【黎筍談中越關係】中國曾阻撓越南統一

【黎筍談中越關係】中國曾阻撓越南統一
中國與越南1979年2月至3月間爆發了一場戰爭，在此背景下，當時的越共總書記黎筍就越中關係發表了一番講話，涉及越共和中共、以及兩國之間的多個重大歷史事件。黎筍的這個講話中指責中國在1952年的日內瓦會議逼迫越南簽署南北分治的和約，此後又阻撓越南統一。
日內瓦事件的歷史背景是，中國、蘇聯、美國、英國、法國五大國，以及越共領導下的越南民主共和國（北越）、法國支持下的越南共和國（南越）、老撾和柬埔寨1954年4月在瑞士日內瓦召開停戰和會。會議決定，南北越以北緯17度分治。中國出席日內瓦會議的代表團團長是周恩來。
越共政權1959年決定武裝統一越南。據中國方面稱，總共至少提供了兩百億人民幣的援助。而美國也於1961年介入，支持南越。此次戰爭打到1973年時，南北雙方簽訂停火協議，美國撤軍。越共軍隊1975年擊敗南方軍隊，1976年統一越南，成立越南社會主義共和國。
以下是黎筍談日內瓦會議，以及此後中國阻撓越共統一越南的內容，括號中的內容是編者註，或者銜接性的補充。胡伯伯，是越共領導人胡志明，1969年已去世。


儘管中國人幫助過朝鮮，但那不過是為了保衛他們自己北方的側翼地區。戰鬥結束以後，壓力全都落在越南身上，當時他說如果越南人還要繼續打下去，那他們就得自顧自了。他不會再幫助我們，壓我們停止戰鬥。
當我們簽署日內瓦協議時，正是周恩來將我國分為兩（部分）。我國以這種方式被分為北方地區和南方地區後，他曾又一次向我們施加壓力，要我們不要對南越做任何事情。他們禁止我們起來（向美國支持的越南共和國進行鬥爭）。 （但是）他們（中國人）無法阻止我們。
當時我們在南方，已經做好準備，日內瓦協議簽字後馬上就發動游擊戰爭。這時毛澤東告訴我們黨的代表大會，說我們必須強迫老撾立即將他們已經解放了的兩個省交給萬象政府。不然美國人就會摧毀它們，這（在中國人看來）是一個十分危險的局面！越南不得不立即（就此）與美國打交道。毛澤東這樣強迫我們，我們也不得不這樣做。
這樣，在這兩個（老撾的）省份被交給萬像後，（老撾）反動派立即逮捕了蘇發努馮（1975年至1986年任國家主席）。當時老撾有兩個營被包圍。而且，他們還沒有做好戰鬥準備。後來，一個營逃出（包圍）。就在這時，我發表了自己的意見，認為必須允許老撾人發動游擊戰爭。我邀請中國人前來和我們討論這個問題。我告訴他們：“同志們，如果你們繼續這樣向老撾人施加壓力，那麼他們的力量就會徹底瓦解。現在必須允許他們搞游擊戰。”
張聞天，原來是（中共）總書記，用洛甫做筆名，這樣回答我：“是的，同志們，你說得對。我們要允許老撾營發動游擊戰。”
我馬上問張聞天：“同志們，如果你們允許老撾人進行游擊戰，那麼在南越發動游擊戰也就沒有什麼好怕的了。是什麼把你們嚇成這樣，以至於到現在還在阻止這種行動？ ”
他（張聞天）說：“沒有什麼好害怕的！”
　　這就是張聞天說的話。然而，當時中國駐越南大使何偉也坐在那裡，聽著大家談話。他立即向中國打電報。毛澤東立即回電：“越南不能那樣做（在南方從事游擊戰爭）。越南在相當長的一段時間內必須坐等。”我們這麼貧苦，如果沒有中國作後盾，我們怎麼能和美國人戰鬥？我們不得不聽他們的，對不對？
　　然而，我們不同意。我們繼續秘密地發展我們的力量。當吳庭艷拖著他的斷頭機在南越許多地方往來巡遊時，我們發布命令組建群眾武裝來反對已經建立起來的秩序，（從吳庭艷政府手中）奪取權力。我們並不在意（中國人）。當奪權起義開始以後，我們前往中國，會見周恩來和鄧小平兩人。鄧小平告訴我：“同志，既然你們的錯誤已經變成了既成事實，你們就只應該以一個排以下的規模作戰。”這就是他們向我們施加的那種壓力。
我說：“是的，是的！我們會這樣做。我們只以一個排以下的規模作戰。”
——在美國人已經派了幾十萬人進入南越後，我們在1968年發動了一場總攻，以逼迫他們（使戰爭）降級。為了打敗美國，我們必須知道如何促使他們逐步降級。這就是我們的戰略。和我們作戰的是一個強大的敵人，一個有兩億人口、主宰著世界的敵人。如果我們不能促使他們逐步降級，那麼我們就會舉步艱難，也就不會打敗敵人。我們必須通過戰鬥來銷蝕他們的意志，從而迫使他們走到桌子前和我們談判，而同時也不允許他們增派軍隊。
到了他們（美國人）想和我們談判的時候，何偉給我們寫了一封信說：“你們不能坐下來和美國談判。你們必須把美國部隊牽到越南北部來和他們作戰。”他這樣向我們施加壓力，使我們極為困惑。這根本不是一個簡單的事。每次出現這種情形，都非常令人厭煩。
　　我們斷定不能這樣行事。我們必須坐下來。為了打敗他們（美國）我們必須促使他們降級。在此期間，中國（向美國）發出聲明：“如果你不打我，我就不會打你。無論你們想向越南派多少部隊，隨你們的便。”中國自覺自願地做這樣的事，以這種方式來壓我們。
他們（中國人）積極地與美國人做交易，強迫我們以這種方式成為用來討價還價的一張牌。當美國人認識到他們已經失敗了以後，他們立即利用中國人（加速）他們（從南越）撤軍。尼克松和基辛格到中國去就是為了討論這件事。
——在尼克松去中國之前，（他此行的目的是）要以維護美國利益並減少美國的失敗的方式解決越南問題，同時還要引誘中國更多地站到美國（一邊），周恩來前來會見我。周恩來告訴我：“在這個時候，尼克松即將來訪問我，主要是討論越南問題，所以我必須會見你，同志，以便討論。”
我回答說：“同志，你願意說什麼都可以，但是我仍然不會跟從。同志，你是中國人；我是越南人。越南是我自己的；決不是你的。你沒有權力談論，而且你沒有權力（與美國人）討論。今天，同志，我要親自告訴你一些我還沒有對政治局講過的事情，因為，同志，你們已經引發了一個嚴重的問題，所以我必須說：
——在1954年，當時我們贏得奠邊府的勝利，我正在後義省。胡伯伯發電報給我，要我必須前往南越重新集結，並向南越的愛國者說明。我乘貨車到了南方。一路上，愛國者們出來歡迎我，因為他們認為我們已經取得了勝利。這是多麼痛苦！看著我的南方愛國者們，我哭了。因為在這之後，美國人會到來，會以可怕的方式大肆屠殺。
一到南方，我立即向胡伯伯發電報，要求留下來，不回北方，這樣我就可以再鬥爭個十來年。 （我對周恩來說：）“同志，你給我帶來這樣大的困難（指1954年在日內瓦會議做出越南分治的決議，周恩來是中國代表團團長），你知道嗎，同志？”
周恩來說：“我在你面前道歉，同志。我錯了。我在這一點上錯了。”在尼克松已經去過中國之後，他（周恩來）再次來越南，為的是向我詢問關於南越的戰鬥的一些問題。
然而，我馬上對周恩來說：“尼克松已經和你見過面了，同志。很快他們（美國）就會更猛烈地進攻我。”我根本不害怕。雙方（美國和中國）已經互相談判，為的是更猛烈地打擊我。他（周恩來）始終沒有把這（種觀點）斥為站不住腳的，只是說：“我將向你方同志增加輸送槍砲彈藥。”
然後他（周恩來）（針對擔心中美之間進行密謀）說：“沒有這回事。”然而，雙方已經討論瞭如何更猛烈地打擊我們，包括B-52的轟炸和封鎖海防（港）。事實顯然就是如此。

每個不吸取歷史教訓的歷史重演者都會死得很慘

我記得1979年老鄧入侵越南, 中國輸得很慘。

當時在中國，在香港, 都不叫'入侵越南', 都叫'對越反擊自衛戰'。

1979年2月17日，新華社發布聲明:“....越南當局無視中國方面的一再警告，最近連續出動武裝部隊，侵犯中國領土……嚴重威脅我國邊疆的和平與安 全。中國邊防部隊在忍無可忍的情況下，被迫奮起還擊。” 老鄧坐統六十多萬大軍全線向越南發動入侵，一支曾經依靠人民打人民戰爭的軍隊，打了一場反人民的紅色帝國主義侵略戰, 20多天的時間裡，以傷亡2萬的代價向越南縱深推進20多公里，因為無法打下去，於是老鄧就宣稱世界已經和平，1979年3月16日“光榮撤退", 之後, 要韜光養晦，將軍隊裁掉100萬。

窮兵黷武，黎民遭殃, 戰爭的最高境界是不戰! 是和平! 老鄧好壞也是個軍頭, 錯了，還知道回頭是岸; 現在坐在廟堂磨拳擦掌者和周邊大喊大叫的, 都是從沒上過戰場的戰爭狂熱分子, 都是老百姓的災難 !

先發制人的戰爭, 希特勒打過, 蔣介石打過, 毛澤東打過, 鄧小平打過, 小布殊都打過 ! 都輸了!

"東方"小編的這段話, 寫給誰看? ..... [不怕戰爭 才能和平.....在美日聯手對付中國的情況下，中國已沒有退路，沒有繼續韜光養晦的戰略空間，只能還以顏色，否則大國崛起就成為空話，中國夢就淪為南柯一夢。..... 中國並不缺少強兵利器，缺少的是作戰意志、訓練以及各種軟件。中國只有不怕戰爭，才能避免戰爭；只有做好作戰準備，才能不戰而屈人之兵，示人以弱只會引狼入室，葬送改革開放的所有成果。...] .... 寫給不讀歷史的人看的 !

"不怕戰爭 才能和平" ?

問下蔣介石 "淞滬抗戰"失去什麼？得到什麼？如果可以再打一次, 還會不會這樣炸上海？

"示人以弱只會引狼入室" ?

敢問小編: 什麼叫"能而示之不能" ?

[....1970 年，美日兩國達成協議，准備在1974年把美軍二戰時所占領的琉球交予日本, 當中尚包括釣魚島。過程中，雖然美國沒有明文提及釣魚台法定地位，但是由于美國駐日使館表示“釣魚台為琉球群島一部份”，日本開始對釣魚台進行管 轄。.....] (百度百科)

二戰時怎會被美軍占領了釣魚台的呢? 是國軍丟失了這個島嗎? 我們現在要恢复二戰前的版圖嗎? 如果釣魚台是美國二戰時所占領的琉球---包括釣魚島---交予日本，那釣魚台怎會是中國領土? 我們要推翻美日1970年美日兩國達成的協議嗎 ?

這樣的邏輯是不是說蒙古人也可以來恢復成吉思汗時代的疆土? 滿洲人也可以來恢復大清帝國 ?

1970年，"美日兩國達成協議，准備在1974年把美軍二戰時所占領的琉球交予日本，當中尚包括釣魚島。"..."1971年1月29日，二千多位中國 大陸及台灣留美學生在聯合國總部外面示威，高呼“保衛釣魚台”。"....哈! 1972年呢? 中美建交! 1973年呢? 中日建交 ! 如果釣魚台真的是中國領土, 美日這樣轉贈你的領土視你為無物, 而你中國還可以跟美日建交的, 那真是好荒唐 !

如果現在拿釣魚台來開戰, 這跟1938年希特勒入侵捷克蘇台德區一模一樣，都是說: 這塊地是我的, 不是你的, 你只是通過(對我)不平等的條約得到了它, 你的主權是不合法的, 只我擁有這片土地的主權才算合法, 我就是要發動戰爭! 我就是要打你!

歷史不斷在重演, 每個不吸取歷史教訓的歷史重演者都會死得很慘, 一個比一個更慘 !

 

 

[2]-1967.3.20 [林彪同志在军以上干部会议上的讲话]

[林彪同志在军以上干部会议上的讲话]

林彪同志在军以上干部会议上的讲话 一九六七年三月二十日 我今天要讲三个问题。第一，讲阶级、阶级斗争、阶级观点的问题；第二，讲主流、支流问题；第三 ，讲军队支援地方的问题。 前几年，毛主席就提出社会主义社会的阶级斗争的问题。阶级斗争和无产阶级专政问题本来是马克思主 义的根本问题。可是在社会主义的条件下面，阶级斗争这个问题，好象变得容易被忽略，好象没有阶级 斗争了。我们毛主席就特别地强调了在无产阶级专政条件下的阶级斗争，社会主义条件下的阶级斗争。 这一点，有些好的马克思列宁主义者也没有注意，更不用说修正主义的赫鲁晓夫式的人物了。在这个重 大问题上，毛主席是把马克思列宁主义大大发展了。 毛主席说：“阶级斗争，一些阶级胜利了，一些阶级消灭了。这就是历史，这就是几千年的文明史。拿 这个观点解释历史的就叫做历史的唯物主义，站在这个观点的反面的是历史的唯心主义。”马克思、恩 格斯早就讲过，自从有了文字以后的人类的历史，就是阶级斗争的历史。自从原始公社崩溃瓦解以后， 人类的历史都是阶级斗争的历史。列宁更进一步了，他强调无产阶级夺取政权以后，还有尖锐的阶级斗 争。 列宁在《向匈牙利工人致敬》一文中说，“消灭阶级要经过长期的、艰难的、顽强的阶级斗争。在推翻 资产阶级政权以后，在破坏资产阶级国家以后，在建立无产阶级专政以后，阶级斗争并不是消失（如旧 社会主义和旧社会民主党中的庸人所想象的那样），而只是改变它的形式，在许多方面变得更加残酷。 ” 列宁在《共产主义运动中的‘左派’幼稚病》一书中强调说：“无产阶级专政是新阶级对较强大的敌人 ──资产阶级进行的最无畏和最无情的战斗。资产阶级的反抗，因为自己被推翻（哪怕是在一个国家内 ）而凶猛十倍。它的强大不仅在于国际资本的力量，不仅在于它的各种国际联系牢固有力，而且还在于习惯的力量，小生产的力量。因为，可惜现在世界上还有很多很多的小生产，而小生产是经常地、每日 每时地、自发地和大批地产生著资本主义和资产阶级的。” 古今中外，阶级存在的社会领域里面，最基本的问题，影响一切的问题，是阶级斗争的问题。正如伟大 领袖毛主 席教导我们的：“在阶级社会中，每一个人都在一定的阶级地位中生活，各种思想无不打上阶 级的烙印。”每一个人在思想上都有阶级的烙印，没有一个人不是属于某一个特定的阶级，总都是隶属 于一定的社会关系，一定的阶级。这种社会阶级是人類在一定的历史阶段所产生的现象，区别于原始共 产主义社会，也区别于将来的高级的共产主义社会。这种阶级存在的事实，经历几千年的历史，贯串于 各个方面。这种阶级斗争的存在，来自一定的经济基础，反映到上层建筑，就形成了政治、法律、文化 、宗教、道德、政党、政党里面路线的分歧、政策上的分歧、社会上的风俗习惯的差别。这些分歧和差 别，处处都有阶级的烙印，处处都是由于阶级、阶级斗争这个根源引起的。 因此，阶级和阶级斗争是所有阶级社会的现象的总的根源。离开了这个总根源去观察社会现象，就观察 不出来，就会观察错了。它是一个客观的存在。它这个客观的存在不是不影响我们的思想，而是或者不 知不觉地，或者有意识地，自觉地来影响我们的思想。我们共产党，就是要用马克思列宁主义，毛泽东 思想，自觉地来影响我们的思想，自觉地指导我们的思想，自觉地指导我们的路线，指导我们的政策。 我们的路线和政策，如果离开这一点，就会犯错误。我们观察人，观察事，离开这一点，就会犯错误。 如果我们不自觉，不重视阶级、阶级斗争、阶级观点，不注意阶级分析，就会变成客观主义。而客观主 义，就是资产阶级妁一种思想体系。这种客观主义的思想，在表面上是否认阶级的。但是，实际上用这 种形式来掩盖它的阶级的面貌，阶级的愿望，阶级的政策, 階级的行为，便于欺骗群众。 整个的社会，几千年来都是处在阶级、阶级斗争中，阶级斗争通常采取三种斗争形式来进行，一种是思 想战线；一种是政治战线；一种是经济战线。可是这三样不是孤立的，而是互相渗透，互相影响，有的 时候以这一个为主，有的时候由那一个为主，可是它总不是孤立的。所以，它这三个方面是统一的东西 。 阶级斗争在各个时期，由不同的阶级来出现，采取不同的阶级对抗形式。正如马克思在《共产党宣言》 中说的，奴隶主和奴隶、地主和农民、资产阶级和无产阶级等等。当然，每个国家发展的阶段不同，在 不同的阶段，每个国家都有两个主要的对抗的阶级。当然，同时也总会有其他阶级的残余，或者新的阶 级的这种苗头。 我们的国家，正如毛主席所说的，从一九四九年以后，开始进入社会主义时期。毛主席说：“中国革命 在全国胜利，并且解决了土地问题以后，中国还存在著两种基本的矛盾。第一种是国内的，即工人阶级 和资产阶级的矛盾。第二种是国外的，即中国和帝国主义国家的矛盾。”无产阶级和资产阶级这两个阶 级的矛盾、对立、斗争都成为我们全部的政治生活，社会生活的一个总根源。不把各种各样的社会现象 ，看成是阶级斗争的现象，那就会把事情混淆起来，是非颠倒起来，就是回到一种所谓全民观念，就会 把个人看成是孤立的个人。人哪，任何人都不是一个单独的个人，他总是社会的人。正如医生给我们验 血的时候，他抽出一滴血来，就看出全身的红血球和白血球，酸性和碱性的这些变化。这一滴血就代表 你的全身。你一个个人的活动，就是一个阶级整体的一种表现。 所以，没有这种无产阶级观念，看一个人就会看错了。对于每件问题的评价，每件问题的作法就会不同 。例如：对老干部的看法，就可能认为一切老干部都好得很。其实，对老干部，是必须做阶级分析的。 有很多老干部是保持了原来的无产阶级的革命传统。可是有些老干部，进到社会主义时期，没有跟得上 ，没有变成社会主义革命的战士，而是停留在旧的民主革命阶段。有些就蜕化变质，变成资本主义分子 ，变成新的资本主义分子。他到底怎么样？ 是好，是坏？只有用无产阶级的观点来看他。不会是通通变 成资本主义分子，也不会是通通变成了无产阶级革命家。对青年的看法也是这样：或者说这些青年在冲 你那个单位的时候, 就说他们通通都是坏的，或者是另一种观点，说他们通通都是好的。其实，在现在 还有阶级的社会里面，很多人是站在无产阶级方面，但一定还有属于资产阶级的分子，以及其他的社会 成分，地、富、反、坏、右分子。干部子弟也是这样子，有的是无产阶级分子，有的蜕化变质成资产阶 级分子。 没有无产阶级观点，对所谓“乱”的问题也就看不清楚。实际上，这次的乱有两种。一种是主要的方面 ，是把敌人、把走资本主义道路的当权派、党内的资产阶级的头头、社会上面的资产阶级的头头，把它 们打得落花流水， 把他们打乱了。这样的乱，是无产阶级文化大革命的胜利，是很好的事情。当然，是 两方面对立的斗争，无产阶级这方面也有个别误伤的，干部中间也有个别误伤的。但这是个别，而且可 以保护下来。 没有无产阶级观点，对文化的看法，就不可能有正确的评价。只有用无产阶级的观点才能甄别出那些是 好的，那些是坏的，而没有这种观点就甄别不了。 无产阶级文化大革命的意义，就在于它是一个非常严肃、非常深刻的阶级斗争。这次斗争，首先是资产 阶级发起的，然后，无产阶级反击。首先是通过思想斗争，然后逐步进到政权的斗争，以及经济上的斗 争。整个斗争中间出现许许多多复杂的现象，但是，辨别那些可取、那些可舍，那些是是，那些是非， 只有从阶级的观点上，从阶级斗争的观点上，就是说，从阶级、阶级斗争这一个总根源，才能够弄得清 楚。 在我们党内，毛主席是最正确的，是革命的，代表无产阶级的。而刘、邓是错误的，反动的，代表资产 阶级的，一个是要走社会主义道路，一个是要走资本主义道路。所以，就形成了两条路线的激烈斗争。 无产阶级夺取政权以后的这个阶级斗争，不会是一个短时期的斗争，是一个比较长时期的斗争。毛主席 在“关于正 确处理人民内部矛盾的问题”这篇划时代的著作中早就指出：在我国，“无产阶级和资产阶 级之间的阶级斗争，各派政治力量之间的阶级斗争，无产阶级和资产阶级之间在意识形态方面的阶级斗 争，还是长时期的，曲折的，有时甚至是很激烈的。”毛主席又指出：“我国社会主义和资本主义之间 在意识形态方面的谁胜谁负的斗争，还需要一个相当长的时间才能解决。这是因为资产阶级和从旧社会 来的知识分子的影响还要在我国长期存在，作为阶级的意识形态，还要在我国长期存在。如果对于这种 形势认识不足，或者根本不认识，那就要犯绝大的错误，就会忽视必要的思想斗争。”【7】 许多人在不同的程度上，还存在著资产阶级方面的倾向和无产阶级方面的倾向。只有毛主席这种最高度 的马克思列宁主义水准的人，才能排斥、克服、肃清资产阶级的这一面。马克思列宁主义水准稍微低一 点，在自己脑子里面就多多少少还存在著这两个方面的斗争。推翻资产阶级、剥削阶级的政权是在较短 时间可以完成的。推翻它的所有制，短时间也可以完成。 可是，推翻剥削阶级、资产阶级在思想里面的 阵地，这是很不简单、很不容易的，需要很长的时间。而这个战线上如果不打胜仗的话，那么，政权方 面所取得的胜利和经济上面所取得的胜利，可以前功尽弃，我们一些老革命过去所奋斗来的这些成绩， 革命的果实，广大人民所奋斗来的这些革命果实，可以悄悄地被资产阶级偷去了，窃 取了，或者明火执 仗地把它夺去了。 因此，我们应该在思想战线上层开激烈的斗争，展开持久的斗争，我们才能保证无产阶级政权的巩 固，才能够保住社会主义所有制的巩固和向前发展。不然的话，政权要悄悄地改变颜色或者要发生剧烈 的反革命政变，资本主义所有制要重新代替社会主义所有制，地主富农的所有制要重新代替我们现在的 人民公社所有制。所以，这一个斗争胜败，是决定中国向何处去，决定中国的命运，也决定影响整个人 类的命运。因为就现时说，中国可以说是在世界上起决定因素的国家。对于革命说来，对世界革命说来 ，现在的中国是一个起决定因素的国家。任何国家，如果在这点上比较的话，无论如何，没有中国的作 用大。只要中国不倒，中国不变色，世界就有希望。多数地方都修了，都黑了，我们还可以影响它重新 光明起来，重新由黑的颜色变为红的颜色。何况现在世界各地革命力量或者已经起来，或者正在起来， 要革命的总是多数，希望我们给予支持。因此，无产阶级文化大革命是很重要的大事，关系国家命运， 关系人类命运的大事。这是无产阶级进行的非常严肃的阶级斗争，是一个阶级战胜一个阶级，或被一个 阶级所战胜的问题。因此，我们要特别加强阶级的观念，阶织斗争的观念，我们才有劲进行这场无产阶 级文化大革命，我们才有决心来进行这坊文化革命，我们才能够跟得上毛主席在文化革命中间这种伟大 的，气魄和勇气。不然，我们老是跟不上，而且老是犯错误。本来这一个问题是老生常谈的问题。可是 在新的情况下，重新提醒，那还是有作用的。我们写的座右铭，不是天天贴在那个地方的嘛，背也背的 来，但是常常看一下总会有点好处。而且今天尤其必要。今天的思想动态，今天的活思想，从上到下， 从下到上，都实际上存在著这个问题。因此，我们需要把这个问题重新提出来，这是我今天讲的第一点 。 第二，就是讲讲主流和支流的问题。 毛主席有这样的话：“这些同志看问题的方法不对。他们不去看问题的本质方面，主流方面，而是强调 那些非本质方面、非主流方面的东西。应当指出：不能忽略非本质方面和非主流方面的问题，必须逐一 地将它们解决。但是，不应当将这些看成为本质和主流，以致迷惑了自己的方向。”这是特别引起我们 注意的问题。假如我们不看清楚主流，就会发生迷失方向的问题。任何时候的事情，总是有主流和支流 的，总有顺的地方，有逆的地方，有正的方面，有反的方面，不会只是一个方面。可是这两个方面任何 时候都不会是绝对平衡的，都不会是半斤八两的，它总是有重有轻，它总是处在变动的中间，一下这个 轻那个重，一下这个重那个轻。它不会象机械那样保持平衡的，机械经过过细观察的时候，它也是在变 动的，至于其他的东西就更不用说了。所以肯定是有两个方面，两个方面不会一样，肯定有一个方面是 主，一个方面是次。 现在我们看看这次文化革命到底主流是主要的，还是支流是主要的。当然，主流是主要的。 可以说这场 阶级斗争中，我们是打了大胜仗，得了大胜利，中国人民的大胜利，人类的大胜利。必须要有这样一个 总的看法。 从文化大革命开始，我们就认为，不要怕乱。这次果然经过这个乱出现了很多的好事情。我 找了一些同 志谈了一下，他们高兴极了，情绪非常之高，他们觉得好得很。经过这一个乱， 就把那些走资本主义道 路的当权派，社会上的资产阶级分子，头目，和四旧，打得狼狈不 堪。他们是真正的乱，使他们遭受惨 重的失败。他们是会感到是一种惨痛的失败。不经过这样的大的运动，要想取得这样的结果是不可能的 ，是不能够打倒他们的。运动搞出了很多的牛鬼蛇神，很多的资产阶级代表人物。这些人如果不揭露、 不打倒，他们就要公开推翻毛主席所代表的无产阶级的政治、经济、文化整个这一套。我们通过一个表 面上很乱的形式，把他们打倒了，这是伟大的胜利。当然，假若他们夺权以后，得势以后，革命群众还 会造他们的反就是了。可是那时的牺牲，就会比现在大的多。这从表面上看来，好象是乱，也付出一点 代价。但是，我们的事业是在向上发展。例如生产，有些地方还上升。抓一下就上升了。 今后抓下去， 还会大高涨，会出现新的高潮，新的兴旺的高潮，发展的高潮。所付的损失，少数人觉得很大，其实， 比起世界各国任何一次大革命都小得不能比拟，也比不上我们的抗日战争，解放战争，甚至比不上一次 小的战役，一场不大的流行病。当然，毛主席是从头到尾强调文斗，不要武斗。所以说损失是最小最小 最小，而得到的成绩是最大最大最大。可是，有的同志看到自己的几个熟人挨了一下斗，就觉得天下整 个都黑了，就很容易产生这种错误观念。其实，那是一种暂时的现象，而且属于很末尾的现象，很次要 的现象。我们看到打倒那一批坏家伙，这就是伟大的胜利啊！如果不打倒他们，将来还要大流血，他们 得了势，就会要实行大白色恐怖来镇压革命群众，不知道要杀掉多少人就是了。正像伟大领袖毛主席所 提醒我们的：“那就不要很多时间，少则几年、十几年，多则几十年，就不可避免地要出现全国性的反 革命复辟，马列主义的党就一定会变成修正主义的党，变成法西斯党，整个中国就要改变颜色了。”假 定那种情况出现，我们革命人民还要用革命战争反抗他们，推翻他们，还要死好多人。 这一个主流、支流的问题，是很清楚的。 另一方面，不经过这一个运动，这场轰轰烈烈的文化大革命，很多好人也看不出来，接班人也看不出来 ，新的苗子也发现不了。在这一次斗争中间，坏人固然揭露了，斗倒了，斗臭了，斗垮了，好人也涌现 出来了。这就保证了今后的百年大计。许多好人，很多无产阶级革命派，他们涌现出来了。不然，他们 是处在九地之下，压得很低，冒不出头来。打倒了坏人，发现了好人。没有这一场革命，坏人打不倒， 好人发现不了。我们的领导将来就可能落在坏人手上。这次革命是最好了，是采取打倒他们的最好的办 法：搞红卫兵，大鸣大放、大字报等等。红卫兵就是捉拿牛鬼蛇神，捉拿那些走资本主义道路的当权派 头子的天兵天将，起了很大的作用。当然，起最主要的作用的，还是我们毛主席。还有中央文革小组的 同志，党内走无产阶级道路的同志，广大的群众，广大的革命左派。 同时，除了打倒坏人，发现好人以外，还挽救半好半坏坏，差一要滑下去的人，挽救了一批干部，使他 们悬崖勒马，及早回了头，没有更深地陷下去。经过这场大震动，使这些同志不陷下去。和平生活过了 十七年，有些人是变了，有些人也到了边缘上，这个运动，是把为数不少的人挽救了。 坏人打倒，好人发现，中间这部分人挽救过来，这是重大的成绩。我们打倒的那些，不是凭一个宗派的 原则去打倒的，而是根据一个政治的原则，根据无产阶级革命派还是资产阶级反动派，拥护毛主席还是 反对毛主席，拥护马克思列宁主义还是反对马克思列宁主义。根据这样的原则来打倒，或者是发现，或 者是挽救。这是有原则的。 不管那个山头，只要是站在无产阶级这一面，站在毛主席这一面，我们这一 次统统是保的。不管那个山头的，站在反无产阶级的这一面，站在反毛主席这一面，反社会主义这一面 ，那就是有的要打倒，有的要半打倒。这样，就是解决了很大的问题。这样子，今后所出现的局面是根 本不同，会保持我们的政权是无产阶级的革命政权。革命的政权，是排挤了那些修正主义分子的政权， 是能够保证我们社会主义生产更加发展的政权，是保证我们思想革命化的政权，是能够保证我们更便于 对抗外来侵略战争的政权，是能够保证我们镇压颠要活动的政权。这样的政权，也就能够保证我们更顺 利地应付各种困难、天灾或者人事方面变化的问题。所以，在这一方面，胜利是很大的。 同时，在思想方面，就是把旧思想、旧文化、旧风俗、旧习惯来一个大的革命，把新的思想──毛主席 思想空前地普及，把人们的精神面貌、政治水平，都提高了。毛主席的思想可以说变成家喻户晓、妇孺 皆知，小孩儿都能够讲得出几句毛主席的话来，这是一种很好的气象。思想上的这种变化，是很大的。 今后还要继续地坚持下去，把毛主席的思想变成全国人民的行动的纲领，行动的指导，必修的功课，这 是保证我们不走错误道路、保持革命到底的重要作法。 这一个无产阶级文化大革命的斗争，苏联没有进行，因此苏联人民受了大害。伟大的十月革命，到今年 恰恰是整整的半个世纪，可是，现在苏联的领导集团不但没有沿著列宁的道路前进，相反地，他们倒退 了，他们倒退了。 还有一些社会主义国家也前后沦落为修正主义国家，成为变相的资本主义国家，成为 变相的资产阶级专政的国家，成为变相的法西斯国家，用最欺骗的面貌来欺骗群众。 我们有毛主席的马克思列宁主义的高度智慧、魄力、经验、威望，举行了这个史无前例的震撼全国、全 世界的大运动，这是有伟大的意义的。不然，我们经过二十八年的民主革命所取得的成果，和十七年、 十八年来社会主义革命所取得的成果，可以付之流水，付之东流，可以前功尽弃，可以毁于一旦。毛主 席所进行的，所发现的、所领导的这种无产阶级文化大革命，如同马克思恩格斯创造了科学的社会主义 ，影响全世界，如同列宁斯大林建立了在一个国家之内取得了无产阶级的政权和建立了社会主义国家这 种胜利。 我们一九四九年那个时候的胜利是个什么胜利？是夺取政权的胜利。这一次是保卫政权，巩固政权的胜 利。无产阶级夺取政权，一些国家实现了，可是大多数都保不住，那里给资产阶级的狡猾办法，资产阶 级的影响，剥削阶级的影响，外国的帝国主义的影响，自己本身产生的一批资产阶级分子，把政权变了 性质、国家变了颜色。阶级斗争是不能以调和的办法解决的，这是马克思列宁主义、毛泽东思想一条定 律，如同数学上、物理学上、化学上的定律一样，是不以主观意志为转移的客观的定律，是不能掩盖的 。对于资产阶级和修正主义者，只有把它揭露，只有把它暴露，只有把它打倒，只有把它战胜。你不打 它，它要打你。这是树欲静而风不止。树不动，风总是要吹得你动。这是流传的语言。这句话有道理。 其实，我们不是个树，我们应该成风，我们要刮他们的风。当然，他们要刮我们的风，但我们也要刮他 们的风。我们刮它十一级、十二级的台风，来摧垮他们。单纯的消极防御不行，要采取主动的进攻。我 们过去一段的时间的防御是必要的，但是后来这一时期采取主动的进攻是尤其必要的。今后有的时候还 可能转到防御，但有的时候还采取大规模的进攻，或者小规模的进攻。 以上所说，就是：我们对于文化大革命，要看到事情的两方面，要看到那一方面是主要的。如果不 看到主流这一方面，只看到自己一些老同事挨点整，就把整个天下都看黑了，那就全错了，那就糟了。 那就上敌人的大当。 看不到主流，就会迷失方向。而且，毛主席已经及时地采取了一些措施，采取了很多具体的政策，来去 掉支流中那些不那末健康的东西。我们要看到，不管怎么样，要看到这个伟大的胜利，要欢呼这个胜利 ，庆祝这个胜利，巩固这个胜利，发展这个胜利。这是第二个问题。 第三，讲讲军队支援地方的问题。 毛主席在古田会议上教导我们：“中国的红军是一个执行革命的政治任务的武装集团。特别是现在，红 军决不是单纯的打仗的，它除了打仗消灭敌人军事力量之外，还要负担宣传群众、组织群众、武装群众 、帮助群众建立革命政权等等重大的任务。” 毛主席还经常说，我们军队不仅仅是一个战斗队、又是一 个工作队，不但要会打仗，而且要会做群众工作。这是毛主席的一贯的教导。从红军时代直到最近。所 以我们军队同世界上的一切的军队不同，其他的军队就是个打、就是打仗，其他的不管，我们军队还担 负著这样多的任务，这是毛泽东思想的军队，是马克思列宁主义的军队。 我们的军队不是单纯地执行军 事战斗任务，应该义不容辞地，责无旁贷地来支持地方。军队和地方实际上是一个整体。军队离开地方 就不能存在，不能存在，不能存在。地方越搞的好，你军队就越好打仗嘛，地方越搞的不好，你军队就 越不好打仗嘛。兵员靠地方，吃的靠地方，穿的靠地方；打仗的时候，封锁消息，切断敌人的电话，都 靠地方嘛。侦探敌人的消息，伤兵抬到后方去，都靠地方嘛。所以，不把地方搞好，军队就好不了。你 们同志们经过草地吧、长征吧，那个时候沿途就是没有地方工作。我们的人，老实讲，给国民党正规军 打死的不多，主要是给地主武装打死的。我们那个部队，过草地这一段，国民党没打倒几个人，主要是 没有根据地饿死的。在江西的时候，一个连一百多人，后来一个连就只剩下了二三十个人、十来个人。 所以我们必须要搞好地方工作。 毛主席有个老办法，要打仗先要创造战场。什么叫做创造战场呢？就是 把我们军队分散，以连为单位，以排为单位，到处去打土豪，分田地帮群众建立党、建立政权，做群众 工作，让那个地方变成根据地。变成根据地了，敌人进来的时候，就进入了迷魂阵，我们在什么地方躲 著，他们都搞不清楚，结果他们就是草木皆兵，一草一木都变成了红军，即使没有红军的地方，他们也 觉得有红军，要拿队伍去对付，有红军的地方反而没有去对付，结果就遭我们的袭击，他们在整个的战 争中都是被我们袭击了打败的。我们所进行的人民战争差不多不是那种堂堂之阵，那样子摆开来打的， 而是在群众的掩护之下，把他们打掉的。 但有的时候没有群众，我们就困难了，例如，刚才我讲的长征 啦，草地啦。一九四五年日本投降以后，到了那些没有群众工作的地方，又重新吃了苦头。兵没有补充 嘛，粮食没有嘛，消息被封锁嘛，被反动派欺骗的少数人还放冷枪，这些，同志们都知道。我们中央苏 区那么点队伍，能够抗击几十倍、十倍、八倍的敌人，可是一脱离了根据地，困难就多啦，人家就敢向 前冲，我们就怕有伤兵，一个伤兵就几个人抬，士气就不旺。所以，搞好地方工作是个大事情，从军队 的观点来说是个大事，从全国来说那更加是大事。 毛主席、党中央很信任人民解放军，搞军管、搞军训、支援工业、支援农业、支援左派，好多重大的任 务。这种种任务，光荣是光荣，伟大是伟大，但是，是新的任务。一方面证明毛主席、党中央相信军队 ，另一方面我们军队责任：是很大的，任务是很新的，过去还没有这样子搞过。有些当然搞过了，不同 的程度搞过了，但是没有这样的抽出军队去这样子搞。至少十七年来没有这样子搞过。我们一方面固然 要勇敢的、负责的、积极的来承担这些责任，来完成任务，但另一方面因为是新的，又是复杂的，所以 搞得不好就要犯错误，或者是犯右的错误，或是犯“左”的错误，特别要警惕犯右的错误。全国各个地 方都有军队，现在有些地方已经实行军管，用了很多干部，十七年来还没有这样干过。这个事情是要看 到有一种危险，有犯错误的可能。我们一方面要勇敢执行任务，但是要非常谦虚，非常谦虚，要非常细 心。 支援地方，总的方面还是抓革命，促生产，不要只抓革命，不促生产了，把生产停顿下来。 也不要只搞 生产，把革命停顿下来。我们应该同时进行，而且应该以革命来带头，来挂帅， 来促进生产。在革命的 期间，当然应该以革命来带头，但是同时我们不能不搞生产。所以这两个方面缺一不可，但也不能等量 齐观。革命期间要抓住革命。就是将来这个大运动过去以后，也始终要由革命、由政治来领导经济建设 。但这不等于说，我们一到地方就只搞革命，放松了生产。生产是不能放松的，生产放松了，会发生非 常大的危险，会转过来破坏革命。 因此，我的看法，在这个问题上，就重要性来说，要把革命摆在第一 位，可是就时间上来说，生产的时间应该占得多。 一般的说，生产的时间要更多。文化革命和生产，二者是统一的，但又是有差别的，要分别对待。 地方有各派，左、中、右，要坚定不移地站在左派这一边，而不能站在右派那一边。我们派出干部的时 候，要交代清楚，自己本身就应该是很好的左派。你派一些右派分子或者政治上糊涂的人去搞，他一定 搞不出好事来，一定不会或者不懂支持左派！所以要站稳立场，还是回到我刚才讲的第一个问题，阶级 问题，要站稳阶级立场，站稳这个革命的无产阶级的立场。这样子的支援，就是好事。不然，可能帮倒 忙，那就危险了。 在这个问题上，我们一定要有很清楚的头脑，不能．有点含糊。但是，左派、中派、 右派要坚( 定不移地站在左派这一边，而不能站在右派那一边。我们派出干部的时候，要交代清楚，自己本身就应 该是很好的左派。你派一些右派分子或者政治上糊涂的人去搞，他一定搞不出好事来，一定不会或者不 懂支持左派！所以要站稳立场，还是回到我刚才讲的第一个问题，阶级问题，要站稳阶级立场，站稳这 个革命的无产阶级的立场。这样子的支援，就是好事。不然，可能帮倒忙，那就危险了。在这个问题上 ，我们一定要有很清楚的头脑，不能．有点含糊。但是，左派、中派、右派有时搞不清。有搞错了的， 本来想支持左派反而支持了右派，所以一定要照毛主席的老办法，也是马克思主义的老办法，就是要唯 物论呐！要调查研究，搞清呐！ 我们支持左派，支援地方，首先应该从思想上支持。现在各个地方搞毛泽东思想宣传队这个办法，是大 家创造的好办法。就是这么办，就要思想上的支持。毛主席思想，党中央的政策，同群众结合起来，变 为群众自己的政策，自己的思想，群众自己懂得了，他们动起手来办，比我们包办代替，那就好多了。 只要他们知道这一套思想，这一套政策，没有我们去，或者我们走了，他们也完全能够办好！否则，你 人在，这一套就在，人走了，这一套也就走了。能够扎下根来的还是思想。所以，要大力宣传毛泽东思 想，这是关系我们国家命运的，保证我们国家兴旺的最根本的措施。我们在军队内部固然要如此，到地 方上，也要把思想工作这件事当作最主要的事情来办。 刚才讲到了要注意调查情况、弄清情况以外，还要报告请示，碰到重大问题要报告请示，不要以为自己 的想法当然是对的。这种想当然，自以为是，常常同党的口径、党的政策差的满远！满远！满远！才不 是那么回事情！才不能那么办的！所以重大的问题一定要向上级报告请示，要养成报告请示的制度。现 在军一级的同志要办很多事，你们就是要经常向中央报告请示。 不能随便抓人，的确查清了是很反动的头头，不得已才抓起来，一般的少抓。我们已经建立了无产阶级 专政的政权，我们要掌握这个政权，实行这个政权的专政职能。但是，多抓不如少抓好。几个很反动必 须要抓的，一定要断然抓起来。 一般地都不要开枪。总的精神就是不要开枪。有什么了不得的情况，用不着开枪。有个别同志性情急要 开枪，可不能开枪！这是重大的问题，要注意报告请示。 我们搞军管的，是革命的“三结合”还不成熟的地方。军管是一个暂时的过渡的作法。因此，一切事情 ，还是要支持地方的新生力量，左派的力量，把他们支持起来办事情，实现革命的大联合和革命的“三 结合”。整个的工作不能采取包办代替的办法，只能协商，只能帮助，只能临时代管。有些同志可能调 到地方去做工作，这是另一回事。在军队没有撤回来之前，一定要搞好一个新的班子，搞一个好的班子 ，不能马马虎虎地走了。原有的班子我想是有五种情况：一种是基本上好的，只有个别坏人；一种全部 烂掉了的，那只好搬掉了；一种呢，烂掉一半，那就只搬掉一半就是了；一种呢，烂掉了一小半，那就 搬掉一小半就是了；一种是烂掉了大半，那就搬掉大半就是了。总而言之，不能一概搬掉，也不能一概 保留。要分清楚五种情况，分别处理。要看具体情况，分别处理。总的原则，就是团结大多数，要很具 体地体现毛主席所说团结百分之九十五这样的道理。 这次搞好一个好的班子，是百年大计。政权就是这个班子的问题，班子搞好了，能保证毛主席革命路线 的执行，无产阶级的利益就有保证。一个坏班子，就不能够保证毛主席路线的执行，不能够保证无产阶 级的利益，不能保证社会主义的向前发展。所以搞一个新班子，是当前面临著的一个迫切事情。怎么才 能搞好一个新班子，是大问题。我们搞军管的时候，要把这个问题，很慎重地来注意，而不要把这样一 个政权问题，轻率地处理。革命的根本问题就是政权问题嘛卜你不通过政权，经济问题不能解决嘛！你 不通过政权，文化上问题不能解决嘛！那些反动东西就没法打它嘛！所以，一切阶级斗争，是政治斗争 ，也就是政治，归根到底是政权。这是马克思主义讲的，是毛主席讲的，我们要以严肃的态度来对待。 关于支援地方，现在还没有成套的经验。初步想到这些。 我们要看到，这些任务很大，很重，又新，我们要勇敢负责，但是要很谦虚、谨慎，这许多必须注意。 当然，应该注意的事，还绝不止我上面说的这些，你们还可以讲许多，工业怎么搞，农业怎么搞，军训 怎么搞，等等。我们必须边做边总结经验。这是我们毛主席历来的作法，也是马列主义的辩证唯物主义 的精神。 我要讲的第三个问题就是这些。 我总共讲的问题，就讲完了吧！三个问题：就是阶级观念，主流和支流，支援地方。这些问题已经提过 ，现在只是一提再提吧！三令五申吧！注意又注意吧！无非是起这个作用。 另外，我讲一个单独的零碎的问题。最近我发现有什么林彪同志语录，是学生搞的，一个是一个中学校 搞的，另一个是一个什么红卫兵组织搞的，我们就收到两种。另外，我们总政过去也搞了我的一个政治 工作语录。我看，不要搞。你们看到的时候，请你们代为没收。总政，我是给他们讲了，我这个意见是 雷打不动的，你们不要搞。现在我们的任务就是要善于活学活用毛主席的思想。毛主席思想是全中国人 民的思想财富，而且是全世界人民的思想财富。毛主席的话，一句等于我们一万句。我们要以毛主席的 思想来统帅全国，来指导我们一切的工作。

JPMorgan’s Fruitful Ties to a Member of China’s Elite

NOVEMBER 13, 2013, 10:00 PM.  New York Times

JPMorgan’s Fruitful Ties to a Member of China’s Elite

By DAVID BARBOZA, JESSICA SILVER-GREENBERG and BEN PROTESS

To promote its standing in China, JPMorgan Chase turned to a seemingly obscure consulting firm run by a 32-year-old executive named Lily Chang.

Ms. Chang’s firm, which received a $75,000-a-month contract from JPMorgan, appeared to have only two employees. And on the surface, Ms. Chang lacked the influence and public name recognition needed to unlock business for the bank.

But what was known to JPMorgan executives in Hong Kong, and some executives at other major companies, was that “Lily Chang” was not her real name. It was an alias for Wen Ruchun, the only daughter of Wen Jiabao, who at the time was China’s prime minister, with oversight of the economy and its financial institutions.

JPMorgan’s link to Ms. Wen — which came during a time when the bank also invested in companies tied to the Wen family — has not been previously reported. Yet a review by The New York Times of confidential documents, Chinese public records and interviews with people briefed on the contract shows that the relationship pointed to a broader strategy for accumulating influence in China: Put the relatives of the nation’s ruling elite on the payroll.

And the Wen family’s sway was not just political. After Ms. Wen’s father joined the inner circle of China’s rulers as vice prime minister in 1998, the family amassed a secret fortune through a series of partnerships and investment vehicles, a 2012 investigationby The Times found.

Now, United States authorities are scrutinizing JPMorgan’s ties to Ms. Wen, whose alias was government approved, as part of a wider bribery investigation into whether the bank swapped contracts and jobs for business deals with state-owned Chinese companies, according to the documents and interviews. The bank, which is cooperating with the inquiries and conducting its own internal review, has not been accused of any wrongdoing.

The investigation began with an examination of the bank’s decision to hire the daughter of a Chinese railway official and the son of a former banking regulator who is now the chairman of a state-controlled financial conglomerate. The contract with the consulting firm of Ms. Wen, 40, indicates that the bank’s hiring practices also touched the highest rungs of political power in China. Her father was prime minister from 2003 until earlier this year. Her mother has served as a government official with oversight of the nation’s gem and diamond industry. And since 2006, Ms. Wen’s husband has been an official at the China Banking Regulatory Commission, according to China Vitae, an online database.

For Ms. Wen’s consulting firm, Fullmark Consultants, the JPMorgan deal was lucrative. While many Hong Kong investment bankers were earning as much as $250,000 a year, JPMorgan paid Ms. Wen’s firm $900,000 annually from 2006 to 2008, records show, for a total of $1.8 million.

JPMorgan appeared to benefit from the relationship as well. Fullmark claimed in a confidential letter to the bank that it “introduced and secured” business for JPMorgan from the state-run China Railway Group, a construction company that builds railways for the Chinese government. The bank was an underwriter in the company’s 2007 initial public offering, which raised about $5 billion.

It is not known whether Ms. Wen’s father, Wen Jiabao, played any role in that deal. But as prime minister, he would have had ultimate responsibility for state-owned companies and their regulators.

Efforts to reach Ms. Wen and other members of her family were unsuccessful.

A spokesman for JPMorgan declined to comment. In a previous regulatory filing, the bank disclosed that authorities were examining “its business relationships with certain related clients in the Asia Pacific region and its engagement of consultants.”

Executives at JPMorgan’s headquarters in New York did not appear to be involved in retaining Fullmark, a decision that seemed to have fallen to executives in Hong Kong. And the documents reviewed by The Times do not identify a concrete link between the bank’s decision to hire children of Chinese officials and its ability to secure coveted business deals, a connection that authorities would probably need to demonstrate that the bank violated anti-bribery laws.

The Securities and Exchange Commission and the United States attorney’s office in Brooklyn, which are leading the investigation, both declined to comment on the case.

Underpinning their investigation is the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which effectively bars United States companies from giving “anything of value” to foreign officials to obtain “an improper advantage” in retaining business. In recent years, the S.E.C. and the Justice Department have stepped up their enforcement of the 1977 law, which is violated if a company acts with “corrupt” intent, or with an expectation of offering a job in exchange for government business.

It is unclear whether JPMorgan ever had such an upfront agreement. But the bank did briefly keep a document that tied some of its well-connected hires in China to revenue it earned from deals with Chinese state-owned companies, according to interviews and records that JPMorgan turned over to federal authorities.

The investigation comes at a difficult time for the bank, which is already under scrutiny from a number of agencies in Washington and abroad. JPMorgan recently reached a tentative deal with the Justice Department to pay a record $13 billion over its sale of troubled mortgage securities. It is also facing an investigation into its role as Bernard L. Madoff’s primary bank. The bribery investigation could take years. The S.E.C. and prosecutors have expanded their focus to other Asian countries, including Singapore and South Korea, looking at whether hiring practices that have become commonplace on Wall Street crossed a line at JPMorgan.

For the last two decades, Wall Street banks and multinational corporations operating in China have sought out so-called princelings as employees, consultants or partners in major Chinese business deals. Many banks talk freely about the ability of princelings to open doors and offer insights into government policies and regulations.

In 2006, JPMorgan established a program, called Sons and Daughters, according to interviews with people in New York and China, to have better control over such hires. But documents that the bank turned over to investigators showed that there were less stringent hiring standards for applicants from prominent Chinese families.

The children of China’s ruling elite, according to experts, have occasionally used government-approved aliases to protect their privacy while studying or traveling abroad. Ms. Wen used her alias for both schooling and business. According to government records, Ms. Wen holds two national identity cards with matching birth dates, one issued in Beijing under the name Wen Ruchun and a second issued in the northeastern city of Dalian, as Chang Lily.

Lily Chang was the name she used while studying for an M.B.A. at the University of Delaware, where she graduated in 1998, and also when she lived in Trump Place, the luxury apartment complex overlooking the Hudson River in Manhattan, according to public and university records.

Like the children of other senior Chinese leaders, she was courted by Wall Street. After securing her M.B.A., regulatory records show, she worked at Lehman Brothers and later Credit Suisse First Boston as Lily Chang. Separately, she held a stake in several private companies.

Ms. Wen’s work for JPMorgan was tied to her company, Fullmark Consulting. According to the documents reviewed by The Times, Fullmark was located on the ninth floor of Tower C2 at Oriental Plaza, a high-end retail and office complex in central Beijing.

Over the last decade, corporate filings show that the location also housed private companies that were either controlled by or affiliated with the Wen family. Some of those companies have held indirect stakes in Baidu, China’s biggest Internet search engine, and Ping An Insurance, the financial services giant.

Ms. Wen’s apparent partner at Fullmark, and a signatory to the JPMorgan consulting agreements, was a woman named Zhang Yuhong, a longtime Wen family friend and business partner who at one time held a large but indirect personal stake in Ping An. She also helped control Wen family assets in other industries, including diamond and jewelry ventures.

Little else is known about Fullmark or its other clients. When JPMorgan hired the firm in 2006, people briefed on the contract said, the consulting firm had already worked with at least one other major financial institution.

JPMorgan’s contract with Fullmark called for the consultant to “to promote the activities and standing” of the bank in China. According to Fullmark’s letter to JPMorgan, the consulting firm had three main tasks. One, it helped JPMorgan secure the underwriting job on the China Railway deal. It also advised JPMorgan about forming a joint venture with a Chinese securities firm and provided counsel on the “macroeconomics policy in mainland China.”

In that letter, which was undated but almost certainly sent to the bank once the contract had expired, Fullmark declared that it did not “have the intention to continue the consultancy service.” The letter, signed by Lily Chang and Zhang Yuhong, cited “personal reasons.”

During her two-year consulting stint, JPMorgan executives struck a series of deals with Chinese companies closely affiliated with Ms. Wen and her family. Like other big banks, JPMorgan held a stake in New Horizon Capital, a private equity firm co-founded by her brother, Wen Yunsong.

JPMorgan also invested its clients’ money in Ping An and served as an adviser to the giant company. Today, on behalf of clients, JPMorgan owns nearly $1 billion worth of the company’s shares. At the time of JPMorgan’s initial investment for clients, members of the Wen family held a large, hidden stake in Ping An through a complex network of Chinese investment vehicles, a stake that in 2007 was worth more than $2 billion, according to corporate filings reviewed by The Times.

JPMorgan also won an assignment in 2009 to help underwrite an initial public offering of BBMG, a large Chinese building materials company. BBMG’s largest shareholders included New Horizon Capital, the private equity firm of Ms. Wen’s brother, and Beijing Taihong, an investment vehicle controlled by a longtime business associate of the Wen family. After the shares rose after the company’s I.P.O., Ms. Wen became the largest shareholder in Beijing Taihong, according to a filing.

There is no indication from the documents reviewed by The Times that Ms. Wen brokered any of the deals or investments between JPMorgan and companies affiliated with her family. And it is unclear whether JPMorgan employees even knew about her family’s ties to some of those companies, because the Wen family often held secret stakes in companies through little-known investment vehicles.

Ms. Wen also kept some distance from the Fullmark documents. Her name does not appear in the contract, though she was a signatory on the undated letter concluding the relationship with JPMorgan.

The letter, sent around the time of the financial crisis, struck an optimistic tone. “We hope JPMorgan Chase will grasp the opportunities and become to be the winner in the financial crisis,” it read.

[1]-1966年5月18日 - [林彪同志在中央政治局扩大会议上的讲话]

[林彪同志在中央政治局扩大会议上的讲话]

林彪同志在中央政治局扩大会 议上的讲话 （ 上午） 本来是常委其他同志先讲好。常委同志们让我先讲，现在我先讲一点，我没有写出稿子来，凭口来讲， 有些材料念一念。 这次政治局扩大会议，上次毛主席召集的常委扩大会议，集中解决彭真的问题，揭了盖子。 这次继续解 决这个问题。罗瑞卿的问题原来已经解决了，陆定一、杨尚昆的问题，是查地下活动揭出来的，酝酿了 好久，现在一起来解决。四个人的问题，是有联系的，有共同点，主要是彭真，其次是罗瑞卿、陆定一 、杨向昆。他们几个人的问题揭发解决，是全党的大事，是保证革命继续发展的大事，是巩固无产阶级 专政的大事，是防止资本主义复辟的大事，是防止修正主义篡夺领导权的大事，是防止反革命的政变， 防止颠复的大事，这是使中国前进的重大措施，是毛主席英明果断的决策。 这是最大的问题，是防止反革命政变，防止颠复，防止“苦迭打”。革命的根本问题是政权问题。有了 政权，无产阶级劳动人民就有一切；没有政权，就失去了一切。生产关系固然是基础，但是靠夺取政权 来改变，靠夺取政权来巩固，靠夺取政权来发展。否则，是经济主义、是叫花子主义，是乞求恩赐。无 产阶级拿到了政权，百万富翁、千万富翁、亿万富翁，一下子就可以打倒，无产阶级就有了一切。所以 不论怎样千条万绪，不要忘记方向，失掉中心，永远不忘记政权。要念念不忘政权，忘记了政权，就是 忘记了政治，忘记了马克思列宁主义的根本观点，变成了经济主义，无政府主义，空想主义。那就是糊 涂人，脑袋掉了，还不知道是怎样掉的。 上层建筑的各个领域，意识形态、宗教、艺术、法律、政权，最中心是政权。政权是什么？ 孙中山说： 是管理“众人之事”。但他不理解政权是一个阶级压迫另一个阶级的工具。反革命是这样，革命也是这 样。我想用自己的习惯语言，政权就是镇压之权。当然政权的职能不仅仅是镇压，无产阶级政权还要改 造农民，改造小私有者，搞经济建设，抵御外部侵略。职能是多方面的，但主要是镇压。社会上的反动 派，混进党内的剥削阶级代表人物，都要镇压。 有的杀头，有的关起来，有的管制劳动，有的开除党籍 ，有的撤职。不然我们就不懂得马克思列宁主义关于政权的根本观点，我们就要丧失政权，就是糊涂虫 。 毛主席近几年来，特别是去年，提出防止修正主义的问题，党内党外，各个战线上层下层都可能出。我 所了解，主要是指领导机关。毛主席最近几个月特别注意防止反革命政变，采取很多措施，罗瑞卿问题 发生后，谈过这个问题。这次彭真问题发生后，毛主席又找人谈这个问题。调兵遣将，防止反革命政变 ，防止他们占领我们的要害部门，电台、广播电台、军队、公安部都做了布置。毛主席这几个月就是作 这个文章，这是没有写出来的文章，没有印成文章的毛主席著作。毛主席为了这件事多少天没有睡好觉 ，这是很深刻很严重的问题。 政变现在成为一种风气。世界政变成风，改变政权，大概是这样，一是人民革命，从底下闹起来，如陈 胜、吴广、太平天国，我们共产党都是这样；一种是反革命政变，反革命政变大多数是宫庭政变，内部 搞起来，有的是上下相结合，有的和外国颠复活动或者武装进犯相结合，有的和天灾相结合，大轰大闹 大乱，历史上是这样，现在也是这样。世界上政变的事， 远的不说，1960年以来，据不完全统计， 仅在亚非拉地区的一些资本主义国家中，先后发生六十一次政变，搞成了的五十六次，把首脑人物杀死 了的八次，留当傀儡七次，废除了的十一次。这次统计是在加纳、印尼、叙利亚政变之前，六年中间， 每年平均十一次。 马克思主义者是唯物主义者，在任何时候都是正视现实的，我们不能听而不闻，视而不见，无动于衷。 别的事情闹得热热烈烈，忘了这件事，看不见本质问题，就是糊涂虫，不警惕要出大乱子。 我们过去十几年来，解放前想的做的就是夺取政权，革命胜利以后，我们已经夺取了政权，许多同志不 注意政权本身的问题，只是搞建设、教育，对付蒋介石、对付美国，没有想到夺取政权还可能丧失政权 ，无产阶级专政还可以变成资产阶级专政。在这个消极方面，我们，至少是我，没有多想这个问题，更 多想到的是打仗，发生战争的问题，从大量事实看，是要防止内部颠复，防止发生反革命政变，道理很 简单，很多大量事实才能加深印象，才能认识。人的认识规律就是从感性到理性。 从我国历史上来看，历代开国后十年、二十年、三十年、五十年很短时间就发生政变，丢掉政权的例子 很多。 周朝建立以后，不久发生了叛乱。到春秋战国就大乱了。“春秋”无义战，各国相互颠复，内部相互残 杀。楚成王儿子商臣，以卫兵包围王宫，逼成王自杀。成王好吃熊掌，要求让他吃了熊掌再死，企图拖 延时间，以待外援。商臣不许，说：“熊掌难熟。”成王被迫立即自杀。 吴国公子先派专绪刺杀了王， 夺取了政权。晋献公、齐桓公、齐懿公当政前后多次发生政变杀人。春秋战国这类事太多了，我就不说 了。除了相砍相杀夺取政权外，还有其他阴谋诡计掌握实权的。例如吕不韦送怀孕的赵姬给秦庄襄王， 生了秦始皇，是吕不韦的儿子。秦始皇的统治初期，实际上政权者落在吕不韦的手里。 秦朝三代统治了十五年。秦始皇只统治了十二年就死了。以后赵高捧出秦二世当皇帝，秦二世把他的兄 弟姐妹杀了二十六人。 汉高祖在位十二年，后来吕后专政，夺了刘家的政权。周勃、陈平勾结起来，又把吕家搞掉了。 晋朝司马炎统治了二十五年，以后爆发了八王之乱，出现互相残杀的局面。 南北朝的时候，为了夺政权互相残杀的事就更多了。隋文帝在位二十四年就被隋阳帝帝杀了，儿子杀老 子。有一出戏叫“御河桥”，就是杨广杀父，还杀了他的哥哥杨勇。 唐朝李世民兄弟相杀，争夺王位。李世民杀了他的哥哥建成，弟弟玄吉，即玄武门之变。 宋朝赵匡胤在位十七年。就被他的弟弟赵光义杀了。“大虫影奔声，千古之谜。”有一出戏叫“贺后骂 殿”进了这件事【析世鉴： “进了这件事”，原文如此。】。 元朝忽必烈统治中国十六年，他的儿子铁木儿在位十三年，皇族争位，大乱，两宫相争。一个是皇孙， 一个是皇后，也是夺权。 明朝朱元璋在位三十一年，他的儿子燕王棣带兵打朱元璋的孙子建文帝，相杀三年，南京的 王殿被烧， 建文帝是杀死了还是跑了弄不清楚，后来还派人到外国去找。 清朝统治中国不久，到了康熙晚年，他的儿子们为了争夺政权互相残杀，传说康熙病时遗说“传位十四 子”雍正改为“传位一于四子”据说康熙是喝了雍正送去的“人参汤”死掉的。雍正夺政权后，还把他 的好多兄弟杀了。 辛亥革命，孙中山当了大总统，三个月被袁世凯夺取政权。一年后袁世凯做了皇帝，又被人 推翻。此后 军阀混战了十几年，两年直奉战争，一次直皖南战争。蒋介石正是靠篡夺党权、政权，发动反革命政变 上台的，对革命人民进行了大屠杀。 这些历史上反革命政变，应该引起我们惊心动魄，高度警惕。 我们取得政权已经十六年了，我们无产阶级政权会不会被颠复、被篡夺？不注意就会丧失，苏联被赫鲁 晓夫颠复了，南斯拉夫早就变了。匈牙利出现了纳吉搞了十多天小灾难，也是颠复。这样的事情多得很 。现在毛主席注意这个问题，把我们一向不注意的问题提出来了。多次找负责同志谈防止反革命政变问 题。难道没有事情，无缘无故这样？不是，有很多迹象，“山雨欲来风满楼”“古文观止”里的《辩奸 篇》有这样的话：“见微而知著”“月晕而风，础润而雨”。坏事事先是有征兆的，任何本质的东西， 都由现象表现出来。最近有很多鬼事，鬼现象，要引起注意，可能发生反革命政变，要杀人，要篡夺政 权，要搞资本主义复辟，要把社会主义这一套搞掉。有很多现象，很多材料，我在这里不详细说了。你 们经过反罗瑞卿、反彭真、反陆定一和他老婆、反杨尚昆，可以嗅到一些味道，火药味道。资产阶级代 表人物混到我们党内，混到党的领导机关，成为当权派，掌握了国家机器，掌握了政权，掌握了军权， 掌握思想战线的司令部。他们联系起来搞颠复，闹大乱子。 罗瑞卿是掌握军权的，彭真在中央书记处抓了很多权。罗的手长，彭真的手更长。文化战线、思想 战线的一个指挥官是陆定一，搞机要情报联系的是杨尚昆。搞政变有两个东西必须搞，一个是宣传机关 、报纸，广播电台、文学、电影、出版，这些是做思想工作的。资产阶级搞颠复也是思想领先，先把人 们的思想搞乱。另一个是搞军队，抓枪杆子，文武相结合。 抓舆论又抓枪杆子，他们就能搞反革命政变 ，要投票有人，要打仗有军队。不论会场上的政变，战场上的政变，他们都有可能搞得起来。大大小小 的邓拓、吴_、廖沫沙，大大小小的“三家村”不少哩！毛主席说：十六年来思想战线我们没有占领。 这样下去人家就会不投我们的票，不投毛主席的票，而投他们的票。打起仗来，人家就会跟他们走，拿 起枪来打我们。 笔杆子、枪杆子，夺取政权靠这两杆子。所以很值得注意，思想上不能麻□，行动上要 采取具体措施，才能防患于未然。要把资产阶级代表人物、定时炸弹、地雷事先挖掉。不然一旦时机成 熟就会发生反革命政变，或者发生天灾，或者生发战争，或者毛主席百年之后，这样政权危机就会来了 。七亿人口的大国就会乱起来，这是很大的问题。当然还是两个前途，他们的阴谋不一定能得逞，不一 定能胜利，不一定能实现。因为我们党是毛主席领导下几十年革命的党，是成熟的党。我们的党紧紧握 著枪杆子，始终没有离开过枪杆子，没有搞过什么议会活动，和欧洲的党不同的。我们的党是同广大劳 动人民群众血肉相连的，是有长期革命传统的，是有丰富的革命经验的。 整个形势是大好形势。世界是大好形势，中国也是大好形势。他们想得逞是不很容易的。他们可能得逞 ，也可能失败。如果我们不注意，大家都是马大哈，他们就会得逞。如果我们警惕，他们就不能得逞， 他们想杀我们的脑袋，靠不住，假使他们要动手，搞反革命政变，我们就杀他们的脑袋！ 任何时候，不管形势多么好，总有阴暗面。形势好的时候，要看到坏的一面。如果没有坏的一面，好就 不成为好的。好之所以为好，是有坏；坏之所以为坏，是有好。 现在毛主席健在，我们是大树底下好乘凉。毛主席已经七十多岁了，身体很健康，可以活到一百多岁。 正因为形势好，我们不能麻□，要采取措施，防止发生事变。有人可能搞鬼，他们现在已经在搞鬼，野 心家大有人在。他们是资产阶级的代表，想推翻我们无产阶级的权，不能让他们得逞！有一批王八蛋， 他们想冒险，他们待机而动。他们想杀我们，我们要镇压他们！他们是假革命，他们是假马克思主义， 他们是假毛泽东思想，他们是背叛分子，毛主席还健在，他们就背叛，他们阳奉阴违，他们是野心家， 他们搞鬼，他们现在就想杀人，用种种手法杀人。陆定一就是一个，陆定一老婆就是一个，他说他不知 道他老婆的事，怎么能不知道，罗瑞卿就是一个，彭真的手段比他们更隐蔽、更狡猾，使人家不容易看 出来。他们冒充拥护毛主席，他在晋察冀是百分之百的王明路线，比王明路线还远，超过王明路线。一九三六年党的六届六中全会批判了王明路线，他参加了这次会议，会后他把蒋介石说成是“最有政治眼 光的人” “要竭诚的拥护蒋委员长。”他说：“抗战最坚决的是蒋委员长”他还说：“国共两党之间，要互助互 爱互让，反对利用困难与政府（即国民党政府）为难。”他在延安装著反对王明路线，到东北又搞王明 路线。彭真在东北拒不执行党中央和毛主席指示，在炮火连天的时候，他们幻想和平，幻想和国民党蒋 介石谈判，没有战争打算，幻想在谈制桌上取得胜利。他没有一点马克思列宁主义和毛泽东思想的味道 。不搞阶级斗争。他不把重点放在农村，不把干部和主力派到农村去建立根据地。恋恋不舍大城市，不 愿离开大城市，撒出沈阳，还赖在郊区不走。搬到本溪、搬到抚顺、又搬到梅河口，不肯在农村安家， 不准备打，只准备和。在东北他想把主力军孤注一掷和敌人硬拼，以军事上的冒险主义掩盖政治上的投降主义。他借口照顾山头，实际上是培植他个人的实力。他不注意补充主力，只是从散兵游 勇中收编和 建立一些地方部队。后来这些部队都叛变了，成了“座山雕”。他说反山头，就是他在搞山头，招降纳 叛，搞他自己的军队，搞小圈子，搞“桃园三结义”。北京水也泼不进，针也插不进，党内搞党，党内 搞派。毛主席、周总理和其他同志都有感觉，我也有感觉。 不少人挂著马克思主义的招牌、毛泽东思想的招牌，他们挂著共产党的招牌，实际上是反共分子。这次 揭露是党的伟大胜利。不揭非常危险，再让他们搞下去就可能不是党揭露他们、而是他们“审判”党。 我们的社会还是建立在阶级对立的基础上。资产阶级、地主阶级，一切剥削阶级是打倒了，但是没有完 全消灭，我们没收了他们的物资，但是不能没收他们的反动思想。把他们关起来也没法没收他们的脑袋 。他们是想复辟的。他们在整个人口比例上占很少数，但是他们政治上的能量很大，他们的反抗力量比 他们的人口比例大得多。城市小资产阶级自发势力，不断地生长新的资产阶级分子。工人中间也掺杂著 一些复杂成分。党和国家机关有些人腐化，加上帝国主义和现代修正主义的包围和颠复活动，这些是我 国产生资本主义的危险。这种危险是综合的，各种反动力量是联合的，国内国外，国内是主要的；党内 党外，党内是主要的；上层下层，上层是主要的，危险就出在上层。苏联出现了赫鲁晓夫，全国就变了 颜色。 现在我们把剥削阶级打倒才十六年，他们的人还在，心不死。地主把他们的地契还秘密地保存起来。被 推翻的地主和资产阶级随时都在梦想恢复他们的天堂。他们的枪杆子被缴械了，他们的印把子被夺过来 了，但是他们在思想文化阵地上还有相当的优势。他们拼命利用这种优势到处放毒。为资本主义复辟制 造舆论准备，当前正在进行的无产阶级文化大革命，就是这种资产阶级阴谋复辟和无产阶级反复辟的尖 锐的阶级斗争。它是关系到党和国家之命运、前途和将来面貌的头等大事。也是关系到世界革命的头等大事。 我们一定要严重注意资本主义复辟这个重要问题，不要忘掉这个问题。而要念念不忘阶级斗争，念念不忘无产阶级专政，念念不忘突出政治，念念不忘高举毛泽东思想伟大红旗。不然的话就是糊涂虫。不要 在千头万绪、日理万机的情况下丧失警惕性，否则一个晚上他们就要杀人，很多人头落地，国家制度要 改变，政权要变颜色，生产关系就要改变，由前进变成倒退。 说社会主义社会没有矛盾，这是错误的，是违反马克思主义的，是不合乎辩证法的。哪会没有矛盾呢？ 一千年、一万年、一亿年仍然有矛盾。地球毁灭了，太阳熄灭了，宇宙还是有矛盾的。不久前，邢台地 区发生了地震，自然界也在斗争著。我们总理亲自去处理。太阳黑子增加到一定程度，无线电就发不出 去。任何事物都处在矛盾中间、斗争中间、变化中间，这才是马克思主义的看法。从沙粒到太阳，大到 银河系小到基本粒子，大到宏观世界，小到微观世界，都充满著矛盾，马克思主义的本质是批判的、革 命的。它的基本观点是要批判、要斗争、要革命。无产阶级只有经过批判斗争和革命，才能夺取政权、 保持政权，推动我们的事业前进。因此要提高警惕、要斗争，不能存在和平幻想。斗争就是生活，你不 斗他，他就斗你嘛！你不打他，他就打你，你不杀他，他就杀你。丧失这种警惕性，不团结起来斗争就 不是马克思主义者。全党越团结得好，越要斗争，越有战斗力。但是绝不同反党分子团结，而是批判他 们、揭露他们，一直到开除他们出党。不是绝对团结，而是相对团结，是批判反党分子，揭露反党分子 的团结。 总之要斗争，这次我们斗了彭真、罗瑞卿、陆定一和他的老婆，还有杨尚昆。这是马克思主义的行为， 是辩证唯物主义的行为，是重大的政治措施，是防止反革命颠复的措施。不然我们得了天下要丧失天下 ，创了业不能守业。我国人民一百多年来，几十年来，为革命前赴后继，无数先烈所流的血，统统付之 东流，我们成历史的罪人，成为机会主义者。我们同他们斗争，但内部要团结，要以毛泽东思想为中心 来团结，以毛主席为中心来团结。他们这些家伙的共同点就是反毛主席、反毛泽东思想。无论是彭真、 陆定一、罗瑞卿、杨尚昆、邓拓、吴_、廖沫沙等等，都是这样。材料太多了。他们或者明目张胆，或 者暗中放箭，采取不同的语言，不同的体裁，不同的手段，恶毒地反对毛主席，反对毛泽东思想。 毛主席是我们党的缔造者，是我国革命的缔造者，是我们党和国家的伟大领袖，是当代最伟大的马克思 列宁主义者。毛主席天才地、创造性地、全面地继承、捍卫和发展了马克思列宁主义，把马克思列宁主 义提高到一个崭新的阶段。毛泽东思想是在帝国主义走向全面崩溃，社会主义走向全世界胜利时代的马 克思列宁主义，毛泽东思想是全党全国一切工作的指导方针。我们一定要把毛泽东思想在全国人民面前 端出来，同全国人民更广泛地见面，同全国人民更广泛地结合，让毛泽东思想更加深入人心，促进全国 人民思想进一步革命化。我们要以毛泽东思想为武器，批判揭露各种修正主义，批判揭露各个战线、各 个部门的资产阶级代表人物，批判揭露为资本主义复辟鸣锣开道的资产阶级思想。把无产阶级文化大革 命进行到底，把社会主义革命进行到底。这样就能保证我们防止修正主义、避免资本主义复辟。这是最最根本的关键问题。许多党内的坏家伙，他们反对学习毛主席著作，他们是反党分子。陆定一控制的中 宣部就反对学习毛主席著作，诬蔑这是简单化、庸俗化、实用主义。他们不宣传毛泽东思想，宣传资产 阶级思想。不宣传革命思想，宣传反动思想，不是把革命推向前进，而是拉著革命倒退。别人宣传毛泽 东思想他们就冷嘲热讽，千方百计加以压制，加以攻击，加以反对。 马克思主义起码应该知道存在决定意识，物质是第一性的，精神是第二性的，同时意识又有巨大的能动 作用，物质变精神，精神变物质。毛主席说：“人的正确思想是从哪里来的？是从天上掉下来的吗？不 是。是自己头脑中固有的吗？不是。人的正确思想，只能从社会实践中来。只能从社会的生产斗争、阶 级斗争和科学实验这三项实践中来。人们的社会存在，决定人们的思想，而代表先进阶级的正确思想， 一旦被群众掌握，就会变成改造社会、改造世界的物质力量。”马克思列宁主义和毛泽东同志的认识论 观点就是这样。我们要很好地应用毛泽东思想，就能大大地前进，精神潜力大得很。 几十年来，毛主席经常阐明精神变物质这两方面的辩证关系。马克思主义的核心是辩证法。 毛主席 对辩证法应用自如，渗透一切，在每一个问题上都体现了辩证唯物论和无产阶级哲学基础。毛主席全面 地、创造性地发展了马克思主义的辩证法。 毛主席所经历的事情，比马克思、思格斯、列宁都深刻得多。当然马克思、思格斯、列宁都是伟大的人 物。马克思活了六十五岁，思格斯活了七十五岁。他们有很多预见，他们继承人类先进的思想。预见到 人类社会的发展。可是他们没有亲自领导过无产阶级革命，没有象毛主席那样亲临前线指挥那么多的重 大的政治战役，特别是军事战役。列宁只活了五十四岁，十月革命胜利以后六年就去世了。他也没有经 历过象毛主席那样长期、那样复杂、那样激烈、那样多方面的斗争。中国人比德国多十倍，比俄国多三 倍。革命经验之丰富，没有哪一个人能超过。毛主席在全国全世界有最高的威望，是最卓越最伟大的人 物。毛主席的言论、文章和革命实践都表现出他的伟大的无产阶级天材。恩格斯说：十八世纪的天才是 黑格尔、圣西门，十九世纪的天才是马克思。他说，马克思比我们一部分人都站得高些，看得远些，观 察的多些和快些，他是天才。列宁也承认天才。他说，要有十几个天才的领袖才能领导俄国取得革命的 胜利。毛主席是天才，我们同毛主席哪一点不同，一起搞战争，有些我们读不懂，或者不很懂，毛主席 读懂了。我看了很多人，读书圈圈点点把书都涂满了。证明他没有读懂不知什么是主次。辩证法的核心 ，毛主席在几十年前就懂了，而且还会熟练地应用。从懂到利用，有很大的差距，懂了未必会用。打乒 乓球你懂得了规则，你也打不过庄则栋、徐寅生。打仗也一样，你懂得一点书本上的军事知识，打的时 候不一定能打胜利。毛泽东思想全部贯穿着唯物辩证法。毛主席广泛地发展和应用了马克思列宁主义理 论，在当代世界上没有第二个人。十九世纪的天才是马克思、恩格斯，二十世纪的天才是列宁和毛泽东 同志。不要不服气，不行就不行。不承认这一点，我们就会犯大错误。不看到这一点，就不晓得把无产阶级最伟大的舵手选为我们的领袖。 和一般动物的根本区别是，人是能制造工具的动物。人类在劳动过程中逐步发展了自己的头脑，能够去 思想。思想是人的最大特点之一。思想在一定条件下起决定作用。我们应该重视先进思想的作用，重视 社会主义时代先进思想的作用。重视毛泽东思想的作用，不重视思想的作用是庸俗的唯物论，机械的唯 物论。在社会主义时代，在财产公有制的条件下，忽视先进思想的作用，搞物质刺激是不利的，是非常 危险的。我们同修正主义不同，我们不能同他们那样，靠物质刺激。资产阶级物质刺激这条路我们决不 能走的，我们必须用毛泽东思想，用伟大的正义事业来激发人民的热情，放开眼界看未来 ，坚定不移向 前进。摆脱几千年来一切剥削阶级传统和习惯势力的影响，从这种狭隘的影响下解放出来，表现出强大 的力量，发生强大的作用。 文化思想战线被坏家伙控制了。彭真、陆定一控制了，中宣部是为资产阶级服务的中宣部。 他们控制了 文化部，是为资产阶级服务的文化部。他们仇视毛泽东思想，他们阻碍毛泽东思想的传播。毛泽东思想 一定要广泛地同人民群众见面，不同人民群众见面，我们国家的面貌可能改变。我们一定要把毛泽东思 想深入到人民群众中去。毛泽东思想和人民群众一结合，无论哪一方面，就会发生很好的变化。 毛泽东思想是无产阶级思想集中的表现，是同私有制思想、剥削阶级思想根本对立的。我们反对私有制 和私有观念。私有制和私有观念是产生修正主义的重大因素，这种因素非常广泛。农村有自留地、有集 体的地，一筐粪是先送自留地还是先送集体的地，都是有斗争的。 这是两个阶级的心理，这两个阶级是 两条道路的表现，是阶级斗争的表现。我们不用马克思列宁主义、毛泽东思想去战斗，资产阶级思想就 会占领阵地，引起蜕化变质，出乱子。匈牙利不是就有裴多菲俱乐部这批学阀吗？在他们煽动下，二十 万人包围著国会，要纳吉当政，我们党内这些坏家伙就是纳吉，一旦有事，他们振臂一呼，就会有些人 跟著跑，幸亏过去几年各个击破，打掉了一些纳吉，打掉了高岗、彭德怀、张闻天，这次又打掉了一批 纳吉，一批反革命修正主义分子。 这场斗争以后，不要有太平观念，有些人私有观念、剥削阶级观念根深蒂固，渗透到每一个细胞。他们 随时都要捣鬼。还得提高警惕。 人的脑子是存在的反映，是矛盾的，是有阶级性的。我们社会主义社会也不例外。就拿革命队伍来说， 也有正确思想和错误思想，有无产阶级思想和资产阶级思想的矛盾，有集体主义、共产主义同个人主义 的矛盾，有真马克思主义同假马克思主义的矛盾，有走群众路线同反对群众路线的矛盾等等。这一系列 的矛盾，不断在脑子里发生斗争，不是这个克服那个就是那个克服这个。 还有些人的脑子里，甚至有革命思想同反革命思想的矛盾，要随时展开斗争，两军对战，消灭隐蔽的反 革命思想。 要看到地球在运动，万物在发展的现象，要看清历史发展的规律。不要做违背历史发展的事。做这种事 害人害己，身败名裂。毛主席提出保持无产阶级晚节，就是这个问题。老同志也要按照毛主席提出的保 持无产阶级革命接班人的五个条件严格要求自己，认真改造自己，不看清这个大形势，打个人小算盘， 必然会犯大错误，甚至于会参加卑鄙无耻的阴谋反党集团。 我们现在拥护毛主席，毛主席百年以后我们也拥护毛主席。毛泽东思想要永远流传下去。毛泽东思想是 真正的马克思列宁主义，是高度同实际相结合的马克思列宁主义，是全国人民最好的教课书和必修课， 是全国劳动人民团结和革命的共同思想基础，是全国人民行动的指南。毛泽东思想是人类的灯塔，是世 界革命最锐利的武器，是放之四海而皆准的普遍真理。 毛泽东思想能够改变祖国的面貌，能够使中国人 民在全世界人民面前站起来，永远站起来。 毛主席活到那一天，九十岁、一百岁，都是我们党的最高领 袖，他的话都是我们行动的准则。谁反对他全党共诛之，全国共讨之，在他身后，如果有谁做赫鲁晓夫 那样的秘密报告，一定是野心家，一定是大坏蛋，全党共诛之，全国共讨之。

TIME on China 02.25.1966 Red China: Frustrated & Alone

  

Friday, Feb. 25, 1966 Red China: Frustrated & Alone If it is possible for a nation of 700 million people to have a nervous breakdown, Communist China is perilously close to the breaking point. Its craving for victory in Viet Nam, where it has staked its revolutionary reputation on the success of "the war of national liberation," has been frustrated by the stepped-up American commitment. Traditionally paranoid about foreigners, China has become more isolated and sealed off than any other Communist state (including Stalin's Russia). Led by aging, ethnocentric men with little personal knowledge of the world beyond, it feels encircled and threatened on every side. When it directs its voice to the outside world, its normally strident tones now verge on hysteria. This is the nation whose intentions are a main topic of speculation in the West, and were frequently invoked at last week's hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (see THE NATION). About to set off its third nuclear blast, supported by a huge army that could bring full-scale war to Southeast Asia if it marched south, Red China is certainly what Defense Secretary Robert McNamara recently called it: "a threat of greatest concern to the U.S." The threat is the more bother some because China's very frustrations make its reactions so odd and unpredictable. But, while the West worries about China, China is building for itself a worrisome string of problems that looks to be nearly as long as the Great Wall. Pimps & Promises. Its relations with Russia are steadily growing worse. It now refers to the Russians as "pimps of the imperialists," and last week it all but ignored the 16th anniversary of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship—while the Russians marked the occasion by carrying a long Pravda attack on the Chinese. Peking is bristling about Leonid Brezhnev's recent visit to Ulan Bator and the resulting U.S.S.R.-Outer Mongolian treaty, which contains military clauses that China believes are clearly aimed against it. There is mounting evidence that the Soviets will try to practically excommunicate Red China from the world Communist movement at the 23rd Party Congress in Moscow next month, thus isolating the Chinese even further. Because Peking is beginning to look like a loser, its position is markedly deteriorating just about everywhere. Cuba has slammed the door in its face be cause it welshed on a rice deal (TIME, Feb. 18). Last week in Indonesia, once the brightest Red Chinese hope in Southeast Asia, the deputy chairman of the Communist Party went on trial for leading a revolt against the government, and the now-dominant army leaders huffily withdrew their ambassador to Peking for "consultation." Peking has fallen into disrepute in most of Africa, where it has failed to produce on its big promises of aid. Even hard-lining, Peking-backing Albania (which Chou En-lai called "the flower garden of socialism") is showing symptoms of a turn politically and economically away from China and toward its Eastern European neighbors. To the Boondocks. As China's reputation in the outer world slides, its internal policies are hardening and its struggles to erase "revisionist" tendencies increasing. The army has been singled out for stepped-up ideological indoctrination, but the campaign is much broader. Mao Tse-tung recently banished 160,000 artists and writers to the boondocks "to remold their thinking." Vicious attacks have just been launched on two top Chinese Communist writers, Playwright Tien Han, 66, who wrote the Red Chinese national anthem, and Historian Wu Han, 56, the former vice mayor of Peking. Tien was accused of writing a play that "preaches an idealistic historical viewpoint," and Wu has confessed to "using idealism and metaphysics" to attack bureaucracy. China's economy is not doing too badly—it has about recovered to the 1957-58 level after the disastrous "Great Leap Forward"—and its nuclear capability is obviously growing. Experts believe that the Chinese may soon set off a hydrogen explosion in addition to the expected atomic explosion, and that China will try to bypass other delivery means and develop a missile to carry its bombs. But the Chinese are probably testing their bombs as quickly as they make them, will have no atomic arsenal for some time—perhaps not until 1970. In the interim, Mao & Co. have plenty to worry about. Despite stringent nationwide efforts at birth control, China's population continues to escalate with lemming-like abandon. Self-sufficiency in food production remains a hit-or-miss proposition. China's nascent industry is already cranking overtime to produce war supplies for Viet Nam and small arms for tinhorn revolutionaries from Africa to Latin America. Less rabid Reds in Europe and Asia threaten China with ideological isolation—to Mao, the unkindest cut of all. It is not at all strange, in these circumstances, that a note of persecution has crept into China's propaganda. As Peking's Red Flag saw it, everyone is out to get China—particularly "the Soviet-Japanese-American-Indian alliance."

                                  

TIME on China:May. 20, 1966 WHAT THE U.S. KNOWS ABOUT RED CHINA

05.20.1966 WHAT THE U.S. KNOWS ABOUT RED CHINA

Friday, May. 20, 1966 Essay: WHAT THE U.S. KNOWS ABOUT RED CHINA EXCEPT for flies, beggars and Americans, Communist China is not a Forbidden Land in the way in which that celebrated term applied to Tibet. In an age of satellite eyes-in-the-sky, it is certainly not Terra Incognita; its huge land mass, slightly bigger than all 50 U.S. states, lies naked before the orbiting cameras. The figurative curtain that it has drawn around itself is not of iron but, more appropriately for the Orient, of pliable bamboo. Yet of all the earth's too many closed societies, that of Red China ranks as the most ominously secretive. This secretiveness, paranoiac in its intensity, is the more worrisome to the world because militant Red China is the global troublemaker with the greatest revolutionary threat. Red China has brawled with its most powerful neighbors, India and Russia. It has urged on, by word and deed, the war in Viet Nam, has openly supported insurgency in neighboring Thailand and has exported subversion as far away as Africa. Its disciplined, indoctrinated population, which constitutes a quarter of the human race, is told ceaselessly that the U.S. is "the world's chief enemy." To read the intentions of this sullen giant and to formulate its policy toward it, the U.S. obviously and vitally needs to heed the ancient dictum: "Know thine enemy." Knowledge is the basis of policy—but just how much does the U.S. know, and how much can it find out, about a nation of such implacable hostility and resolute secrecy? Sophisticated Snooping There are two answers, one expectable, the other surprising. The first is that the U.S. knows not nearly enough, because secrecy inevitably covers with impenetrable shrouds certain facts about China. The second—and surprising—answer is that the U.S. knows more about Red China than does any other nation, with the possible exception of the Soviet Union. Says an expert who has been studying China for more than 20 years: "We know a lot more about some things in China than the Chinese themselves." The practice of "Sinology"* is enjoying a boom in the U.S.: there are now ten major academic centers and 50 lesser centers for China studies, and some $50 million in private grants has recently been made for such studies. China-watching has become the indispensable underpinning for the evolution of U.S. policy. To get the material they need to form realistic analyses, both Government and academic experts tap numerous and diverse sources, covert and overt. The U.S. maintains its largest consulate in Hong Kong, where a corps of translators collects and analyzes an endless stream of Chinese periodicals, some smuggled out from remote provinces. The compulsive outpourings of Radio Peking and other internal radio stations are monitored by a string of sophisticated snooping devices on China's perimeter. Drone planes, high-flying U-2s and satellite cameras record roads, railways, steel mills, oil wells, nuclear plants, missile ranges and troop movements. U.S. Government analysts early spotted China's gaseous diffusion plant at Lanchow, the plutonium reactor at Paotow, and the atom-bomb test site at Lop Nor in the Taklamakan wastes of Sinkiang. They have predicted well in advance the timing of all three Chinese atomic explosions. China-watchers also pick up clues from the non-American tourists and businessmen (about 10,000 a year) who are now permitted to go on strictly conducted tours arranged by the Red Chinese tourist agency Luxingshe. Though they carefully emphasize the more attractive aspects of Chinese life, the tours nonetheless reveal a good deal of its quality and detail. The accompanying color pictures, taken on one such tour, show smiling children in their best dress, model schools, other civic projects and an air of brisk, bright uplift —but they also make clear the ceaseless indoctrination, the careful regimentation and the firm discipline that pervade life in Red China. The volume of information about Red China has become so huge, in fact, that one of the major problems of both Government and academic Sinologists is how to handle, summarize and evaluate it all. Herewith, based on the best knowledge, deductions and estimates of more than 30 China experts interviewed by ten TIME correspondents in the U.S. and Asia, are the capsulated highlights of what the U.S. knows about Red China: ∙ THE REGIME. Seventeen years after its victory over Chiang Kaishek, the Communist regime is solidly entrenched on the mainland. The chance of an internal revolution that would overthrow the Chinese Communists, says Professor Robert Scalapino of the University of California, "seems remote, barring global war or some other major and unforeseeable crisis." Other China experts agree. The Communists have unified the provinces, centralized all authority and imposed a totalitarian administration that has steadily tightened its grip on all phases of government and life. Chairman Mao Tse-tung's chilling philosophy is that "all political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." The gun that ensures his control is held by the Chinese Communist Party apparatus, whose 19 million members make up the largest of all national Communist parties. At its apex perch Mao and his top comrades in a seven-member Politburo Standing Committee; beneath them are a twelve-member Politburo, then 94 Central Committeemen. From there the party descends into tens of thousands of local branches whose vigilance reaches into every city block and every village hut. This pervasive network controls all facets of existence, pulls young and old into the web of ideological influence and ensures that no "foreign" political concept can take root. ∙ THE MILITARY. Red China's armed forces of 2,700,000 men—roughly equal to the U.S.'s 2,935,562 and Russia's more than 3,000,000—is formidable, but not a modern force by American or Russian standards. The infantry, 1.8 million men divided into 35 field armies (110 divisions), is well trained and adequately armed with light weapons, but it is woefully deficient in transportation, maintenance, service, communications and medical branches. In addition, there are a million security police and a militia of upwards of 20 million, most of them armed with makeshift or hand-me-down weapons. The army could probably defend China well in any homeland war against an invader, but its deficiencies allow it little ability to move far beyond China's borders. The Chinese air force is second rate, consisting of about 175,000 men and 2,500 aircraft. Most of the jets (1,900) are obsolete for combat against the best U.S. and Russian craft. The country's navy is negligible by big-power standards: 140,000 men, 30 to 50 diesel-powered Russian submarines, one missile-launching sub, a few destroyers and a flock of motorized junks. Despite three test explosions, nuclear capacity is still elementary. About 1,300 engineers and 500 scientists are working on the bomb, and estimates are that there will be ten to 20 bombs by the end of 1967. But there will be no ICBM until at least 1970, and, unless there is a real forced draft effort, no serious ability to get a bomb on target with that missile until about 1985. ∙ THE ECONOMY. It is still quite a mess, but improving. China's gross national product is estimated at $70 billion (compared with Japan's $71 billion, Britain's $86 billion, the U.S.'s $714 billion). After a rapid expansion in the first decade of Red rule (the G.N.P. reached $85 billion in 1959), the economy was badly set back by the failure of the Great Leap Forward (backyard steel furnaces, instant communization), a monument to statist mismanagement. University of Michigan Professor Alexander Eckstein believes that the mismanagement of the Leap "cost the Chinese economy roughly a decade of growth." The economy has been improving for the last two or three years, but it is now approaching only its 1957 levels. (By contrast, little Taiwan's per-capita production is almost three times as large as Red China's.) Another indicator of the economy's state is the number of motor vehicles in Red China; the country's pitiful total of 236,600 compares with 5,782,085 for Japan, 4,391,000 for the Soviet Union, 830,063 for New Zealand. As for any comparison with the U.S., there are nearly three times as many cars and trucks in Cuyahoga County, Ohio (706,653), as in all of Red China. Mainland China remains largely an underdeveloped country, still at subsistence level. Its economy is still basically agricultural, and its agriculture is still largely primitive. Just to keep up with an annual increase of 15 million people in population, the regime needs to increase food production by 2% to 3% a year—a mark it has not yet attained. Concentration of food production has forced a cutback in the rate of new plant construction, and the removal of Russian aid and the high cost of nuclear development have also hurt the economy. ∙ LIVING CONDITIONS. No one is starving any more, and the average Chinese is better off than he was even five years ago. The standard of living is still low, but the people appear healthy and adequately fed and clothed. There are equal if slim rations for all: about 2,000 calories a day of food, two dresses or an equivalent two yards of cotton cloth a year, one bar of washing soap a month. An equitable rationing system of such basics as rice has been introduced. Wage levels and food prices are both low. Chinese earnings range from $8 a month for an apprentice to $24 for a skilled industrial worker, $80 for an engineer, $100 for a party big shot. A pound of pork costs 20¢, a pound of sugar 28¢, a pound of rice 5¢. Housing costs only $1.20 a room per month, but the accommodations are spartan. Flies, beggars and pickpockets have mostly disappeared—but so has something else. "There is no magic and no fascination," wrote Lorenz Stucki of Neue Zürcher Zeitung, after a recent visit to Red China. "Life has become an abysmal bore." ∙ MORALE. The temper of the country is generally stoic; there are no signs of popular restiveness, but no signs either of a really contented people. The Chinese are proud that they have achieved unity and become a force on a world scale, after a rankling century of humiliation by foreigners. Now that the country has settled down internally, the party's big problem is to retain revolutionary momentum. This it seeks to do with regular campaigns of "rectification," which Mao defines as "one of the methods of evolving social contradictions in our country" but which is really a fancy word for purge. Though experts disagree about its extent, there is definitely dissidence and some underground opposition to the regime. In 1961 the army was ruthlessly purged of "corrosive and disintegrating influences." Peking is now cracking down hard on the country's 5,000,000 or so intellectuals, some of whom seem to be bothered by the deification of Mao and his thought, the implacable brainwashing and the minute surveillance and shepherding of individuals. The government continues the dreaded practice of shipping urbanites to the country or remote provinces as ideological discipline. ∙ THE LEADERSHIP. Mao Tse-tung is in his 73rd year, and his health seems ever more precarious. The Politburo averages 66 years of age, the Central Committee more than 60. Says Columbia University Professor A. Doak Barnett, a leading China expert: "This means that one can say, with actuarial certainty, that before very long virtually the entire top-leadership group will disappear during a relatively brief period, with results that will be felt at every level of the country." The leadership's ideas are also aging. Practically all of the top men are first-stage revolutionaries who made the Long March, the retreat from Chiang Kai-shek's armies for 6,000 miles from east China to the barren northwest in 1934-35. They are afflicted with the "Yenan complex"—a belief in absolute, rigid adherence to the methods by which they survived and ultimately attained power. There are some among the Chinese leadership who clearly have doubts about the present course of Chinese policy, which is leading to a growing isolation of China; most of them are among the "new generation" that is faced with the day-to-day problems of running the country. Mao and his men are out of touch with and unsympathetic to the younger generation of the party, and Mao has already groomed as his heirs-apparent men who will be dutiful preachers of the Maoist gospel. Among them are Party Doctrinal Elder Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping, the party's powerful secretary-general, and Lin Piao, the Defense Minister (see THE WORLD). Eventually, though, the younger generation is bound to rise to leadership, and the China experts hope—but it is only a hope—that they will be more concerned with internal development and less intractable than the present leadership. A Certainty of Change As much as the U.S. knows about Red China, the experts are the first to recognize that there is a great deal that it does not—and should—know. Almost nothing is known, for example, about the exact process of decision making among Mao and his colleagues. Who are the Red Chinese hawks and who are the doves? Is there a show of hands in critical disputes, or does Mao decide by fiat? The hardest information to get is on the party's cadre organization, and only a minimum of biographical material is available on the leadership. The U.S. would like more information on agriculture and more reliable figures on the economy. It is particularly wary about a precise population count; the experts estimate the present population at 750 million, but concede that it could be as low as 650 million or as high as 800 million. China-watching will become increasingly important as the old leaders fade back and the new ones come onstage. Says M.I.T. Professor Lucian Pye: "Though Chinese Communism is here to stay, it is certainly going to change greatly." There are plenty of important clues for the China-watchers to keep their eye out for. They will watch for signs that the younger technocrats in the Chinese government are making any headway against the insistence on doctrinal purity, as the technocrats have done in Russia. Will the successors of Mao, involved with their own problems, retreat in the face of American power in Viet Nam, seek a compromise with the Russians, adopt a less inflammatory international stance, be less adamant about Taiwan? Though no one is certain that a new generation of Chinese leaders would be any more moderate than the Maoists, the U.S. is already directing its policy more at the future generation than at the present regime. Well before the Fulbright hearings, the Administration had been constantly reviewing its China policy. Though the term "containment without isolation" is now in vogue, the U.S. has actually been pursuing such a policy for some time. If China is isolated, she has herself to blame. While opposing China's designs on Southeast Asia by arms, the U.S. has made several overtures—and been rebuffed. It offered, for example, to exchange newsmen and scholars. It still keeps up diplomatic contacts with the Red Chinese in Warsaw. If all of this has done no good so far, most Sinologists feel strongly that it is well worth the effort. Columbia's Barnett describes it as a process of "slowly involving Communist China in more patterns of international intercourse." Says Harvard's John Lindbeck: "One of our obligations as world citizens is to help the Chinese to become more sophisticated." Another Sinologist in his own right, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, speaks eloquently of a latent force that may be at work deep in the body of China as a modifying influence—"the pragmatic genius of the Chinese people." These are the people whom Americans have known and befriended for more than a century, in missionary, educational and trade relations and as allies in a great war. Therefore, says Rusk, the U.S. does not assume that there is anything "eternal" about the "state of hostility" between the U.S. and Red China. "We must continue to explore and analyze all available information on Communist China and keep our own policies up to date." In other words, neither China-containing nor China-watching can be relaxed. *A term that properly applies to the study of traditional Chinese scholarship, but is popularly used today to embrace all studies of China.

TIME on China Apr 9, 1965 - Red China: The Busy Travelers

Friday, Apr. 09, 1965

Red China: The Busy Travelers

Pakistan seems to have a special fascination for Red China's leaders these days. Foreign Minister Chen Yi spent five days there last week, signing a new border agreement with the government of President Mohammed Ayub Khan, and engaging in such tourist antics as a jolting ride atop a camel.
Chen also caused a diplomatic stir in an interview given to a Turkish newsman in Karachi, informing him that Ayub Khan had promised his "good offices" in an effort to bring China and Turkey closer together. Chen Yi thought both countries had a lot in common since Turkey "takes its past from Asia." He added, "China is an injured country. As far as I understand, Turkey has not been free from suffering in her relations with the great powers."
Let Down. It was a shrewd ploy. Turkey had been cold to the idea when it was first broached by Ayub Khan last year. Since then, the Turks have been more ready to listen to Pakistani suggestions of an independent and self-serving foreign policy. Both nations feel a bit let down by the U.S. In Pakistan's case, it is the old grievance over arms shipments to India; in Turkey's, the U.S. position on Cyprus, which Turks regard as pro-Greek.
Several Turkish newspapers were eager for a break with Formosa and recognition of Peking, and even Ankara officials were talking about closer cultural and economic ties with Red China. Understandably well pleased, Chen Yi returned home by way of Nepal, stopping off in Katmandu to inspect a shoe factory built by Chinese technicians and to exude peace, friendship and coexistence.
Floodlit Formal. As Chen Yi left Pakistan, China's Premier Chou En-lai arrived. He had flown to Rumania for the funeral of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, stopped at Tirana, capital of Albania, Peking's most distant and tiniest ally, and jetted on to Algeria and Egypt where he reportedly urged Ahmed ben Bella and Gamal Abdel Nasser not to invite Russia to the second Bandung-style conference of Afro-Asian nations scheduled for June in Algiers. Chou's point: despite its possession of Siberia, Russia is essentially a European country.
In Karachi, Chou got red-carpet treatment, though his name was misspelled "Chau" on a welcoming banner. He had a long and private talk with Ayub Khan, and a formal dinner at the President's floodlit house. Next day a Pakistani spokesman said the discussions had concerned the "tense and delicate situation prevailing in Southeast Asia, with special reference to Viet Nam." Pakistan hoped that "all nations, large and small, Asian and non-Asian, will play their role in bringing tranquillity and peace to that unfortunate country that has seen warfare for over two decades." Ayub was clearly enjoying his new Nehru-like role as world statesman and mediator. Two hours before Chou En-lai left Karachi, Ayub Khan was off on travels of his own—an eight-day state visit to the Soviet Union.

TIME on China Feb 26, 1965 - Asia: A Test for Tigers

[1965.02.26] Asia: A Test for Tigers

Friday, Feb. 26, 1965

Asia: A Test for Tigers

(See Cover) 

Out of Peking's Forbidden City, once the seat of China's emperors and now the headquarters of its Red masters, stomped an angry man in dark sunglasses. He was Marshal Chen Yi, Foreign Minister of the Chinese People's Republic and spokesman for Chairman Mao Tse-tung. "United States imperialism is the most ferocious enemy of the world's people," Chen declared in a speech at the Soviet embassy. "Peaceful coexistence is out of the question. Only in concrete action against the U.S. and its followers can the Chinese-Soviet alliance be tested and tempered."

Moving on to Nepal's embassy, Chen got even more excited. "Sheer drivel!" he cried when asked about U.S. demands that Communist guerrilla attacks in South Viet Nam be stopped. "There will be no peace in Indo-China," prophesied Chen, "so long as the aggressive forces of U.S. imperialism hang on there." Later, Chen told a touring Swiss journalist: "The Chinese people will not stand idly by as North Viet Nam is attacked. China and North Viet Nam go together like teeth and lips."

In that odd, oral simile Chen neglected to say who was the teeth and who was merely the lip. But Peking's friends provided plenty of lip service. From Djakarta to Caracas, mobs led by Chinese Communist and other "students" smashed U.S. embassy windows, burned cars, ripped American flags, winged inkpots, and howled for Lyndon Johnson's blood. Back in Moscow after his eleven-day swing through Asia, So viet Premier Aleksei Kosygin at least partly echoed the Peking line; he promised "appropriate" military aid to the North Vietnamese, and his propaganda machine threatened dire consequences unless "American imperialism" withdraws from Indo-China. On the surface at least, the divided Communist giants were closing ranks.
The Real Issue. Even in the paralyzed U.N. General Assembly, Peking's pals were busy raising a final bit of hell before adjournment. In Cambodia, Chief of State Norodom Sihanouk, who long ago decided that the Red Chinese are bound to win in Asia, is convening an Indo-Chinese People's Conference, at which many of the area's Communist and pro-Communist groups will no doubt demand the withdrawal of the U.S. "aggressors." Sihanouk's scheme was dignified by a letter from Charles de Gaulle, whose Foreign Minister, Maurice Couve de Murville, was in Washington pushing the French line about neutralization of Southeast Asia.

In South Viet Nam itself, the mood oscillated between faint rays of optimism and farce. The U.S. retaliatory air strikes against the North had lifted Saigon morale, and there was some feeling that continued U.S. pressure—rather than just tit-for-tat response—might create a climate of hope in which some political stability could be achieved. But while a new civilian government was trying to set itself up in business, the army engaged in another disheartening series of coups and countercoups (see South Viet Nam). On the military side, things looked a little better. For the moment, the Viet Cong were quiet. Presumably they had been given pause by the U.S. raids of Feb. 7 and 11. And besides, they were tired from the ferocious pace they had set for most of that week: they lost 795 men, more than in any earlier period, while taking 37 American and 290 South Vietnamese lives.

But beyond Saigon politics, beyond the agonizing guerrilla war, beyond the question of further air strikes against North Viet Nam, loomed the basic issue: the U.S. confrontation with Red China. Mao Tse-tung professes to take an unhurried view of the matter. "The Americans will tire," he told U.S. Journalist Edgar Snow recently. "They don't have the patience for this."
Perhaps not. But that is what the conflict comes down to: a test of patience, of will, of strength involving the whole balance of power in Asia.

Foothold on the Rim. In the vast sweep of country from Angkor Wat to the Great Wall, from the Yellow Sea to the Pamirs, Red China seeks hegemony. There is little doubt that Peking has two long-range objectives: 1) to drive the U.S. from the Asian mainland and eventually out of all Asia and 2) to re-establish Chinese borders as they were under the 18th century Manchu Dynasty.

China's borders then penetrated deeply into what is now Soviet territory, both on the west and beyond the Amur River to the north. Manchu China en compassed all of Mongolia, Korea and Taiwan. To the south, China either extracted tribute from much of the IndoChinese peninsula or else dominated trade so thoroughly that tribute was unnecessary. All this made the Chinese hated, feared, but nonetheless respected in the region. Since then, history has not favored Chinese ambition. First the colonial powers of Europe, then the Japanese conquerors early in World War II, and finally the U.S.—after assuming France's responsibilities in 1961—denied China control over the rice bowls of Indo-China. South Viet Nam, Malaysia and Thailand represent salients on the edge of China's sphere of influence.

So the Viet Nam battle comes down to the basic question: Can the U.S. and its allies retain their foothold on the rim of Asia, or must they eventually give way to China's insistent pressure?
Western Force. In one sense, it is absurd that the question should be posed at all, because the Western side is overwhelmingly stronger. If Peking's famous propaganda phrase is applicable to anyone, it is not the U.S. but Red China that is the "paper tiger." 

The U.S. and its allies in the Western Pacific are deployed in a highly mobile, heavily armed arc of military power around China (see map). Carriers, cruisers and attack transports of the U.S. Seventh Fleet range the bulge of Asia from the bleak Kuriles north of Japan to the "gong-tormented" South China Sea. Three Polaris subs recently attached to the fleet add a 48-missile nuclear punch with a range of 1,500 miles, thus freeing the carriers from strategic responsibilities and allowing them to support Viet Nam operations. 

The U.S. Air Force keeps 32 tactical squadrons of strike aircraft, ranging from Japan to the Philippines, while two squadrons of Strategic Air Command B-52s are on station at Guam. Air Force transports could carry a sizable force from Okinawa or Hawaii into Thailand within 24 hours. Since 1962's Laos crisis, which brought U.S. marines into Thailand, the U.S. and the Thais have been busy creating a military infrastructure that would make Thailand a final redoubt if the rest of Indo-China were to be abandoned. Three all-weather, 10,000-ft. jet strips have been built, and the hardware and ammunition needed to supply a brigade of U.S. troops is stockpiled in the countryside. The U.S. has even implemented its own psychological-warfare campaign among the Thais: USIS and Thai Mobile Information Teams produce films in the popular Mohlam style, with pro-Western propaganda messages insinuated in the love lyrics sung by the Mohlam actors.

Also, the British. Off Southeast Asia, a Marine Corps ready force of 1,500 men is embarked continuously, some aboard amphibious landing ships, some on carriers. In addition to its own force of 222,000 men, the U.S. can count with some surety on the support of 550,000 South Korean troops in the event China carries through its threats in that peninsula. The R.O.K. forces have recently been equipped with the latest in American weaponry: Hawk antiaircraft-missile batteries, Northrop F-5 supersonic "Freedom Fighters," and 175-mm. cannon that pack a harder, flatter wallop than anything North Korea possesses. A real showdown would release Chiang Kai-shek's wellarmed, tautly disciplined 600,000-man force, and in that eventuality the U.S. could probably also count on 40,000 SEATO-allied Filipinos. 

Far to the southwest, the British have beefed up their forces to counter Indonesia's Peking-leaning President Sukarno, who threatens to "crush Malaysia." The 70,000 British and Commonwealth troops—including 50 Royal Navy men-o'-war and some 250 bombers—might not join a U.S.-Chinese fight directly, but they could be counted upon to defend the left flank from any incursion.

What can China offer in response? Mostly size and mass. Mao must rely on his powerful, ponderous infantry of 2,500,000 troops, backed by 12 million militiamen.

Well trained in both conventional and guerrilla warfare, the Chinese foot soldier is amply armed with Chinese-made automatic weapons—usually a stamped copy of the Russian World War II vent-barreled burp gun. He is supported by light and medium mortars, bazooka-style rocket launchers, recoilless rifles, and artillery that in performance ranks with the best in the world. As to armor and transport, Mao's millions are woefully underequipped. Some 4,000 Russian T-34 tanks are still operating, but though that machine was first-rank armor during the Korean War, it is now obsolete. Still, armor would be of little use to any army fighting in Southeast Asia, an area about as conducive to good traction as a rumpled rug on a waxed floor.

Weakness in the Air. Though China's air force ranks third in size in the world (behind the U.S. and Russia), its 2,900 planes are mostly obsolete MIG-15s and 17s. Western experts prediet that China will soon start turning out a few advanced MIG-19 and 21 jets on its own, but production will be slow and light. In any air clash with U.S. Navy and Air Force jets over Southeast Asia, Mao's planes would certainly be swept from the skies in a matter of days. Even the Chinese Nationalists, flying slow F-86 Sabre jets armed with Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, were able to shoot down 32 Red Chinese planes during 1958's Formosa Straits dustup. Since then, Red jets have rarely appeared over the Taiwan Straits. Moreover, military experts in Asia note that Chinese jets have not left their borders, even to make a show of force over North Viet Nam.

Of bombers, China mounts 300 Russian-built IL-28 twin-jets, but these planes are incapable of supersonic flight and thus become easy prey for U.S. air defense. China's navy is strictly a coastal-defense outfit, although its 28 submarines—if committed in a surprise thrust against the U.S. Seventh Fleet —could do some damage.

Theoretically, the Chinese might diffuse Western forces by fighting in half a dozen places at once, from Korea to India. But, given their immense logistical problems and other weaknesses, most military experts are sure that the Chinese could not possibly mount a multiple-front war.
Land v. Sky & Sea. In sum, while the U.S. still fears a land-based entanglement with China's vast army, American military superiority is overwhelming in any situation where air and seapower can be brought to bear. Mao Tse-tung seems determined to avoid any such situation. Protesting a little too much, an editorial in People's Daily last week asked: "What is naval and air superiority after all? Even if twelve American aircraft carriers are deployed in this area, it would only mean twelve more airports on the ocean. What can they do, since the outcome of the war in Viet Nam must be decided on the ground?" 

Almost unanimously, military experts believe that Mao wants to avoid any direct encounter with the U.S., if he can possibly help it. His first aim clearly is to continue guerrilla war and subversion, where air-and seapower are least effective — even if the U.S. were to overcome moral and political scruples and use such power fully. Next, Mao wants to use other people's ground forces. As one observer puts it: "He wants the Vietnamese to fight the Americans, and he wants the Laotians and Cambodians and Thais and Burmese and anyone else Peking can subvert to fight the Americans." After his first audience with Mao Tse-tung, the new French ambassador to Peking reportedly cabled Paris in some horror that Mao "regards human life as part of his inventory of resources and is perfectly willing to spend it." But he plainly does not want to start spending the inventory unless he has to. 

Slow Creep Forward. Perhaps the most vulnerable part of China is its economy, which would suffer disastrously in any war. Mao tries to divert Chinese attention from the weakness of the economy by harping on austerity as a kind of ethic. Last week, fearful that the traditional Lantern Festival with its fireworks, kite flying, dragon and lion dances would evoke memories of long-gone "golden eras," the regime sent cadres of girls to block celebrators from entering Shanghai's Temple of the Goddess of Mercy. Shop windows wore posters calling on people to end superstitious practices (one showed a coin on a coil of burning incense, implying that money spent on joss sticks is money profitlessly burnt). Traditional "round-ihe-Kang"* murals no longer depict scenes of filial piety but show "realistic" revolutionary hardship. In Peking, where chrysanthemums and purple cabbages once added daubs of color to the overwhelming grey of the city, the only flowers to be seen are in parks, under signs that read "The Chrysanthemum Is a Collective Flower." The cabbages are being salted down in jars in backyards—a sign that the Chinese believe vegetables will be scarce in the spring.

During the slow creep forward from the disastrous Great Leap six years ago, China's recovery has been uncertain all the way. Western economic analyses show China today at about the same level as 1957—with seven years of population growth adding to the burden. In most areas, the Chinese are still trying to transform a medieval economy into a late 19th century one. Typical of Chinese improvisation is a clever device recently developed for "mechanized" plowing of rice fields: the plow is dragged back and forth by barges sailing in canals at either end of the field.
Although China produces about as much food grain as the U.S., its population (700 million) is nearly four times as large, and Mao's regime must import 6,000,000 tons of grain a year merely to keep its people at subsistence level. Each year fully a third of Peking's convertible foreign exchange is spent on grain.

Aid from Trade. Still, Mao's hard-handed central planners have engineered some striking .gains in industry. Since the Korean War, steel production has increased 800% (still only a low 8-10 million tons a year, v. almost 40 million tons for Japan), coal output has tripled, and petroleum production is 20 times what it was then. As a result, China could within the next few years hope to produce enough fuel to keep its 2,900-plane air force flying for a change. In fact, Western intelligence sources claim that Red China's planes have been much more active in train ing flights over the past six months, indicating that fuel production has already increased considerably.

China has also received an economic boost from the West—through trade. Business between Red China and the non-Communist world rose 30% last year and now comprises more than half of China's total trade. Despite 14 years of U.S. objections, many of Washington's allies are serving Mao's purposes as suppliers and customers. Canada leads the imports list with $155 million in China trade, while Hong Kong and Malaysia took the largest amount of Chinese exports ($340 million). Japan, the object of much Chinese wooing over the past few years, bought $146 million worth of goods from Peking last year, while exporting $143 million to China. France, Britain, West Germany, Australia and Argentina also ranked high in trade with Peking.

Help from Puritans. This recovery from the Great Leap has emboldened Mao to draw up another Five Year Plan (after a three-year lapse) due to begin next year. But Mao knows that the greatest internal danger to his economy is population growth. Each year the Chinese increase in number by roughly 12 million—the equivalent of the population of Taiwan. To cut back on this score, China is once again advocating birth control, and early marriages are frowned upon. Couples who marry too early, in the Party's opinion, are likely to find themselves working hundreds of miles apart. Chinese "puritanism" helps too: boys and girls sleep in segregated dormitories, and block wardens keep a sharp eye out for hanky-panky in hallways or back alleys.

For all his slowly healing economy, Mao is hell-bent on developing a costly nuclear-strike capability. As Marshal Chen Yi once put it: "We'll build atomic bombs, no matter what—even if the job makes it necessary for us to go about without wearing pants." Last week Washington called a second Chinese bomb test imminent, and although the State Department remarked that the second bomb "would appear as of now to have no more military significance than the first," the Chinese might very-well drop the next bomb from a TU4 bomber rather than explode it on a test tower. That would give Mao a great psychological boost in the eyes of already intimidated Asians, hinting at the threat of Chinese delivery capacity.

All this aids Peking's most powerful weapon—subversion. The central agency for foreign subversion is the Party's United Front Work Department. Divided into internal and external, political, economic and military sections, U.F.W.D. seeks to win the favor of nonCommunist nationalists abroad, organizes innumerable friendship associations and cultural societies. As a rule, Peking avoids blatant takeovers of national movements, prefers to give them financial and arms support and help agitate against "imperialist" rule.

Being relatively new to the subversion game, Mao's men frequently make mistakes and are caught in embarrassing situations. In Burundi this month, a high-handed, totally undiplomatic Chinese embassy was expelled lock, stock and barrel, thus depriving Peking of its most important Central African base. But closer to home, China has done well, thanks to a small, skillful group of tirelessly traveling diplomats, headed by Premier Chou En-lai and his substantial shadow, Foreign Minister Chen Yi.

The Hatchet Man. Chen's personality is ideally suited to Peking's purpose: mercurial, cultured, tough, he can referee a pingpong match between Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah and Chou at Accra, dance with Mrs. Sukarno or talk "NEFOS" and "OLDEFOS" (New Emerging and Old Established Forces) with Mr. Sukarno in Djakarta. In Katmandu some years ago, he flew into a top-popping rage at an Indian reporter who was needling him about Tibet. Another time he delighted Japanese businessmen by mimicking Nikita Khrushchev—Chen's girth made him good casting for the part—growing Red-faced as he repeated Nikita's crack that China was "a mass of human flesh and nothing else." A U.S. reporter once buttonholed Chen and asked him whether China intended to recognize the U.S. Chen's answer: a jolly "No!"

In a sense, Chen Yi, 64, is an outsider who made it into the ranks of Red China's leadership by dint of energy and courage. The hard-core Chinese leaders—Mao, Premier Chou Enlai, President Liu Shao-chi, Marshal Chu Teh—all took part in the Long March, Mao's epic retreat from the Nationalist Armies in 1934. Chen stayed behind, south of the Yangtze River, hence never acquired that special patina of heroism of the Long Marchers. Chen was left behind for good cause: in the early 1930s, he supported an anti-Mao faction in Kiangsi province, and although Chen shrewdly changed horses later, Mao took a long time to forgive him.

As Mao's Kuai-tsu-shou (hatchet man), the rehabilitated Chen quelled a revolt in which hundreds died; during World War II he led Mao's Fourth Army across the Yangtze, later won several major victories in the Civil War, and in 1949 emerged—thanks to Mao —as the "conqueror" of East China. His tough, agile infantrymen chewed up dozens of Nationalist divisions. But for all his military success, Chen was afflicted with what the Chinese Communists call "liberalism"—a certain in ability to adapt to Mao's hard-boiled personal asceticism. Chen prefers Western suits to the stern, closed-collar pajamas affected by Mao, Chou and Liu, plays go (a Japanese game of strategy) like an expert—though one Japanese master found him "too hasty." In Shanghai some years ago, Chen's friendliness with Chekiang Opera Star Yuan Hsueh-feng was the talk of the Bund. He once said: "Without women, a guerrilla unit has no soul."

Like Mao, Chen is a poet, but his verses tend less toward ideology than his master's. In Geneva during the 1961-62 Laos peace talks, he wrote:

With the waters of the Rhone as my pillow
And facing the mountains of France,
Under the delectably cold moonlight
I forget my long trip.

The Options. Against this complex enemy, what are the U.S. choices? Despite Charles de Gaulle's belief that the U.S. and China are a pair of rigid giants locked in relentless struggle, the actions available are both multiple and mutable:

∙U.S. WITHDRAWAL from South Viet Nam would of course leave all of mainland Indo-China within Peking's reach. The U.S. might fall back on Thailand and still make quite a stand there, together with the plucky Thais and backed by U.S. offshore power. But this would depend on Thailand's willingness to bet its existence on U.S. determination and skill. After a U.S. retreat from South Viet Nam, not many would care to make such a bet. In short, withdrawal would largely destroy American credibility as a reliable anti-Communist ally—in Bangkok, in Seoul, in Manila and elsewhere. It would push Cambodia and Indonesia completely into China's lap. Malaysia would catch the brunt of this power realignment, thus forcing the British into a narrow, nasty corner. According to many experts, Russia would regret this move as much as the U.S., since it would immensely strengthen Peking's pretensions to the leadership of world Communism.

∙NEGOTIATED NEUTRALIZATION would only delay the effects of complete withdrawal. Right now, what is there to negotiate? The U.S. would have to insist on a non-Communist South Viet Nam. and this probably could be obtained only by 1) a foolproof international control, which is almost impossible to achieve; and 2) exclusion of the Communists from future South Vietnamese government, since "coalitions" including Reds usually end up all Red. But at present neither the Viet Cong nor their mentors in Hanoi or Peking have any reason to accept such terms. Thus any neutralization formula now possible would sooner or later deliver the Indo-Chinese peninsula to Communist domination.

∙TIT-FOR-TAT RESPONSE against North Vietnamese Communist nations and staging areas might inhibit both the Viet Cong and Hanoi to some extent. But essentially the policy of hitting North Viet Nam whenever the Viet Cone get too nasty leaves the initiative to the Communists and might at best maintain a shaky status quo. By itself it certainly could not change the course of the guerrilla war in the South sufficiently to send the U.S. into negotiations with a real, strong hand. Some of the top-ranking U.S. military commanders in Asia think it is high time the U.S. engaged in a little "tit-tit-tit for tat."

∙MEASURED RESPONSE aimed at hurting the North Vietnamese enough to keep them from supporting the Communist guerrillas in the South might show important results. This would necessitate more U.S. raids over the 17th parallel, launched 1) at will and not merely in retaliation; 2) at major targets, though perhaps still short of Hanoi. Such attacks would make sense only if coupled with hard, tough fighting against the Viet Cong. This might demand something close to the 10-1 troop ratio with which Britain beat the Reds in Malaya, hence additional U.S. ground forces in South Viet Nam. Judging by available intelligence, China is unlikely to join battle if U.S. troops enter South Viet Nam in force, though the North Vietnamese well-trained, 225,000-man army might. U.S. air and naval power could interdict the entry routes effectively enough to bloody the North Vietnamese army's nose, and the threat of bombing Hanoi—and the country's hard-won industrial complex along with it—might possibly keep the North Vietnamese out.

∙ATTACKING NORTH VIET NAM by bombing all major targets, including Hanoi, plus possibly sending in U.S. ground forces, would probably bring in the Chinese, if only for face reasons, and would probably also draw at least greatly stepped-up help from Soviet Russia. Nevertheless, some U.S. military men feel that the U.S. would be in a far better position than it was in Korea to fight successfully in North Viet Nam, and they favor such a course as the only one that would hurt the Communists badly enough to make, them accept an international deal the U.S. could tolerate.

∙BOMBING CHINA and its fledgling nuclear-production centers sounds tempting to some but is not now advocated by serious policymakers or experts. Whatever may be said in favor of "getting the war with China over now," before Peking achieves an effective nuclear-retaliatory force, such preventive war goes too heavily against American morals. Besides, Russia probably could not tolerate such a move despite its differences with Peking, and total war could result.
A Question of Patience. Letting go —either with all its force or through withdrawal—is clearly not the answer to America's Asian dilemma. No one relishes the risks involved in the var ious options available to the U.S. But to maintain its position in Southeast Asia, and ultimately perhaps in all Asia, the U.S. may sooner or later have to take the risk of war with China—care ful and calculated but still a risk. The U.S. held on to West Berlin and ejected Soviet missiles from Cuba only by a calculated risk of war with the Soviet Union. Short of an all-out nuclear holocaust, which would level American cities, China after all stands to lose much more from a war than the U.S. So long as the U.S. creates the impression that it will do anything in Southeast Asia short of facing the real enemy—either militarily or diplomatically—China can simply sit back and wait.

For 15 years the principal U.S. stand toward China has been not to recognize its Red regime. While there is no reason to change that stand at present, nonrecognition is no substitute for a policy. Since Korea, the U.S. in fact has developed not a China policy but a China mythology. One side of the myth holds that China is remorseless, implacable, omnipresent and possessed of warriors who love nothing better than to die in "human sea" at tacks. The other side holds that, like Russia and the satellites with whom the West has learned to live, Chinese Communists will in time grow softer, more reasonable. They may, although European Communism, superimposed on viable economies and workable political structures, is vastly different from the Asian variety. What is at stake in Asia is an undeveloped, politically shapeless region full of people who deserve better than the absence of chrysanthemums. 

The West certainly cannot impose capitalism or democracy on Asia with the air of a crusader. But it can work toward building free economies and free societies, even if socialist concessions have to be made. Malaysia and Thailand represent viable, hopeful alternatives to Tibet and Burma. In the meantime, the U.S. must hang on—and then hang on some more—in Southeast Asia. The operative word is patience, and essentially, patience is an Asian word.
^{* The Kang is a raised, brick bed under which a fire is lighted to warm peasant homes; homey murals bedeck the surrounding walls.}