，還另有機構，這些機構已參與第一步交易出資。至於第二步交易，尚待審批，具體出資還未發生。

來自不同大型機構投資者的數個消息源告訴財新記者，在第一筆152億港元資金中，有三分之一左右來自泰國他信家族，其餘部分來自由肖建華領銜的中國內地投資者。

他 信家族是泰國政商界的頭號豪門。他信曾為泰國首富，1998年創立泰愛泰黨，2001年2月，當選為泰國總理。2006年，泰國政爭激化，軍隊發動政變， 他信流亡海外，但仍通過其親屬在泰國國內政治中保持強大影響力。2011年7月，泰國大選，他信的妹妹英拉勝選，成為泰國第一位女總理。

今年41歲的肖建華是“明天系”的實際控制人，旗下有信託、銀行等多個金融機構牌照，在多個跨境金融交易中表現活躍，近年來與平安集團董事長馬明哲過從甚密，在前段發生的其他平安股權轉讓案中亦有其角色。

涉及平安的股權轉讓案，近年來一而再再而三，既引人關注，又始終有一層神秘之紗。
值得注意的是，據正大公告稱，第二筆交易因所涉股份超過5%（約12%），還需等待保監會的合規性審批，期限是2013年2月1日晚11點59分。
滙豐撤出 
全球範圍內出售非核心資產，應付美國的巨額罰金，已有內地保險牌照，內資保險股增長瓶頸到來，規避不確定風險——滙豐選擇退出的原因可以有很多。
滙豐稱以727.36億港元將平安15.57%股權轉讓給正大註冊於維京群島的四間全資子公司，作價為每股59港元，較之前停牌價57.65港元略有溢價。交易完成，正大將成為平安第一大股東。
滙豐公告稱，所持平安股權的賬麵價值約65億美元，此番溢價所得約為26億美元。但若累計滙豐十年來在平安共140億港元股權投入，滙豐實際盈利可超過70億美元。
滙豐給出的售股理由是，“為實現向股東提供持續長遠價值的目標，滙豐會根據其制定的策略架構，定期檢討各項業務和投資項目。出售平安保險股權反映滙豐落實其策略的另一進展。”
“平安並非滙豐的核心業務，滙豐CEO歐智華一直在出售非核心資產，平安只是其中的一例。”瑞信香港亞洲部保險研究總監Arjian van Veen對財新記者分析。
2011年初歐智華上任後，滙豐就宣布將在2013年底前節省最多達35億美元成本，以達到股東權益回報率在12%-15%之間的目標。
2011 年以來，滙豐頻頻出售其在全球各地的非核心資產業務。截至2011年末，已出售累計12.28億美元的財險業務給法國安盛保險集團(AXA)和澳大利亞昆 士蘭保險集團(QBE)。2012年滙豐又陸續將香港、新加坡、墨西哥及阿根廷的一般保險業務出售給了安盛保險及昆士蘭保險，資產總計9.14億美元。有 報道稱，滙豐正洽售上海銀行8%股權，交易接近達成，可能出售給建銀投資參與的投資團。
市場上也有觀點認為，滙豐選擇在此時出售平安，乃因受困於今年以來各國監管機構對其的巨額罰款。巴黎Alpha Value的分析師David Grinsztajn告訴財新記者，“滙豐出售平安股權所得，正好緩解近來滙豐在美國被罰帶來的現金壓力。”
2012 年7月16日，美國參議院調查報告指控滙豐涉嫌在墨西哥、伊朗、開曼群島、沙特阿拉伯及敘利亞等中東國家為恐怖分子和毒梟轉移資金。報告中除指控滙豐涉嫌 轉移資金和隱瞞巨額交易外，還細數了滙豐在防控洗黑錢體系方面存在的七項重大漏洞。12月11日，滙豐同意支付19.2億美元，與美國反洗錢調查達成和 解，創下美國歷來洗錢案和解金額的“新高”。滙豐首席合規官(CCO)巴格利已經引咎辭職。
滙豐控股（美國）紐約商業銀行副總裁Earl Carr Jr.告訴財新記者，滙豐出售平安還因為在中國內地已經有了自己的保險牌照，與平安存在同業競爭之嫌。滙豐在2009年6月得到保監會批准，與國民信託成 立合資保險公司滙豐人壽，各佔50%股權。據財新記者了解，去年滙豐人壽在國內保費收入2.97億元，業績增長主要來源於銀行保險業務，佔到公司總業績的 89%。
不過，滙豐人壽規模太小。平安2012年三季度報財務數據顯示，平安壽險業務累計實現規模保費1575.68億元，信託資管規模達2315.15億元，銀行業務為集團增利52.46億元，證券業務前三季度完成16個IPO項目和31個債券主承銷項目。
也 有觀點認為，中資保險股的增長瓶頸已經來臨，外資股東撤出為數不少。中信建投研究報告持此看法。2011年以來中國壽險業保費增長陷入低迷，預計2013 年亦不會好轉。2011年開始，外資投行已陸續撤出中資保險股。UBS、BlackRock、凱雷、金駿投資在港股先後減持了新華保險、中國人壽、中國太 保和中國平安。
對於滙豐在內地持有股權的另一重量級金融機構交行，滙豐CEO歐智華近日重申，“滙豐將繼續與交行構建長遠的銀行業務策略關係。”今年8月，滙豐斥資133億港元增持交行股份，目前持有交行18.7%股權，保住第二大股東的地位。
滙豐退出平安，也有解讀為規避不確定因素——12月中旬，紐約、倫敦等地的滙豐員工都對財新記者表示內部對此確實存在顧慮。外資銀行對此類風險尤為敏感。

平安股權變遷

上市之前股權轉讓頻繁，上市以後則保持穩定
平安保險於1988年4月成立於深圳蛇口，最初僅有兩家股東，一家是深圳招商局社會保險公司（後由招商局蛇口工業區持有，下稱招商局），還有一家是中國工商銀行深圳分行信託投資公司（下稱工行），分別持股51%和49%。
其後四年間平安又引入三個新股東，中國遠洋運輸（集團）總公司（下稱中遠集團）、深圳市財政局和平安職工合股基金（後來的新豪時投資發展公司），截至1992年12月31日，分別持有平安25%、14.91%和10%的股權。
1992年，平安獲得全國保險牌照。第二年，平安增資擴股，股東數由原來的5家迅速增加到114家。當年底，摩根士丹利和高盛分別以1.2億元購得平安8.01%的股權，平安成為第一家引入外資的國內保險企業和金融企業。

隨後基於國內金融機構的大幅整頓，在從1992年至1995年的三年間，平安清退了過半數股東，最後保留54家。截至1995年12月，公司股本增加到15億元。

此時，前七大主要股東分別是工行持有26.4%、招商局17.79%、中遠集團11.55%、新豪時9.22%、深圳市財政局8.09%和兩家外資（摩根士丹利和高盛）分別持有8.01%。

1997年初，平安開始了新一輪的股份制改造，註冊資本從1997年的15億元增至22.2億元，引入新股東深圳市江南實業（下稱江南實業，認購12.14%股權），其他除持股比例略有變動外，主要股東均未發生變化。

1999 年，平安身陷財務困境，但化險為夷，也安全渡過可能遭拆分的危機。就在平安穩步壯大之時， 2000年至2002年兩年間，前三大股東招商局、工行和中遠集團陸續退席。2000年，工行最先將手中持有的18%（3.96億股）的平安股份轉讓給了 深圳市投資管理公司（下稱深圳投資）。招商局和中遠集團則在2002年尾隨其後，都將股份轉讓給了三家新的投資方。

2002年，招商局把所 持17.09%（3.75億股）的平安股份轉讓給了寶華投資、源信行投資和上海銀峰投資。這三家公司背後的控制人鄭建源浮出水面。據媒體早前的報道，寶華 投資和源信行同屬沒有任何經營活動的殼公司，上海銀峰投資是鄭建源在2001年成立並控制的公司。（點擊查看大圖）

中遠集團也於2002年12月將手中持有11.1%（2.44億股）的平安股份出讓給了三家公司：廣州市恆德貿易、中投創業投資和天津泰鴻，分別持股4.54%、3.02%和3.63%（其中，天津泰鴻的持股份額數還包含從大連遠洋運輸公司手上購入的221萬股）。

同期，平安引進了最為重要的戰略股東。2002年9月，滙豐以6億美元買下了平安10%（2.46億股）的股權。

於 是，平安的未上市股權一年三價。照當時外匯牌價計算，滙豐是以每股20元人民幣買入平安股份。而據媒體報道，滙豐入股一個月前，鄭建源從招商局手中拿到的 價格是每股約6.4元；同年12月，中遠集團轉讓給包括天津泰鴻等三家投資方的價格約為每股6.5元左右，均比當時平安的賬面凈資產略高。

滙豐成為第一大股東，收購股權有溢價在情理中。

但另外幾家內資股東入股價只有滙豐入股價的四分之一強，招致外界議論紛紛。招商局有關人士則稱自己是滙豐最早的原始股東，凈資產積累豐厚，當時出讓亦有利潤，程序公開合法。“出讓股份的老股東都是有利潤入袋的。”一位市場人士如此評價。
2004年6月，平安於香港證券交易所上市。2007年3月1日，平安登陸上海證券交易所。
平安A股歷來年報顯示，平安上市至今，股權結構相對穩定，五年間前十大股東及持股情況均沒有發生重大變化，惟有2008年報中出現了一家名為深圳登峰投資集團的股東，持有4398萬平安A股。
員工持股歷史

員工持股為主要股東之一的治理結構，保持了20年

從股權變遷可見，平安從成立之初就是一家員工持股公司，持股合計比例一直位於主要股東之列。自2002年起，平安的單一第一大股東為滙豐，幾家員工持股公司合計持股一直緊隨其後，其他股份則相對分散。

平安公開確認，員工持股有三家實體，分別是新豪時投資、景傲實業和江南實業。員工投資集合的權益持有人以平安工會、平安證券工會、平安信託工會的名義，分別擁有新豪時投資和景傲實業100%股權。

享 有員工投資集合的參與者，包括平安的董事、監事、高級顧問、專職員工和若干保險銷售代理人。參與者購買的集合單位數額取決於其資歷、工作年限以及對平安的 貢獻等多種因素。員工的購買價格為新豪時投資資產凈值與景傲實業資產凈值之和。根據持有的員工投資集合中的比例獲得紅利。如發生回購，價格為上年度單位賬 目凈資產。

新豪時投資前身是平安職工合股基金， 1992年成立之初出資2236萬元認購平安10%的股權，1993年和1996年分別二度增資認購平安股份，1996年12月新豪時投資以1.76元/ 股認購平安5654萬股，加之2004年平安H股上市前夕的10轉10轉增股本，截至2006年12月31日，新豪時投資共持有平安3.89億股，持股比 例為6.29%。

景傲實業1996年12月31日註冊成立，平安證券工會及平安信託工會分別持有80%及20%股權。2004年12月，景傲實業受讓江南實業所持平安3.31億股份，截至2006年12月31日，景傲實業持有平安3.31億股，佔A股上市前總股本的5.34%。

平 安副總經理王利平代理平安全體委託人托持江南實業。其中，王利平和北京金裕興電子技術有限公司（下稱金裕興）分別持有63.34%及36.66%的股權。 1997年，江南實業認購平安2.69億股，占平安增資後總股本2.22億股的12.14%。從2001年至平安A股上市前夕，江南實業減持平安股權至 2.25%，持有1.39億股平安股權。

2004年平安H股上市前夕，滙豐為避免上市後股權比例被相應攤薄，斥資12億港元以招股價認購平 安股份，維持持股比例在9.99%，進而穩坐平安上市後第一大股東的交椅。平安H股上市第二年，滙豐又花10.39億美元從摩根士丹利和高盛手中買下平安 9.91%的股權，持股量躍升至19.9%，更加穩固了單一大股東的地位。

2007年平安A股上市後，新豪時投資、景傲實業與江南實業合計持有平安13.88%的股份。單一大股東滙豐的股權則從19.9%被攤薄到此次交易前的狀態，15.57%。
員 工持股最終需要變現。上市滿三年後，新豪時投資和景傲實業持有的8.59億股限售股上市流通前夕，平安公布了員工所持解禁股減持方案，兩家公司將在未來五 年內減持，每年減持總數不超過總份額的30%。此舉將產生高達逾40%的稅賦，因新豪時投資需繳納22%-25%的企業所得稅；新豪時投資向員工支付收益 時還要代扣代繳20%的個人所得稅。
受此刺激，有員工不惜提起訴訟，要求將新豪時投資代持的股權過戶到自己名下。
為此，新豪時投資和景傲實業於2010年7月將註冊地由深圳遷至了西藏，更改後的公司名為林芝新豪時投資和林芝景傲實業，以享受西藏自治區新設相關行業企業免徵企業所得稅兩年的優惠政策。
截至2011年底，新豪時投資和景傲實業已累計減持平安1.27億股A股。
稅負問題雖然暫時緩解，但員工的套現壓力帶來的另一個後果，是員工所持股份稀釋後，如何保證管理層對公司的控制權？
今 年5月15日平安公告稱，四家投資者正式接手平安員工持股機構，平安的員工持股問題暫告一段落。新豪時投資60%、景傲實業60%和江南實業38%的股權 將轉讓給四家投資公司，涉及約4.08億平安股權（A股），交易金額約在170億元左右。其餘3億多股員工股也與這四家投資方達成轉讓意向。

這四家投資方分別是北京豐瑞股權投資基金（下稱北京豐瑞）、天津信德融盛商貿有限公司（下稱天津信德融盛）、中國對外經濟貿易信託（下稱對外經貿信託）以及林芝正大環球投資有限公司（下稱林芝正大）。

中國平安工會將持有的新豪時55%股權轉讓給北京豐瑞；景傲實業持有的新豪時5%股權轉讓給天津信德融盛；平安證券工會持有的景傲實業60%股權轉給對外經貿信託；中國平安執行董事王利平持有的江南實業38.004%的股權轉讓給林芝正大。
至此，新豪時由平安工會、北京豐瑞以及天津信德融盛三家持有，持股比例分別是40%、55%和5%。

景 傲實業的股權比例則是，對外經貿信託持有60%股權，剩餘40%股權仍由平安證券工會和平安信託工會分別持有20%；最後一家員工持股公司江南實業的股東 背景則相對複雜，此前控制人王利平現持25.33%，38%交由林芝正大持有，其餘部分由裕興科技通過全資子公司金裕興持有（36.66%股權）。

北京豐瑞和林芝正大的工商資料顯示，兩家公司均在此次交易轉讓前兩個月剛剛成立。

正大、肖建華的身影此時已出現。林芝正大是正大的全資子公司，通過控股江南實業，間接持有平安已發行股份的1.11%。肖建華是對外經貿信託等的實際控制人。正大和肖建華，被認為傾向於鼓勵管理層控股，為平安管理層的盟友。

正大與平安

從林芝正大接手部分平安員工持股，到此次全面接盤滙豐所持股份，正大與平安素有合作
財新記者了解到，滙豐有意退出，也曾找過國內的大型機構投資者如中信集團等，探詢其接盤意向。如果成事，於滙豐於平安都不失為一個“體面的結局”。中信集團向上打了報告，最終無果。
“有關部門沒有同意國有背景的機構去接盤。”接近交易的知情者透露。
近 年來，中國投資有限責任公司(CIC)和全國社保基金等常常聯袂出現在國有金融機構的改制入股過程中。不過，CIC旗下的匯金公司在所投金融機構中表現強 勢，與平安管理層風格不易兼容，且一旦國有控股，就要遵守財政部的限薪規定等。若非不得已，中投入股不是平安的最佳選擇。

還有分析認為，滙豐賣股份需要合理避稅，設立BVI公司接盤就有此考慮，但國有背景公司不很方便做此安排。

“滙豐要賣股份，首先需要與管理層商議，得到其支持。”一位接近滙豐的法律人士表示。
大股東易主，這是平安治理結構的頭等大事。正大集團最終站到了前台。
正 大集團是世界最大的農牧業公司之一，由華人謝易初創立於泰國，現任董事長為謝國民，2011年福布斯所評泰國首富。正大年收入311億美元，凈資產90億 美元，在華投資超過50億美元，旗下有多家上市公司，如在泰國上市的卜蜂食品企業有限公司、True Corporation Public Company Limited、CP ALL Public Company Limited、Siam Makro Public Company Limited；在香港上市的卜蜂國際、卜蜂蓮花、中國生物製藥。正大旗下的易初蓮花超市（2008年更名為卜蜂蓮花超市），在中國大陸現有75家門店。
“謝國民和馬明哲的關係很好。正大在中國內地的很多融資都是平安幫忙做的，平安為正大介紹了不少生意。”一位律師背景的業內人士說。
有海外市場人士透露，之前謝國民找過海外的機構投資者，希望通過QFII渠道，拿出幾億美元購買平安的A股，認為平安A股價格太低，有利可圖。“沒想到謝最終吃下這麼大口。”他說。
平安此次公告稱，此次接盤滙豐股份的是四家公司：同盈貿易、隆福集團、商發控股以及易盛發展。這四家公司均成立不久，尚未從事任何經營活動，註冊地是在英屬維京群島，均是正大集團的附屬子公司。

正大集團人士曾表態稱，此次交易後，正大集團對中國平安的持股僅在投資層面，不會參與經營。平安則表示，可藉助正大集團開展農村金融業務，通過農業金融保險品擴大範圍。

一名美資基金的機構投資者這樣理解正大接盤，“就是幫忙”。正大過去在中國發展得好，建立了良好關係。“這次大股東從滙豐換到正大，平安相當於換了個婆婆，日子還是要照樣過。但是之前是一個有discipline（紀律）的婆婆，新婆婆就是‘甩手掌柜’了。”

肖建華入平安

部分資金騰挪自肖能影響的三家城市商業銀行

正大收購平安股權，目前已經完成第一步交易，作價152億港元。出資有三分之一左右來自泰國他信家族，其餘三分之二中，主要來自中國內地的投資者。據數位不願透露姓名的消息人士向財新記者表示，領銜者是“明天系”掌門人肖建華。
肖 建華，1971年出生於山東肥城，15歲考入北大法律系，曾任北大學生會主席。1993年在北京創立公司，1999年成立明天控股有限公司，以購買法人股 或發起設立方式參股了多家上市公司，以“明天系”在資本市場風聲水起。“德隆系”崩盤後，“明天系”一度低調，但在2006年後再度活躍，旗下有多家上市 公司及銀行、證券、信託金融機構。

肖建華一向神龍見首不見尾，從不接受任何媒體採訪，很少公開曝光，但近年活躍在多起跨國金融機構收購案中，有時為中介，有時為投資。

2006 年魯能集團私有化未果，“明天系”旗下的新時代信託等參與其中；2006年深發展股改，“明天系”旗下三家證券公司入股並投反對票；2007年末，太平洋 證券（601099.SH）借股改捷徑上市，“明天系”是其主要股東；2009年AIG出售台灣南山人壽保險股份，“明天系”參與收購戰。
2012年6月，內蒙古的ST明科（上海交易所代碼：600091）與西水股份（上海交易所代碼：600291）發佈公告，明天控股收購第一大股東股權，成為實際控制人。

肖建華此次參與出資，資金騰挪自肖具備影響力的三家城市商業銀行，分別為哈爾濱商行、山東濰坊商業銀行、內蒙古包頭商業銀行。

截至2011年末，哈爾濱銀行資產總額2024.99億元，存款餘額1416.38億元，不良率0.67%，凈利潤17.08億元；小額信貸餘額360.88億元，佔全行信貸資產總額的61%。

濰坊銀行總資產458億元，存款餘額為378億元，各項貸款餘額268億元，不良貸款率為0.88%。
包頭商業銀行總資產1819.4億元，存款餘額1170.67億元，不良貸款率0.43%，凈利潤20.93億元。
這三家銀行均與肖建華都有着錯綜複雜的關係。
哈 爾濱銀行的股東之一黑龍江天地源遠網絡科技，早在2003年就與肖建華控股的華資實業有過股權交易。濰坊銀行第一大股東融信達，其控股的遠東證券和新產業 投資股份有限公司，也均是肖建華“明天系”旗下的公司。業內人士告訴財新記者，這三家城市商業銀行都在肖建華的影響所及。

值得注意的是，20天後，這筆出去的資金又回到了這三家銀行賬上。

按照交易完成的進展，在股權完成轉移後，即可以股權抵押向商業銀行貸款，抵押率一般為50%左右。目前上海交易所和港交所均未顯示平安有超過5%的股權在質押中。

誰提供了接下來的資金騰挪？雖然有人懷疑資金來源於平安集團的管理層。但截至本刊發稿，尚無證據支持這一懷疑。

“未來肖建華和馬明哲之間還會有很多故事。”一位市場人士這樣說。
平安何處去
國內投資者認為平安仍在風口浪尖，海外投資者認為平安大的發展方向不受影響
交易公布當日，平安A股和H股分別暴漲逾4%（A股報收38.92元，H股報收60.50港元）。早在半個月前，滙豐減持平安的猜測聲就已在市場上流傳開來，平安股價一度出現暴跌，後漸回升。
紛亂之中，外部投資者十分關心平安的去向和價值重估。H股和A股投資者的看法出現了明顯的分歧，平安A股和H股價格倒掛加劇。

不少內地投資者仍認為平安還在風口浪尖。在這一問題沒有水落石出之前，他們認為平安的估值還有風險。

一位美資基金的分析師告訴財新記者，內地投資者對於中國的政治敏感度要優於海外的投資者，他們切實知道中國的問題；另一方面，最近因量化寬鬆政策，海外熱錢湧入香港，流動性泛濫，較易流入平安這種大藍籌。
不過，幾乎所有海外投行都認為對平安影響較小，既因為滙豐沒有介入平安的日常管理，也因為普遍預期滙豐要退出，對股價造成壓力，現在不過是靴子落地。
“平安本身是有價值的，過去這段時間的風波不會影響到公司大的發展方向。”私募基金上善若水有限合夥公司的投資總監兼合伙人侯安揚持此態度，他傾向於在A股和H股之間套利。

平安在國內綜合金融走得最遠。收購深發展，與平安銀行合并，與高層良好的關係有助於走過各艱難審批環節，客觀上推動了一個有價值的重大交易產生，對公司發展、行業進步均有益。

平安的員工持股和管理層控制機製取向比較明確，由此建立了一個有效的激勵機制和高效的決策機制，很多保險業內的高管自嘆弗如。機構投資者均表示，認同平安的員工持股，股權激勵對公司的影響是正面的。

也有人擔心，平安創建的金融控股綜合經營之路會遭遇挫折。就綜合金融的發展戰略，一位歐資基金經理表示，放眼全球，亦難找出普適性的成功模式。術業有專攻，不同的業務和文化間，整合未必容易。金融危機後，全球都有回到向精細化、獨特化發展的趨勢。
不過，“從目前平安公開資料看，平安發展良好。”東方證券一位保險分析師對財新記者說。

前述歐資基金經理稱，大家擔心的是平安未來可能會失去政策的優先性，也擔心馬明哲對平安的控制力經歷此次股權變動後會不會受損，因為資本市場還是認可馬明哲對平安的正面作用。

總理家人隱秘的財富

Oct 26, 2012 6:58 PM

总理家人隐秘的财富

By DAVID BARBOZA

This is a Chinese-language version of an investigation by The New York Times showing that the family of Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, who has staked a position as a populist and a reformer, owns about $2.7 billion in assets.
北京 — — 中国总理温家宝的母亲曾是华北的一名教师，他的父亲在毛泽东时代的政治运动中曾被送去养猪。在去年的一次演讲中，温家宝总理说，他的童年被打上了“穷苦、动荡和饥荒”的印记。
然而，公司与监管记录显示，现年90岁的总理母亲杨志云不仅不再贫穷，而且绝对富裕。记录显示，仅她名下一项对中国一家大型金融企业的投资就曾在5年前价值1.2亿美元（约合7.6亿元人民币）。

没人知晓丈夫已经去世的杨志云是如何积累这笔财富的。但这一过程发生在她儿子被提拔进中国的统治精英阶层之后。温家宝先在1998年升任国务院副总理，并在五年后出任总理。

《纽约时报》的调查显示，温家宝担任领导职务期间，他的很多亲属变得极为富有。其中包括温家宝的儿子、女儿、弟弟及妻弟。对公司与监管记录的调查显示，在 总理的亲属中，有些人的生意风格十分强势，他们掌控了价值不低于27亿美元（约合170亿元人民币）的资产。

很多情况下，这些亲属的名字都掩藏在多层涉及朋友、同事、商业伙伴与远亲的合伙企业和投资载体背后。此番财务解析细致而不同寻常地揭示出，在经济高速发展、政府影响和私人财富重叠交错的中国，拥有政治人脉的人物是如何利用自己沟通政商的能力谋取利益。

资料显示，与大多数中国的新企业不同，这个家族的生意不时从国有企业获得金融支持，包括中国最大的电信运营商之一中国移动。其他时候，这些企业得到了一些 亚洲最富有的商业巨头的支持。《纽约时报》发现，温家宝的亲属在银行、珠宝公司、度假村、基础设施项目和电信公司中持有股份，其中部分股权是通过离岸机构 持有的。

他们持股的对象包括位于北京的一处别墅开发项目、中国北方的一家轮胎工厂、一家曾参与修建包括标志建筑“鸟巢”(Bird’s Nest)在内的一些北京奥运场馆的公司，以及平安保险，世界上最大的金融服务公司之一。

今年70岁的温家宝，作为一个仍然严重依靠政府带动的经济体的总理， 在为其亲属带来巨大财富的主要行业中拥有广泛的权力。比如，中国公司如果不经过他手下的机构审批，就不能在证券交易所上市。他在决定是否批准能源与电信等 战略行业中的大型投资项目方面，也起着关键作用。

由于中国政府甚少公开自己的决策过程，所以还不清楚温家宝在大多数政策或法规决策中是否施加了影响，或施加了什么影响。但在一些情况下，他的亲属却试图从这些决策带来的机会中获利。
例如，根据基于政府记录进行的估算，他弟弟的公司曾从政府那里得到了价值超过3千万美元（约合1.89亿元人民币）的合同与补贴，负责处理一些中国大城市 的污水和医疗垃圾。这些合同都是在2003年非典型肺炎(SARS)疫情之后温家宝下令对医疗垃圾处理加强监管之后宣布的。

2004年，温家宝领导下的国务院免除了平安保险等公司所受经营范围上的限制之后，该公司在其首次公开发行股票中募资18亿美元（约合113亿元人民 币），其当下的市值超过了600亿美元。而由温家宝的亲属和他们的朋友、同事控制的合伙人公司在公开发行之前对平安保险公司进行了投资，并从中获取巨额利 润。

2007年，也就是对相关持股进行公开披露的最后一年，《纽约时报》一份经过外部审计人员核实的调查报告显示，这些合伙人公司持有股票的总价值在当时高达22亿美元（约合139亿元人民币）。

中国平安保险在一份声明中表示，该公司不知晓股东背后投资实体的背景。声明还说，中国平安保险无法获悉股东买卖股份背后的动机。
尽管中国共产党的条例要求高级官员公开自己和直系亲属的财产，但却没有法律法规对哪怕是最高层官员的亲属做出禁令，禁止他们成为交易撮合者或者主要投资 人，而这一漏洞实际上让一些人可以打着家族的名号做生意。一些中国人认为，允许共产党领导人的家人从中国长期的经济繁荣中获利，对确保精英阶层支持市场化 改革十分重要。

但是，提交给中国监管机构的资料显示，温家宝亲属的商业交易有时被掩盖了起来。其运作方式暗示，他们急切地想回避公众的关注。调查发现，他们拥有的股权通常掩盖在错综复杂的股权网络当中，其所有权可能距实际运营的公司有五层控股公司之遥。

在温家宝母亲的案例中，《纽约时报》通过调查公开记录和政府颁发的身份证，并对三家中国投资公司的所有权进行追踪之后，估算出她在平安保险持有的股份在 2007年价值1.2亿美元（约合7.6亿元人民币）。他母亲在平安持有的股票被登记在一家名为泰鸿(Taihong)的控股公司名下，该公司注册地是总 理的故乡天津。

这些看上去是在掩饰自身财富的努力显示，围绕着中国精英统治阶层的政治氛围相当紧张，很多人坐拥巨富，却不愿引人注目。6月份，彭博资讯社 (Bloomberg News)报道，中国下届国家主席的既定人选、副主席习近平的亲属积累了数亿美元的财产，中国政府随即在国内屏蔽了彭博社的网站。

“高层领导中，没有哪家没有这样的问题，”与温家宝相识20多年的一位前同事在不具名的条件下表示，“他的政敌正在有意泄露这些消息给他抹黑。”

《纽约时报》将调查发现交给了中国政府，并请求置评。中国外交部拒绝回答有关这些投资和涉及总理及其亲属的问题。温家宝的亲属也拒绝置评或没有回复置评请求。

女富商段伟红的泰鸿公司就是总理母亲与其他亲属持有的平安股份的投资平台。段伟红说，这些投资实际上都是她自己的。段伟红是总理的同乡，也是总理夫人的好朋友。她表示，这些股份之所以放在总理亲属的名下，是为了隐藏她自己持股的规模。
她表示，“我在投资平安的时候，不希望被媒体关注，”段女士表示，“所以我让亲戚找了一些人代我持有这些股份。”

她说，自己的公司选了这些亲属作为名义股东，只是一个“巧合”。股权登记过程需要股东提供自己的身份证号码与签名。直到《纽约时报》向她展示了这些投资者的姓名，她一直表示，她不知道这些人和温家宝有亲戚关系。

此次调查的公司与监管记录的时间跨度为1992年到2012年，调查中没有发现温家宝名下有任何财产。从这些材料中无法看出，温家宝是否曾对任何可能会给亲属的财产带来影响的决定进行回避，也不能断定这些亲属是否在投资上得到过优待。

在任期内的很长时间里，温家宝一直被关于其亲属试图利用其职位谋利的谣言和猜测缠身。但截止到《纽约时报》此次调查为止，并没有出现任何关于这个家族财富的详细报道。

他的妻子张蓓莉是中国珠宝与宝石领域的权威人士之一，自己本身就是一位成功的女商人。《纽约时报》发现，她通过管理后来被私有化的国有钻石公司，帮助亲属戚将一些少数股权扩充为价值十亿美元级别的投资组合，涵盖保险、科技和房地产行业。

温家宝夫妇唯一的儿子曾将自己开创的一家科技公司以1千万美元（约合6千3百万元人民币）的价格卖给香港首富李嘉诚(Li Ka-shing)家族，并利用另一个投资平台成立了新天域资本公司(New Horizon Capital)。相关记录与对银行业人士的采访显示，目前，该公司是中国最大的私募股权公司之一， 其投资合伙人包括了新加坡政府。

记录显示，总理的弟弟温家宏(Wen Jiahong)掌控着2亿美元（约合12.6亿元人民币）的资产，其中包括污水处理厂与回收企业。

作为总理，温家宝阐明了自己是一个平民主义者和改革派的立场。他平易近人，经常接触普通百姓，尤其是在发生自然灾害的危急时刻。官方媒体将他爱称为“人民的总理”和“温爷爷”。

尽管还不清楚温家宝对自己家族的财富知道多少，但在维基解密(WikiLeaks)2010年公布的美国国务院(State Department)外交电文中，有一份电文显示，温家宝对其亲属的商业交易有所了解，且相当不满。

根据这份2007年发送的电报，一名在中国出生并供职于上海一家美国公司的高管告诉美国外交官，“温家宝对家人的活动很反感，但他无力或不愿限制他们。”

中国的钻石女王

在中国的精英圈子里，总理夫人张蓓莉很有钱而且在一定程度上控制着中国的珠宝贸易，这一点不是秘密。但《纽约时报》在查阅了公司和监管记录之后发现，只是在她丈夫步入中国的最高领导层后，她那些利润丰厚的钻石生意才变得异常成功。

张蓓莉是一名专门研究宝石的地质学家，普通中国人基本上不知道她。她很少和总理一起出行或公开露面。目前几乎没有几张这对夫妇在一起的正式照片。尽管曾和 她共事的人说，她喜欢翡翠和精美的钻石，但他们也表示，和其他高级领导人的亲属很像，她的着装通常都很低调，并没有表现得魅力四射，而是宁愿在幕后施展影 响。

维基解密公布的美国国务院文件还表明，温家宝曾因张蓓莉在钻石贸易中利用了两人之间的关系而考虑过离婚。台湾的电视台2007年报道称，张蓓莉在北京的一 个贸易展上购得了一对价值约为27.5万美元（当时约合200万元人民币）的翡翠耳环。但根据当时的新闻报道，透露此消息的那名台湾展商后来否认了该说 法，中国官方新闻审查部门迅速封锁了国内对该事件的报道。
一位曾和温家宝的亲属合作过银行业人士称，“在领导层的圈子里，她的商业活动是众所周知的。”这位银行业人士还表示，张蓓莉的办公室致电商业人士也不是什么不寻常的事，“如果你接到了电话，怎么能说不呢？”

张蓓莉最初得势是在上世纪90年代，当时她还是地质部的一名监管人员。那时，中国的珠宝市场尚处于起步阶段。

当她丈夫在中国的最高领导机构所在地中南海任职时，张蓓莉正在制定珠宝与宝石贸易的行业标准。她协助在北京成立了国家珠宝玉石质量监督检验中心，在上海成立了上海钻石交易所。这是该行业内权力最大的两家机构。

在中国，政府长期以来控制着市场，珠宝行业监管部门常常决定着哪家公司可以开设钻石加工厂，谁可以获准进入珠宝零售市场。国家监管部门甚至还制定了规则， 要求钻石出售方要为在中国售出的钻石购买鉴定证书，而那些认证书就来自北京那家由张蓓莉管理的国营检验中心。
因此，当卡地亚(Cartier)和戴比尔斯(DeBeers)的主管来到中国，并希望能在这里销售钻石和珠宝时，他们经常拜访人称中国“钻石皇后”的张蓓莉。

总部设在瑞士的世界珠宝联合会(World Jewelry Confederation)的主席加埃塔诺·卡瓦列里(Gaetano Cavalieri)已经认识张蓓莉很多年了，他表示：“在中国，她是最重要的人。她就是中外合伙人之间的桥梁 。”

曾和张蓓莉共过事的人说，她早在1992年就开始游走在官员和女商人这两个角色之间了。作为国有的中国地矿宝石总公司负责人，她开始用国有资金投资新兴企业。在1998年她丈夫被任命为副总理时，她正忙着和亲戚朋友一起开办企业。

根据公开披露的信息，她经营的那家国有企业投资了数家下属钻石企业。在这些公司当中，有好几家是由张蓓莉的亲戚或她在国家珠宝玉石检验中心的前同事经营的私有企业。

比如，1993年，张蓓莉负责的那家国企帮助成立了北京戴梦得宝石公司，这是一家大型的珠宝生产商。股东名册显示，一年后，她的一个弟弟张剑鸣和她的两名 在政府的同事以个人的名义购得了该公司80%的股份。北京戴梦得投资的深圳戴梦得宝石公司则是由她丈夫的弟弟温家宏所控制。

中宝戴梦得是她最大的成功之一。这家企业的出资方包括由她担任一把手的国有企业中国地矿宝石总公司。中宝戴梦得和另外一家由她弟弟张剑鹍管理的国企有生意往来。张剑鹍曾是浙江嘉兴的一名官员，那里也是张蓓莉的家乡。

1999年夏，在达成了从俄罗斯和南非进口钻石的协议后，中宝戴梦得在上海证券交易所(Shanghai Stock Exchange)上市，募集到了3.25亿元人民币。根据公司文件，这次募股为张蓓莉的家人带来了大约800万美元（当时约合6600万元人民币）。
尽管她从未被列为股东，但她以前的同事和生意伙伴表示， 张蓓莉早年成立的钻石合伙企业最终成为了一系列企业的核心，她帮助自己的家族和同事获得了那些企业的股份。

《纽约时报》没有发现，温家宝曾利用自己的政治影响力对亲属所投资的钻石公司进行关照。然而，之前的生意伙伴表示，温家宝家族在钻石行业和其他领域的成功往往都得到了富有商人的资金扶持，那些商人试图借此讨好总理一家。

“温家宝成为总理后，他妻子出售了部分钻石相关的投资，转而进入新的领域，” 一名同该家族有过生意往来的中国高管说。 因为怕遭政府报复，这位高管请求匿名。公司记录显示，从上世纪90年代末开始，一群富商轮番买进这些钻石公司的大量股份。出售方通常是温家宝的亲戚，然 后，在这些商人的帮助下，他们将所得再投资到房地产和金融等有利可图的项目中。
根据公司记录，富商通常会向由这些亲戚部分控制的投资合伙公司提供会计人员和办公地点。

“当他们合伙成立公司时，”一位和温家成员一起成立过公司的商人说，“张蓓莉留在幕后。这就是他们的模式。”

唯一的儿子

今年早些时候的一个晚上，总理的独子温云松坐在一个名为“秀”的雪茄吧里，这是一间位于北京柏悦酒店的顶级酒吧。在场的两位客人透露，他当时正喝着鸡尾酒，身边围绕着北京的新贵们。这些人提着名牌包，身着昂贵的西装。
在中国，人们普遍认为高层领导人的下一代构成了一个特殊的阶层，人称“太子党”。这些人往往持有常青藤(Ivy League)名校的文凭，享受贵宾待遇，甚至能在热门股票发行时以优惠价格获得股票。
在市场准入受到政府严格控制的中国，人们都认为太子党好办事。而近几年，还没有几个太子党像年届不惑的温云松这样有魄力。他的英文名是温斯顿(Winston)。

经过调查温云松的各种投资，并采访了与他相识多年的人士，《纽约时报》发现他涉足的交易领域极其广泛，获利甚丰，这即使是在他太子党同辈中也是出类拔萃的。

诸如中国移动这样的国有大机构都和他合作成立了新公司。在近些年，温云松还和好莱坞(Hollywood)制片商就融资活动展开洽谈。

苦恼于中国尚无精英级别的寄宿学校，温云松最近雇佣了康涅狄格州的乔特罗斯玛丽中学(Choate)和霍奇科斯学校(Hotchkiss)的校长来负责成立一所位于京郊、投资1.5亿美元的私立学校，这所学校目前正在建设中。
另外，根据公司记录及熟悉其家庭投资情况的人士的陈述，温云松与其妻还拥有珠宝公司、网络公司和动画公司的股份，他们甚至通过非直接的方式，拥有政府鼎力 支持的在线支付企业联动优势科技有限公司(Union Mobile Pay)的股份。一直以来，他们住在位于北京市中心的总理官邸内。
一位与温云松经常见面的风险投资家说：“他不会对用自己的影响来办事感到不好意思。”
温云松拒绝接受采访，但他的妻子杨小萌在一次电话采访中表示，针对自己丈夫的商业活动的批评并不公平。
“所有关于他的报道都是错误的，”她表示，“他真的已经不怎么做生意了。”
温云松毕业于北京的精英学校，并在北京理工大学(Beijing Institute of Technology)取得工科学位。他后来出国，在加拿大温莎大学(University of Windsor)取得了材料科学的硕士学位，并在美国伊利诺伊州埃文斯顿的西北大学(Northwestern University)凯洛格商学院(Kellogg School of Business)取得了工商管理硕士学位。
熟悉温云松生意的人透露，他2000年回国后，在五年时间里和别人一起成功打造了三家科技公司。随后他将其中两家公司出售给了香港的企业家，其中包括亚洲首富李嘉诚(Li Ka-shing)的家族。
经查阅香港与北京的公司注册信息发现，温云松在2000年成立了他的第一家公司优创科技(Unihub Global)，提供互联网数据服务，启动资金为500万美元。资金来源于一些关系密切的亲戚与他母亲以前在政府和钻石行业的同事，以及香港第二富有家族 的家长郑裕彤(Cheng Yu-Tung)身边的一个人。这家公司的最早客户是一些国有证券公司和平安保险。总理的亲属持有大量平安保险股份。

2005年，他进行了更大胆的尝试，开始进军私募股权行业，和一群西北大学的中国同学成立了新天域资本公司。公司很快从各方投资者募集了1亿美元的资金。 投资人中有日本软银集团(Softbank)旗下的思佰益控股(SBI Holdings)和新加坡政府的投资基金淡马锡(Temasek)。

在温云松的领导下，新天域迅速蹿升为私人股本行业的佼佼者，公司在生物科技、太阳能、风能和建筑设备制造领域投资。据思佰益控股，迄今为止，该公司已经向投资者返还了4.3亿美元，相当于逾四倍的获利。

香港行业出版物《亚洲私募股权评论》(Asia Private Equity Review)的主编凯瑟琳·吴(Kathleen Ng)说：“他们的第一个基金就一炮打响。这使得他们可以募得更多资金。”

目前，新天域管理着逾25亿美元的资金 。

然而，温云松的一些交易却给总理带来了一些不必要的关注。

2010年，就在一家名为四环医药的企业公开发行股票仅两个月前，新天域收购了该公司9%的股权。香港证交所做出裁定，这笔后期投资违反了相关规定，并强迫新天域退回股权。即便这样，该公司还是在这笔交易中获利4650万美元。

不久以后，新天域宣布，温云松已经不再负责公司的日常运作。他转而加入了国有的中国卫星通信集团公司。这家公司和中国的空间项目有联系，目前，他已经成为了该公司的董事长。

富豪们

在上世纪90年代末期，段伟红通过自己的泰鸿地产公司在总理的家乡天津管理着一幢办公楼与几处房产。她当时还不到30岁，拥有南京理工大学的学位。
在2002年，段伟红与几位温家宝的亲戚展开了商业合作，将自己的房地产公司转换成为了同名的投资公司。这家公司最终使段伟红变得非常富有。

现年43岁的段伟红与总理的关系尚不明朗。在数次采访中，她先是表示，自己并不认识温家任何人，但随后又承认自己是总理夫人张蓓莉的朋友。与其他几位中国 企业家一样，在和这些亲属以及他们的关系网中的朋友与同事展开合作后，她的财富规模急速上升。然而她表示，自己和这些人在平安股权上的关系只存在于纸面 上，并没有真正的金钱往来。

段伟红与另外几个商人一直以来都在帮助温家宝家族，他们的作用至关重要，在关键时刻启动大型项目，以帮助温家宝家族成员设立投资平台，并从中获利。这些生意伙伴里包括6位来自中国各地的亿万富豪。

成立于天津的泰鸿获得了惊人的回报。公司披露信息与段伟红的研究生论文显示，2002年，在平安保险首次公开发行股票之前，泰鸿以6500万美元购得了平安3%的股份。5年后，这些股票的市值为37亿美元。

随后，通过自己在香港的一家公司，段伟红和两家国有企业成立了一个合资公司，并在北京首都国际机场附近购得了一大块土地。如今，在这片土地上，坐落着一个 不断壮大的货运物流中心。去年，泰鸿将这一项目中该公司拥有的53%股权出售给了一家新加坡企业，售价为近4亿美元。

《纽约时报》通过查阅公司披露材料发现，这笔交易，连同她对豪华酒店、北京的别墅开发项目，以及在香港上市的北京金隅股份有限公司的投资，对段伟红的财富积累起到了至关重要的作用。北京金隅是中国最大建筑材料企业之一。

通过查阅报表还发现，在过去10年中，泰鸿有着三十多位个人股东，其中很多人要么是温家宝的亲属，要么是张蓓莉的前同事。

其他与总理的亲属合作过的富商拒绝就本报道置评。段伟红强烈否认自己与总理或其亲属存在任何金钱往来，并表示，将平安股票放在他人名下，只为避免媒体关注。“投资平安的钱全是我自己的” ，曾经是平安监事会成员的段伟红表示。“我做的一切都是合法的。”
与温家宝的亲属进行合作的另一位富商是掌握着香港集团企业新世界发展公司的郑裕彤(Cheng Yutung)。《福布斯》(Forbes)数据显示，他的身价为150亿美元，是亚洲最大的富豪之一。

在20世纪90年代，新世界正在中国内地为一家专门经营高档珠宝的姊妹公司寻找落脚点。1998年，这家名为周大福(Chow Tai Fook)的连锁珠宝零售企业在中国内地开设了第一家门店。

相关记录与对当事人的采访显示，郑裕彤的手下向背后有温家宝的亲属支持的钻石企业进行了投资。还与这些企业一起，共同投资了一系列企业实体，其中包括生命 人寿 (Sino-Life)、国民信托(National Trust)和平安保险。企业披露的报表显示，郑裕彤作出的这些投资现在至少价值50亿美元。连锁珠宝企业周大福也得到了蓬勃发展。今天，该公司42亿美 元的年收入中，60%来自中国市场。

本报未能联系到87岁的郑裕彤。新世界发展公司也没有回复打过去的电话。
对温家宝的影响
2007年冬，就在温家宝开始第二个总理任期之前，他呼吁采取新措施打击腐败，尤其是高级官员的腐败。
“各级主要负责同志要……带头执行中央关于党政干部廉洁自律的各项规定。”在北京举行的一次党内高层官员参加的会议上，温家宝说：“领导干部特别是高级干部要严格管束子女、亲属和身边工作人员，防止他们利用自己的影响谋取不正当利益。”
上述讲话，与温家宝较早前推动对公务员实行更严格的财产申报规定，要求高级官员公布家庭资产的行动是一致的。

由于中国共产党并不公布此类信息，并不清楚温家宝是否进行过关于自己家庭财产的申报。尽管如此，《纽约时报》发现的温家宝亲属持有的资产中，很多可能并不需要进行披露，因为那些资产并不是以温家宝，及他的妻子和子女的名义持有的。

《纽约时报》通过调查发现并经由外部审计人员核查的27亿美元资产中，约有80%是由温家宝的母亲、弟弟、弟媳、温家宝妻子的两名兄弟、温家宝的儿媳及亲 家等人所持有的。他们都不受中国共产党公开财产的规定所限制。《纽约时报》对相关亲属的中国平安保险持股总规模进行了计算，其结果得到了审计师的确认。总 额包括亲属曾经持有但在2004年至2006之间售出的股票，以及2007年末剩下的股票。在此之后，他们平安保险的持股状况就没有再进行过公开披露。
法律专家表示，估测准确的价值并不容易，因为可能存在一些并不对外披露、指定真正受益者的附加协议。
哥伦比亚大学法学院(Columbia University Law School)教授克提斯·米尔哈特(Curtis Milhaupt)曾研究过中国公司架构，他表示：“复杂的企业架构并不一定有阴谋诡计。但在企业所有权和政治权力紧密交织的中国体制之下，壳公司就会放 大资产所有人不明、资金来源不明的问题。”
在温家宝的家族所控制的企业中进行投资的人里，有很多长期的商业伙伴、前同事，以及大学同学，其中包括温云松在西北大学的同学于剑鸣，以及温家宝的弟弟温家宏长期以来的同事张玉宏。这些人都没有回复就本报道置评的请求。
披露温家宝家族持有的财富，可能会给温家宝带来政治上的打击。
下个月，中共十八大将在北京召开，共产党将宣布下一届领导人人选。但是这个筛选过程却已经陷入几十年来最严重的政治丑闻中 — — 试图进入最高层的重庆市委书记薄熙来倒台。

在北京，因已到退休年龄，温家宝即将卸任总理一职。数位政治分析人士表示，即使在离任之后，作为党内老领导，他还将在幕后保有强大的政治力量，但这些显示其亲属曾在他任期内积累巨额财富的材料，几乎肯定会削弱他在党内的地位。

“这将影响他手中剩下的政治力量，” 研究中国领导层的专家、加州克莱蒙麦肯纳学院(Claremont McKenna College)的政府学教授裴敏欣(Minxin Pei)表示。
温家宝的支持者表示，他本人并没有从家族的商业往来中获利，甚至可能也不太了解这些商业往来的规模。
今年3月，温家宝暗示，他至少是知晓自己的亲属引发了不少传言。在北京举行的一场向全国电视直播的新闻发布会上，温家宝坚称，自己担任公职期间“没有谋过私利”。
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/26/business/global/family-of-wen-jiabao-holds-a-hidden-fortune-in-china-chinese-version.html?ref=china&pagewanted=all

October 25, 2012

Billions in Hidden Riches for Family of Chinese Leader

By DAVID BARBOZA

BEIJING — The mother of China’s prime minister was a schoolteacher in northern China. His father was ordered to tend pigs in one of Mao’s political campaigns. And during childhood, “my family was extremely poor,” the prime minister, Wen Jiabao, said in a speech last year.
But now 90, the prime minister’s mother, Yang Zhiyun, not only left poverty behind, she became outright rich, at least on paper, according to corporate and regulatory records. Just one investment in her name, in a large Chinese financial services company, had a value of $120 million five years ago, the records show.

The details of how Ms. Yang, a widow, accumulated such wealth are not known, or even if she was aware of the holdings in her name. But it happened after her son was elevated to China’s ruling elite, first in 1998 as vice prime minister and then five years later as prime minister.

Many relatives of Wen Jiabao, including his son, daughter, younger brother and brother-in-law, have become extraordinarily wealthy during his leadership, an investigation by The New York Times shows. A review of corporate and regulatory records indicates that the prime minister’s relatives — some of whom, including his wife, have a knack for aggressive deal making — have controlled assets worth at least $2.7 billion.

In many cases, the names of the relatives have been hidden behind layers of partnerships and investment vehicles involving friends, work colleagues and business partners. Untangling their financial holdings provides an unusually detailed look at how politically connected people have profited from being at the intersection of government and business as state influence and private wealth converge in China’s fast-growing economy.

Unlike most new businesses in China, the family’s ventures sometimes received financial backing from state-owned companies, including China Mobile, one of the country’s biggest phone operators, the documents show. At other times, the ventures won support from some of Asia’s richest tycoons. The Times found that Mr. Wen’s relatives accumulated shares in banks, jewelers, tourist resorts, telecommunications companies and infrastructure projects, sometimes by using offshore entities.

The holdings include a villa development project in Beijing; a tire factory in northern China; a company that helped build some of Beijing’s Olympic stadiums, including the well-known “Bird’s Nest”; and Ping An Insurance, one of the world’s biggest financial services companies.

As prime minister in an economy that remains heavily state-driven, Mr. Wen, who is best known for his simple ways and common touch, more importantly has broad authority over the major industries where his relatives have made their fortunes. Chinese companies cannot list their shares on a stock exchange without approval from agencies overseen by Mr. Wen, for example. He also has the power to influence investments in strategic sectors like energy and telecommunications.

Because the Chinese government rarely makes its deliberations public, it is not known what role — if any — Mr. Wen, who is 70, has played in most policy or regulatory decisions. But in some cases, his relatives have sought to profit from opportunities made possible by those decisions.

The prime minister’s younger brother, for example, has a company that was awarded more than $30 million in government contracts and subsidies to handle wastewater treatment and medical waste disposal for some of China’s biggest cities, according to estimates based on government records. The contracts were announced after Mr. Wen ordered tougher regulations on medical waste disposal in 2003 after the SARS outbreak.

In 2004, after the State Council, a government body Mr. Wen presides over, exempted Ping An Insurance and other companies from rules that limited their scope, Ping An went on to raise $1.8 billion in an initial public offering of stock. Partnerships controlled by Mr. Wen’s relatives — along with their friends and colleagues — made a fortune by investing in the company before the public offering.

In 2007, the last year the stock holdings were disclosed in public documents, those partnerships held as much as $2.2 billion worth of Ping An stock, according to an accounting of the investments by The Times that was verified by outside auditors. Ping An’s overall market value is now nearly $60 billion.

Ping An said in a statement that the company did “not know the background of the entities behind our shareholders.” The statement said, “Ping An has no means to know the intentions behind shareholders when they buy and sell our shares.”

While Communist Party regulations call for top officials to disclose their wealth and that of their immediate family members, no law or regulation prohibits relatives of even the most senior officials from becoming deal-makers or major investors — a loophole that effectively allows them to trade on their family name. Some Chinese argue that permitting the families of Communist Party leaders to profit from the country’s long economic boom has been important to ensuring elite support for market-oriented reforms.

Even so, the business dealings of Mr. Wen’s relatives have sometimes been hidden in ways that suggest the relatives are eager to avoid public scrutiny, the records filed with Chinese regulatory authorities show. Their ownership stakes are often veiled by an intricate web of holdings as many as five steps removed from the operating companies, according to the review.

In the case of Mr. Wen’s mother, The Times calculated her stake in Ping An — valued at $120 million in 2007 — by examining public records and government-issued identity cards, and by following the ownership trail to three Chinese investment entities. The name recorded on his mother’s shares was Taihong, a holding company registered in Tianjin, the prime minister’s hometown.

The apparent efforts to conceal the wealth reflect the highly charged politics surrounding the country’s ruling elite, many of whom are also enormously wealthy but reluctant to draw attention to their riches. When Bloomberg News reported in June that the extended family of Vice President Xi Jinping, set to become China’s next president, had amassed hundreds of millions of dollars in assets, the Chinese government blocked access inside the country to the Bloomberg Web site.

“In the senior leadership, there’s no family that doesn’t have these problems,” said a former government colleague of Wen Jiabao who has known him for more than 20 years and who spoke on the condition of anonymity. “His enemies are intentionally trying to smear him by letting this leak out.”

The Times presented its findings to the Chinese government for comment. The Foreign Ministry declined to respond to questions about the investments, the prime minister or his relatives. Members of Mr. Wen’s family also declined to comment or did not respond to requests for comment.

Duan Weihong, a wealthy businesswoman whose company, Taihong, was the investment vehicle for the Ping An shares held by the prime minister’s mother and other relatives, said the investments were actually her own. Ms. Duan, who comes from the prime minister’s hometown and is a close friend of his wife, said ownership of the shares was listed in the names of Mr. Wen’s relatives in an effort to conceal the size of Ms. Duan’s own holdings.

“When I invested in Ping An I didn’t want to be written about,” Ms. Duan said, “so I had my relatives find some other people to hold these shares for me.”

But it was an “accident,” she said, that her company chose the relatives of the prime minister as the listed shareholders — a process that required registering their official ID numbers and obtaining their signatures. Until presented with the names of the investors by The Times, she said, she had no idea that they had selected the relatives of Wen Jiabao.
The review of the corporate and regulatory records, which covers 1992 to 2012, found no holdings in Mr. Wen’s name. And it was not possible to determine from the documents whether he recused himself from any decisions that might have affected his relatives’ holdings, or whether they received preferential treatment on investments.

For much of his tenure, Wen Jiabao has been at the center of rumors and conjecture about efforts by his relatives to profit from his position. Yet until the review by The Times, there has been no detailed accounting of the family’s riches.

His wife, Zhang Beili, is one of the country’s leading authorities on jewelry and gemstones and is an accomplished businesswoman in her own right. By managing state diamond companies that were later privatized, The Times found, she helped her relatives parlay their minority stakes into a billion-dollar portfolio of insurance, technology and real estate ventures.

The couple’s only son sold a technology company he started to the family of Hong Kong’s richest man, Li Ka-shing, for $10 million, and used another investment vehicle to establish New Horizon Capital, now one of China’s biggest private equity firms, with partners like the government of Singapore, according to records and interviews with bankers.

The prime minister’s younger brother, Wen Jiahong, controls $200 million in assets, including wastewater treatment plants and recycling businesses, the records show.

As prime minister, Mr. Wen has staked out a position as a populist and a reformer, someone whom the state-run media has nicknamed “the People’s Premier” and “Grandpa Wen” because of his frequent outings to meet ordinary people, especially in moments of crisis like natural disasters.
While it is unclear how much the prime minister knows about his family’s wealth, State Department documents released by the WikiLeaks organization in 2010 included a cable that suggested Mr. Wen was aware of his relatives’ business dealings and unhappy about them.

“Wen is disgusted with his family’s activities, but is either unable or unwilling to curtail them,” a Chinese-born executive working at an American company in Shanghai told American diplomats, according to the 2007 cable.

China’s ‘Diamond Queen’

It is no secret in China’s elite circles that the prime minister’s wife, Zhang Beili, is rich, and that she has helped control the nation’s jewelry and gem trade. But her lucrative diamond businesses became an off-the-charts success only as her husband moved into the country’s top leadership ranks, the review of corporate and regulatory records by The Times found.

A geologist with an expertise in gemstones, Ms. Zhang is largely unknown among ordinary Chinese. She rarely travels with the prime minister or appears with him, and there are few official photographs of the couple together. And while people who have worked with her say she has a taste for jade and fine diamonds, they say she usually dresses modestly, does not exude glamour and prefers to wield influence behind the scenes, much like the relatives of other senior leaders.

The State Department documents released by WikiLeaks included a suggestion that Mr. Wen had once considered divorcing Ms. Zhang because she had exploited their relationship in her diamond trades. Taiwanese television reported in 2007 that Ms. Zhang had bought a pair of jade earrings worth about $275,000 at a Beijing trade show, though the source — a Taiwanese trader — later backed off the claim and Chinese government censors moved swiftly to block coverage of the subject in China, according to news reports at the time.

“Her business activities are known to everyone in the leadership,” said one banker who worked with relatives of Wen Jiabao. The banker said it was not unusual for her office to call upon businesspeople. “And if you get that call, how can you say no?”
Zhang Beili first gained influence in the 1990s, while working as a regulator at the Ministry of Geology. At the time, China’s jewelry market was still in its infancy.

While her husband was serving in China’s main leadership compound, known as Zhongnanhai, Ms. Zhang was setting industry standards in the jewelry and gem trade. She helped create the National Gemstone Testing Center in Beijing, and the Shanghai Diamond Exchange, two of the industry’s most powerful institutions.

In a country where the state has long dominated the marketplace, jewelry regulators often decided which companies could set up diamond-processing factories, and which would gain entry to the retail jewelry market. State regulators even formulated rules that required diamond sellers to buy certificates of authenticity for any diamond sold in China, from the government-run testing center in Beijing, which Ms. Zhang managed.

As a result, when executives from Cartier or De Beers visited China with hopes of selling diamonds and jewelry here, they often went to visit Ms. Zhang, who became known as China’s “diamond queen.”

“She’s the most important person there,” said Gaetano Cavalieri, president of the World Jewelry Confederation in Switzerland. “She was bridging relations between partners — Chinese and foreign partners.”

As early as 1992, people who worked with Ms. Zhang said, she had begun to blur the line between government official and businesswoman. As head of the state-owned China Mineral and Gem Corporation, she began investing the state company’s money in start-ups. And by the time her husband was named vice premier, in 1998, she was busy setting up business ventures with friends and relatives.

The state company she ran invested in a group of affiliated diamond companies, according to public records. Many of them were run by Ms. Zhang’s relatives — or colleagues who had worked with her at the National Gemstone Testing Center.

In 1993, for instance, the state company Ms. Zhang ran helped found Beijing Diamond, a big jewelry retailer. A year later, one of her younger brothers, Zhang Jianming, and two of her government colleagues personally acquired 80 percent of the company, according to shareholder registers. Beijing Diamond invested in Shenzhen Diamond, which was controlled by her brother-in-law, Wen Jiahong, the prime minister’s younger brother.

Among the successful undertakings was Sino-Diamond, a venture financed by the state-owned China Mineral and Gem Corporation, which she headed. The company had business ties with a state-owned company managed by another brother, Zhang Jiankun, who worked as an official in Jiaxing, Ms. Zhang’s hometown, in Zhejiang Province.

In the summer of 1999, after securing agreements to import diamonds from Russia and South Africa, Sino-Diamond went public, raising $50 million on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. The offering netted Ms. Zhang’s family about $8 million, according to corporate filings.

Although she was never listed as a shareholder, former colleagues and business partners say Ms. Zhang’s early diamond partnerships were the nucleus of a larger portfolio of companies she would later help her family and colleagues gain a stake in.

The Times found no indication that Wen Jiabao used his political clout to influence the diamond companies his relatives invested in. But former business partners said that the family’s success in diamonds, and beyond, was often bolstered with financial backing from wealthy businessmen who sought to curry favor with the prime minister’s family.

“After Wen became prime minister, his wife sold off some of her diamond investments and moved into new things,” said a Chinese executive who did business with the family. He asked not to be named because of fear of government retaliation. Corporate records show that beginning in the late 1990s, a series of rich businessmen took turns buying up large stakes in the diamond companies, often from relatives of Mr. Wen, and then helped them reinvest in other lucrative ventures, like real estate and finance.

According to corporate records and interviews, the businessmen often supplied accountants and office space to investment partnerships partly controlled by the relatives.

“When they formed companies,” said one businessman who set up a company with members of the Wen family, “Ms. Zhang stayed in the background. That’s how it worked.”
The Only Son

Late one evening early this year, the prime minister’s only son, Wen Yunsong, was in the cigar lounge at Xiu, an upscale bar and lounge at the Park Hyatt in Beijing. He was having cocktails as Beijing’s nouveau riche gathered around, clutching designer bags and wearing expensive business suits, according to two guests who were present.

In China, the children of senior leaders are widely believed to be in a class of their own. Known as “princelings,” they often hold Ivy League degrees, get V.I.P. treatment, and are even offered preferred pricing on shares in hot stock offerings.

They are also known as people who can get things done in China’s heavily regulated marketplace, where the state controls access. And in recent years, few princelings have been as bold as the younger Mr. Wen, who goes by the English name Winston and is about 40 years old.
A Times review of Winston Wen’s investments, and interviews with people who have known him for years, show that his deal-making has been extensive and lucrative, even by the standards of his princeling peers.
State-run giants like China Mobile have formed start-ups with him. In recent years, Winston Wen has been in talks with Hollywood studios about a financing deal.

Concerned that China does not have an elite boarding school for Chinese students, he recently hired the headmasters of Choate and Hotchkiss in Connecticut to oversee the creation of a $150 million private school now being built in the Beijing suburbs.

Winston Wen and his wife, moreover, have stakes in the technology industry and an electric company, as well as an indirect stake in Union Mobile Pay, the government-backed online payment platform — all while living in the prime minister’s residence, in central Beijing, according to corporate records and people familiar with the family’s investments.
“He’s not shy about using his influence to get things done,” said one venture capitalist who regularly meets with Winston Wen.
The younger Mr. Wen declined to comment. But in a telephone interview, his wife, Yang Xiaomeng, said her husband had been unfairly criticized for his business dealings.
“Everything that has been written about him has been wrong,” she said. “He’s really not doing that much business anymore.”

Winston Wen was educated in Beijing and then earned an engineering degree from the Beijing Institute of Technology. He went abroad and earned a master’s degree in engineering materials from the University of Windsor, in Canada, and an M.B.A. from the Kellogg School of Business at Northwestern University in Evanston, Ill., just outside Chicago.

When he returned to China in 2000, he helped set up three successful technology companies in five years, according to people familiar with those deals. Two of them were sold to Hong Kong businessmen, one to the family of Li Ka-shing, one of the wealthiest men in Asia.

Winston Wen’s earliest venture, an Internet data services provider called Unihub Global, was founded in 2000 with $2 million in start-up capital, according to Hong Kong and Beijing corporate filings. Financing came from a tight-knit group of relatives and his mother’s former colleagues from government and the diamond trade, as well as an associate of Cheng Yu-tung, patriarch of Hong Kong’s second-wealthiest family. The firm’s earliest customers were state-owned brokerage houses and Ping An, in which the Wen family has held a large financial stake.
He made an even bolder move in 2005, by pushing into private equity when he formed New Horizon Capital with a group of Chinese-born classmates from Northwestern. The firm quickly raised $100 million from investors, including SBI Holdings, a division of the Japanese group SoftBank, and Temasek, the Singapore government investment fund.

Under Mr. Wen, New Horizon established itself as a leading private equity firm, investing in biotech, solar, wind and construction equipment makers. Since it began operations, the firm has returned about $430 million to investors, a fourfold profit, according to SBI Holdings.

“Their first fund was dynamite,” said Kathleen Ng, editor of Asia Private Equity Review, an industry publication in Hong Kong. “And that allowed them to raise a lot more money.”

Today, New Horizon has more than $2.5 billion under management.
Some of Winston Wen’s deal-making, though, has attracted unwanted attention for the prime minister.
In 2010, when New Horizon acquired a 9 percent stake in a company called Sihuan Pharmaceuticals just two months before its public offering, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange said the late-stage investment violated its rules and forced the firm to return the stake. Still, New Horizon made a $46.5 million profit on the sale.

Soon after, New Horizon announced that Winston Wen had handed over day-to-day operations and taken up a position at the China Satellite Communications Corporation, a state-owned company that has ties to the Chinese space program. He has since been named chairman.

The Tycoons

In the late 1990s, Duan Weihong was managing an office building and several other properties in Tianjin, the prime minister’s hometown in northern China, through her property company, Taihong. She was in her 20s and had studied at the Nanjing University of Science and Technology.

Around 2002, Ms. Duan went into business with several relatives of Wen Jiabao, transforming her property company into an investment vehicle of the same name. The company helped make Ms. Duan very wealthy.

It is not known whether Ms. Duan, now 43, is related to the prime minister. In a series of interviews, she first said she did not know any members of the Wen family, but later described herself as a friend of the family and particularly close to Zhang Beili, the prime minister’s wife. As happened to a handful of other Chinese entrepreneurs, Ms. Duan’s fortunes soared as she teamed up with the relatives and their network of friends and colleagues, though she described her relationship with them involving the shares in Ping An as existing on paper only and having no financial component.

Ms. Duan and other wealthy businesspeople — among them, six billionaires from across China — have been instrumental in getting multimillion-dollar ventures off the ground and, at crucial times, helping members of the Wen family set up investment vehicles to profit from them, according to investment bankers who have worked with all parties.

Established in Tianjin, Taihong had spectacular returns. In 2002, the company paid about $65 million to acquire a 3 percent stake in Ping An before its initial public offering, according to corporate records and Ms. Duan’s graduate school thesis. Five years later, those shares were worth $3.7 billion

The company’s Hong Kong affiliate, Great Ocean, also run by Ms. Duan, later formed a joint venture with the Beijing government and acquired a huge tract of land adjacent to Capital International Airport. Today, the site is home to a sprawling cargo and logistics center. Last year, Great Ocean sold its 53 percent stake in the project to a Singapore company for nearly $400 million.

That deal and several other investments, in luxury hotels, Beijing villa developments and the Hong Kong-listed BBMG, one of China’s largest building materials companies, have been instrumental to Ms. Duan’s accumulation of riches, according to The Times’s review of corporate records.

The review also showed that over the past decade there have been nearly three dozen individual shareholders of Taihong, many of whom are either relatives of Wen Jiabao or former colleagues of his wife.
The other wealthy entrepreneurs who have worked with the prime minister’s relatives declined to comment for this article. Ms. Duan strongly denied having financial ties to the prime minister or his relatives and said she was only trying to avoid publicity by listing others as owning Ping An shares. “The money I invested in Ping An was completely my own,” said Ms. Duan, who has served as a member of the Ping An board of supervisors. “Everything I did was legal.”
Another wealthy partner of the Wen relatives has been Cheng Yu-tung, who controls the Hong Kong conglomerate New World Development and is one of the richest men in Asia, worth about $15 billion, according to Forbes.

In the 1990s, New World was seeking a foothold in mainland China for a sister company that specializes in high-end retail jewelry. The retail chain, Chow Tai Fook, opened its first store in China in 1998.

Mr. Cheng and his associates invested in a diamond venture backed by the relatives of Mr. Wen and co-invested with them in an array of corporate entities, including Sino-Life, National Trust and Ping An, according to records and interviews with some of those involved. Those investments by Mr. Cheng are now worth at least $5 billion, according to the corporate filings. Chow Tai Fook, the jewelry chain, has also flourished. Today, China accounts for 60 percent of the chain’s $4.2 billion in annual revenue.
Mr. Cheng, 87, could not be reached for comment. Calls to New World Development were not returned.
Fallout for Premier
In the winter of 2007, just before he began his second term as prime minister, Wen Jiabao called for new measures to fight corruption, particularly among high-ranking officials.
“Leaders at all levels of government should take the lead in the antigraft drive,” he told a gathering of high-level party members in Beijing. “They should strictly ensure that their family members, friends and close subordinates do not abuse government influence.”
The speech was consistent with the prime minister’s earlier drive to toughen disclosure rules for public servants, and to require senior officials to reveal their family assets.
Whether Mr. Wen has made such disclosures for his own family is unclear, since the Communist Party does not release such information. Even so, many of the holdings found by The Times would not need to be disclosed under the rules since they are not held in the name of the prime minister’s immediate family — his wife, son and daughter.

Eighty percent of the $2.7 billion in assets identified in The Times’s investigation and verified by the outside auditors were held by, among others, the prime minister’s mother, his younger brother, two brothers-in-law, a sister-in-law, daughter-in-law and the parents of his son’s wife, none of whom is subject to party disclosure rules. The total value of the relatives’ stake in Ping An is based on calculations by The Times that were confirmed by the auditors. The total includes shares held by the relatives that were sold between 2004 and 2006, and the value of the remaining shares in late 2007, the last time the holdings were publicly disclosed.

Legal experts said that determining the precise value of holdings in China could be difficult because there might be undisclosed side agreements about the true beneficiaries.
“Complex corporate structures are not necessarily insidious,” said Curtis J. Milhaupt, a Columbia University Law School professor who has studied China’s corporate group structures. “But in a system like China’s, where corporate ownership and political power are closely intertwined, shell companies magnify questions about who owns what and where the money came from.”
Among the investors in the Wen family ventures are longtime business associates, former colleagues and college classmates, including Yu Jianming, who attended Northwestern with Winston Wen, and Zhang Yuhong, a longtime colleague of Wen Jiahong, the prime minister’s younger brother. The associates did not return telephone calls seeking comment.
Revelations about the Wen family’s wealth could weaken him politically.
Next month, at the 18th Party Congress in Beijing, the Communist Party is expected to announce a new generation of leaders. But the selection process has already been marred by one of the worst political scandals in decades, the downfall of Bo Xilai, the Chongqing party boss, who was vying for a top position.
In Beijing, Wen Jiabao is expected to step down as prime minister in March at the end of his second term. Political analysts say that even after leaving office he could remain a strong backstage political force. But documents showing that his relatives amassed a fortune during his tenure could diminish his standing, the analysts said.
“This will affect whatever residual power Wen has,” said Minxin Pei, an expert on Chinese leadership and a professor of government at Claremont McKenna College in California.
The prime minister’s supporters say he has not personally benefited from his extended family’s business dealings, and may not even be knowledgeable about the extent of them.
Last March, the prime minister hinted that he was at least aware of the persistent rumors about his relatives. During a nationally televised news conference in Beijing, he insisted that he had “never pursued personal gain” in public office.
“I have the courage to face the people and to face history,” he said in an emotional session. “There are people who will appreciate what I have done, but there are also people who will criticize me. Ultimately, history will have the final say.”
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/26/business/global/family-of-wen-jiabao-holds-a-hidden-fortune-in-china.html?_r=1&ref=china
“我敢于面对人民、面对历史。”温家宝动情地说：“知我罪我，其惟春秋。”

一筆隱藏在香港的平安股權

一筆隱藏在香港的平安股權

DAVID BARBOZA 報道 2012年11月27日

http://cn.nytimes.com/article/china/2012/11/27/c27pinganside/zh-hk/

溫家寶家人與平安之間的關係主要是通過持有一家位於總理家鄉天津的公司的股份實現的。但此外，他們似乎還與香港有聯繫。

鄭建源曾是平安的主要投資人之一。據平安前高管稱，他曾是香港富豪鄭裕彤(Cheng Yu-tung)的商務助理及投資經理人，鄭裕彤同時掌管着新世界發展集團(New World Development Group)以及世界最大的珠寶連鎖店之一周大福(Chow Tai Fook)。

Bobby Yip/Reuters

香港富豪鄭裕彤。他的公司曾持有平安公司20%的股份。

2000年到2004年之間，在平安公司在香港證券交易所(Hong Kong Stock Exchange)上市之前，鄭裕彤及其新世界集團手下的五家公司從招商局集團和其他國有企業手中購買到了平安20%的股份。這五家公司一度都由鄭建源管理或掌控。
公司和其他公開記錄顯示，在投資平安前後，鄭建源掌控的投資工具與溫家寶的家人之間形成了多種商業合作關係，還曾為總理之子溫雲松的兩家創業公司提供資金。

此外，監管記錄顯示，2001年中期，鄭建源手下的一個投資工具從一家鑽石公司藉資900萬美元（約合5600萬元）。這家鑽石公司部分是由溫家寶 家人及其妻子以前在鑽石行業工作的政府同事控制的。之後不久，該投資工具——寶華——就在平安首次公開募股之前購入了平安約2000萬股的股票。

平安的高管拒絕對此發表評論。記者也無法聯繫到現年87歲的鄭裕彤。聯繫鄭建源的努力也沒有成功。

據那些熟悉平安將股份出售給鄭裕彤手下的人稱，1999年，一家周大福的合資公司在武漢被重組，在中國大陸還成立了其他幾個投資工具，以規避中國對外資公司持股的限制。

當時，高盛(Goldman Sachs)和摩根斯坦利(Morgan Stanley)持有平安約15%的股份。到2002年，滙豐銀行(HSBC)還持有平安10%的股份。根據1998年中國保險業監管機構發佈的規定，平 安的外商投資上限設在25%。由於香港自治，香港投資人也被看做是外商，所以這些規定也適用於香港投資人。

鄭建源利用中國政府頒發的身份證，在平安香港首次公開募股前，就通過多家公司持有平安10億股以上的股票，占平安總股份的20%以上。

“這幾方受控於同一個力量，”曾與鄭裕彤及溫家寶親屬共事過的一位高管稱。他因害怕遭到報復而要求不具名。“它隱藏在表面之下，就像希格斯玻色子理論一樣，是經濟暗物質：它有一股引力，但你卻看不到它。”
《紐約時報》查閱的一份平安公開文件顯示，該公司從未披露過鄭裕彤以及鄭建源曾持有股份，也沒有公開披露與他們有關的那些公司之間存在緊密連繫。對香港方面記錄的查詢以及對鄭建源身份證上所示的家鄉廣東省陸河縣的訪問表明，鄭建源事實上是香港公民。

陸河縣當地民警在搜索了政府數據之後稱，該縣查無此人，而他的身份證號也不在記錄中。在陸河縣編纂家史的鄭程宇（Zheng Chengyu，音譯）說：“我從沒聽過這個名字。”

Another Big Stake in Ping An, Hidden in a Hong Kong Investment

By DAVID BARBOZA November 27, 2012

http://cn.nytimes.com/article/china/2012/11/27/c27pinganside/en/

The main connection to Ping An for relatives of Wen Jiabao was through their stakes in a company based in the prime minister’s hometown, Tianjin, in northern China. But there was also apparently a Hong Kong connection.

One big investor in Ping An was Zheng Jianyuan, who former Ping An executives said worked as a business associate and an investment manager for Cheng Yu-tung, the Hong Kong billionaire who controls both the New World Development Group and Chow Tai Fook, one of the world’s largest jewelry store chains.

Bobby Yip/Reuters

Cheng Yu-tung, a Hong Kong billionaire. At one time, his companies owned 20 percent of Ping An.

Between 2000 and 2004, five companies affiliated with Mr. Cheng and his New World Group acquired 20 percent of Ping An’s stock from the China Merchants Group and other state entities ahead of Ping An’s listing on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. At one time, all five companies were managed or controlled by Mr. Zheng.

Corporate and other public records show that the investment vehicles controlled by Mr. Zheng formed numerous business partnerships with the relatives of Mr. Wen, around the time of the Ping An investments, and financed two start-ups run by the prime minister’s son, Wen Yunsong.

In mid-2001, moreover, one of Mr. Zheng’s investment vehicles borrowed about $9 million from a diamond company partly controlled by relatives of the prime minister, and his wife’s former government colleagues in the diamond trade, according to regulatory filings. Soon after, that vehicle — Baohua — bought about 20 million Ping An shares before its initial public offering.

Ping An executives declined to comment. Cheng Yu-tung, who is now 87, could not be reached for comment. Efforts to reach Mr. Zheng were also unsuccessful.

People familiar with the sale of Ping An shares to associates of Mr. Cheng say that in 1999 a Chow Tai Fook joint venture was restructured in the Chinese city of Wuhan and several other investment vehicles were set up in mainland China in order to avoid a Chinese restriction on foreign ownership.

At that point, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley owned about 15 percent of Ping An’s shares, and by 2002, the British bank HSBC held 10 percent. Under rules issued in 1998 by China’s insurance regulators, total foreign investment in Ping An was capped at 25 percent. Those rules also applied to investors from Hong Kong, who are still considered foreign because Hong Kong is governed separately.

Using a Chinese government-issued identity card in his name, Mr. Zheng was able to control companies that held more than one billion shares of Ping An stock at the time of the Hong Kong I.P.O. — just over 20 percent of Ping An’s shares.

“These several parties were under common control,” said one executive who worked with Mr. Cheng and relatives of Mr. Wen, but who asked not to be named for fear of retribution. “It was under the surface, like the Higgs boson theory, economic dark matter: It has a gravitational pull, but you can’t see it.” 

A New York Times review of Ping An’s public filings indicates that the company never publicly disclosed that Mr. Cheng or Mr. Zheng controlled the stakes — or that the various companies they were linked to were closely related. And a search of Hong Kong records and a visit to Luhe County, in Guangdong Province — the county listed as Mr. Zheng’s hometown on his identity card — suggests that Mr. Zheng was in fact a Hong Kong resident.

After searching the local government database, police in Luhe County said no such person existed in the county, and that the ID number was not in their records. And Zheng Chengyu, who compiles family histories in Luhe County, said: “I’ve never heard of this name.”

金融大盜任志剛

Jun 13, 2012 1:28 PM

某報紙成日話任志剛已經退休三年﹐以此來誤導市民任志剛現在所作出的言論都是為了香港長遠利益不是為了自己﹐ 其實這幾年來﹐他除了掛著一些學者身份做掩飾之外﹐ 還入了瑞银集团的董事會﹐ 這才是他為什麼會"今天的我打倒昨天的我"﹐自己攻擊自己三十年來一直堅持的聯繫匯率的重要關鍵!

某報紙話: [美國的評級機構沒有預見到雷曼破產，保爾森在和英國財政大臣通電話前，也沒想到拯救雷曼失敗，以當時雷曼的商譽和信貸評級，香港的銀行和金融管理局，很難預計到雷曼破產。] 這樣就可以洗脫任志剛的罪名了嗎﹖

任志剛在位時外匯基金每年虧蝕,但是他的工資卻總是每年遞增﹐這曾經是全世界最高薪的央行行長對自己的所作所為完全無擔當的 !

自己身為守門員﹐當年引入迷債﹐會不知道迷你債券根本不是一種債券 而是一種以信貸違約掉期（CDS）為標的的金融衍生工具嗎﹖ 有沒有必要等到雷曼破產才去質疑它的產品的風險程度呀﹖

另外﹐為什麼"CDS 信貸違約掉期"去到香港個名就會變成 "minibond 迷你債券" 的 ﹖

身為金管局大佬﹐勾結銀行存心誤導市民開大門給華爾街大鱷進來香港圈錢﹐這樣的金融大盜, 部份傳媒和議員被賣了還替人數錢,  不捉他歸案還奉他為金融神明為他鼓與歌讓他繼續招搖撞騙,  這樣的社會真是不可思議 !

為什麼不說清楚取消聯繫匯率港元升才能抵抗通脹﹐ 港元跌破原來聯繫匯率水平時找誰埋單﹖

人民幣自匯改後持續升值，人民幣作為累積財富貨幣的角色越來越流行。沒錯! 

但是人民幣一日未完全自由浮動﹐一日未完全得到國際認可你香港大部分的交易是不是一日都用美元結帳﹖  還有!  買石油都是用美元不是用人民幣結算的﹐ 跟美元掛鉤就是跟石油掛鉤! 

當年夠話歐元將取代美元咯! 連印度都收歐元不收美元這麼巴閉了﹐今天歐元不是一樣PK ﹖  美國連歐元都容不下﹐會接受人民幣取代自己成為國際結算貨幣﹖ 好心啦! 

完全自由流通之後的人民幣憑什麼可以避免走上歐元同一命運 ﹖說來聽聽! 

你要取消聯繫匯率﹐ 先要說明自己有什麼能耐在國際炒家發動突襲時能夠保障港元不會一瀉千里!   到時攪到好似1983年人人走去銀行擠提港元你又說自己已經退休完全沒有責任就多得你唔少了!

1995年以前中國還一直是大豆淨出口國，不過這已經成為歷史了!

Apr 13, 2012 4:12 PM

中國將買美1200萬噸大豆

隨同中國國家副主席習近平訪美的中國貿易代表團，15日與美國多家穀物公司簽署
協議，向美國購買862萬噸大豆；中國貿易代表團16日還與美國簽署了一項五年期協
定，購買超過1200萬噸，總計約60億美元的大豆。

路透社報道，儘管此次採購協議是在習近平訪美期間敲定，被業界稱作是一種政治
姿態，但中國的大豆需求的確在升溫。中國對美國農產品的大採購，對於經濟一蹶
不振，失業率高企的美國中西部來說，無疑是一劑讓人振奮的強心針。

根據美國農業部估算，美國去年向中國出口的農產品，共為美國創造了超過16萬個
工作。

16日，在習近平訪美的第二站愛阿華州首府第摩因(Des Moines)，中美共同舉辦了
首屆農業論壇，兩國在論壇上宣佈達成五年期糧食保障及食品安全協定。在前一天，
中國貿易代表團與美國公司簽訂大額購買協 議。根據該協議，中國將從美國購買總
價值約43億1000萬美元的862萬噸大豆。

由於乾旱可能影響南美作物產量，中國開始轉向美國尋求供應。中國的大豆進口量，
佔全球大豆貿易總量的60%。中國商務部部長助理俞建華表示，中國已成為美國大豆
最大單一海外市場，2010年美國對中國出口的大豆達108億美元，佔美大豆出口總額
的58%。

此次貿易合作，是由中國最大的國有穀物公司中國糧油食品進出口集團(COFCO)和中
國儲備糧管理公司，與美方Archer Daniels Midland、Bunge和Cargill等公司，在
愛阿華州與簽署協議。

愛州大豆協會負責人李茲(Kirk Leeds)表示，中國代表團還將在洛杉磯與美國其他
州簽署更多購買大豆的協定，合計採購規模將創紀錄逾1200萬噸，總計購買額為60億
美元左右。

去年中國國家主席胡錦濤訪美時，中國簽約購買了1156萬噸美國大豆，交易金額為
66億8000萬美元，創下當時最高的單次採購紀錄。

愛州農業廳長諾西(Bill Northey)表示，「2012年，大豆將繼續成為美國出口中國
的主要農產品，並且豬肉、農業機械及保險業都將成為今年出口中國的重中之重。
愛州作為美 國的『糧食基地』，大豆和豬肉產量居全美之冠，我們將竭盡所能為中
國提供更好的服務」。

:
2012-02-17 習近平訪美近尾聲中美將簽多項經貿協議

=====================================================================


大豆之殤：“洋豆”驅逐中國良豆

人民网記者 張彬

2012年04月13日07:07 

2011年底，國家發改委農經司結束了東北農作物調研之旅。調研發現，東北种植國
產大豆的面積比上年減少了1400万畝，比2009年國產大豆的种植面積減少了2000万
畝。農業部門數据顯示，近兩年來國內80%的大豆需求依賴進口。大豆成為被外資攻
占的第一批農作物。

　　1995年以前中國還一直是大豆淨出口國，從淨出口國到世界上最大的進口國，
中國僅用了短短5年。變化之快，黑龍江省農科院前院長、大豆專家劉忠堂稱之為
“簡直是火箭速度”。

　　一個擁有著五千多年大豆栽培史的國家，市場就這樣被國外的轉基因大豆所取
代。据國際農業生物技術應用服務組織（ISAAA）調查，80%以上進口大豆都是轉基
因大豆，俗稱“洋豆”。而這些“洋豆”已成為中國的“豆觴”之痛。

　　“劣豆驅逐良豆” 形勢逼人

　　“大豆是我國加入世貿組織后受沖擊最大的農產品。”黑龍江省大豆協會副秘
書長王小語表示，在2002年國務院頒布《農業轉基因生物進口安全管理辦法》之前，
我國在轉基因大豆進口上沒有采取任何限制措施。轉基因大豆在歐洲、日本和韓國
等國家和地區遭到限制后，把出口重點放在中國上，加上國內對大豆的需求一直上
升，這使“洋豆”在几年間迅速取代國產大豆，成為榨油市場的主流產品。

　　黑龍江省金星村豆農老孫清楚記得，2005年，大家開始覺得种大豆不如种玉米
賺錢。“村里种大豆的人一下從200多戶變成150多戶，然后再也沒漲上去過。”

　　“國內許多中小型油脂壓榨工厂倒閉，當年的大豆自然也沒有人收，農民也是
叫苦連天。”王小語表示。受傷的油脂企業至今元气未复。黑龍江全省有100多家油
脂加工厂，今年開工的只有5家。

　　王小語認為，中國對大豆的需求強勁增長，供不應求，嚴重依賴進口的局面將
持續存在。中國大豆的對外依存度之高使得國內市場深受國際价格波動之苦。

　　中華糧网信息事業部主編郭清保稱，在國內油脂原料進口上，跨國糧商利用其
丰富的國際貿易經驗和資金优勢，已基本完成對中國大宗食用油壓榨原料的采購控
制，國內壓榨企業都在以進口大豆作為食用油壓榨的原料。在投資建厂方面，A D
M、邦吉、嘉吉、丰益國際等跨國糧商在全國近百家大型油脂企業中的64家企業持有
股份，控制了國內60%以上的大豆壓榨能力。

　　業內人士認為，由于國內一些中小民營糧食企業資金有限，很難達到与國外集
團軍抗衡的局面，很多瀕臨倒閉。外資就以對民營企業投資、參股等隱蔽方式進入，
規避國家政策監管。更嚴峻的是，由于外資的低調和保密，它們對中國糧食產業民
營企業的投資規模和滲透程度難以估計。跨國糧商利用其對原料采購的优勢，使中
國不僅在國際大豆市場上毫無話語權，而且在國內大豆市場上也失去話語權，大豆
進口時間、數量、价格被國外參股控股企業所掌控，國內油脂壓榨業有被外資壟斷
的趨勢。

　　“洋豆”占領油脂產業鏈

　　2011年12月末，黑龍江大豆收購价約為4元/公斤。對于這一价格，農民和油脂
加工企業都無法接受，所以出現了黑龍江大豆有价無市的尷尬局面。

　　据黑龍江大豆協會測算，2011年黑龍江大豆种植成本約合每市斤1.68元，這意
味著如果以市价出手，農民每畝大豆獲利不足百元，遠遠低于玉米畝均400元的收益。


　　另一方面，對于以國內非轉基因大豆為原料的油脂企業來說，加工生產成本每
市斤至少1.95元，目前的大豆市价明顯高于其承受能力，一開工就虧損。所以，他
們無力收購。

　　國務院發展研究中心研究員程國強認為，上述局面恰好体現了國內非轉基因大
豆的尷尬處境。這种尷尬，不僅對國內非轉基因豆油企業帶來了巨大的挑戰，而且
還給中國非轉基因大豆的种植和推廣造成了巨大障礙。

　　這种情況持續下去，必然迫使“以國內大豆為原料”的油脂企業，轉而進口海
外較為廉价的轉基因大豆。

　　分析人士警告說，這將對中國非轉基因大豆產業鏈造成不可估量的傷害，尤其
會造成中國的“豆農之殤”。有業內人士稱 “一滴金龍魚，兩行豆農淚”。

　　程國強指出，“如果大面積种植和使用轉基因大豆生產食用油，再大面積推廣
噴施草甘膦除草劑，那么中國現有多种栽培模式及科學輪作制度都將受到影響，也
勢必增加大豆病虫害的發生及防治難度，不利于食品安全和生物安全。屆時，整個
中國大豆及豆油產業鏈都將遭受難以估量的重創。”

　　轉基因大豆因何肆虐

　　值得注意的是，所向披靡的“洋豆”几乎全部為轉基因大豆。与進口大豆相比，
國產大豆的蛋白含量較高，但是出油率低于進口大豆。而轉基因大豆和大豆油之所
以能迅速占領國內市場，主要原因就是轉基因大豆出油率高(一般在19%-22%)、成本
低、价格低，而國產大豆出油率為16%-17%。据悉，大豆出油率每差一個百分點，加
工10万吨大豆，效益相差1500万元。

　　豆農們百思不得其解，為什么美國、阿根廷、巴西的大豆漂洋過海運到中國，
价格卻比國產大豆還低很多？王小語認為，主要原因在于种植方式不同、產業結构
不同以及政府補貼等政策机制不同所致。

　　中國大豆多為散戶种植，每戶平均只有3.5畝生產規模，專業大戶也只有150畝，
而美國、巴西、阿根廷的平均生產規模在2200畝。兩相比較，外國大豆成本平均每
吨要低100-200元。

　　國際大公司還建立了從种植農場、貿易公司、港口、船隊、加工厂甚至期貨公
司等覆蓋“全產業鏈”的商業体系，占有明顯的市場优勢。

　　与國外轉基因大豆相比，中國大豆生產不具備成本优勢；國產大豆的出油率較
低，种植大豆收益較少。与外資“航空母艦”般的產業鏈比起來，中國一家一戶的
小農生產和散兵游勇似的油脂加工企業，形同“小舢板”。肆虐的轉基因大豆已成
為國人心中揮之不去的痛。

　　黑龍江省農科院前院長劉忠堂指出，國產大豆的困局已經不僅僅是行業性危机，
已經通過數量方面的极高進口依存度、質量方面的轉基因隱患和產業結构的外資高
度壟斷三管齊下，引發對中國糧食安全的擔憂。如果國內大豆產量越來越少，甚至
完全依賴進口大豆，中國的大豆供應及飼料工業、畜禽、水產養殖業的發展將面臨
不利局面，中國食品營養所需植物蛋白和動物蛋白來源也將存在受制于人的風險。

（責任編輯：呂騫、庄紅韜）